Foster v. Ward
| Docket Number | 5:23-CV-143-TES-CHW |
| Decision Date | 22 August 2023 |
| Parties | JOHN M FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER TIMOTHY C WARD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the Court's previous orders and instructions, pro se Plaintiff John M. Foster, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Washington State Prison in Davisboro, Georgia, has filed his Recast Complaint (ECF No. 10) and paid the required initial partial filing fee. Plaintiff's claims are now ripe for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's claims that Defendants Taylor, Deputy Warden Ward, and Jackson failed to provide him with adequate medical treatment and his claims that Deputy Warden Ward and Jackson retaliated against him shall proceed for further factual development. It is RECOMMENDED, however, that Plaintiff's remaining claims be DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) obligates the district courts to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Screening is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when the plaintiff is proceeding IFP. Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. When conducting preliminary screening, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkins v Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are “‘held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.'” Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1160 (citation omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it “‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.'” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on “‘indisputably meritless legal'” theories and “‘claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.'” Id. (citation omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “‘merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
In his Recast Complaint, Plaintiff primarily contends that he did not receive proper medical care at Washington State Prison (“WSP”). Recast Compl. 6, ECF No. 10. These allegations could give rise to claims that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). “To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.” Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243. A plaintiff must first “set forth evidence of an objectively serious medical need” and must also “prove that the prison official acted with an attitude of ‘deliberate indifference' to that serious medical need.” Id. In other words, prison officials must both “know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner.” Dunn v. Martin, 178 Fed.Appx. 876, 877 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). For purposes of this analysis, a “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243 (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Taylor, Deputy Warden Ward, and Jackson shall proceed for further factual development, but Plaintiff's remaining claims concerning his medical treatment should be dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff is 69 years old and suffers from severe arthritis and an unspecified injury to his left shoulder. Recast Compl. 5-6, ECF No. 10. Despite these injuries, Defendants Taylor, Ward, and Jackson “refused” to assign Plaintiff to a bottom bunk when he arrived at WSP on November 2, 2021. Id. at 6.[1]Instead, these Defendants assigned Plaintiff to a ceiling bunk into which he had difficulty climbing, particularly while he was recovering from a hernia surgery on November 16, 2021. Id. Plaintiff contends he filed several grievances concerning this assignment, and Defendant Deputy Warden Ward ultimately moved Plaintiff to a floor bunk on January 26, 2022. Id. The floor bunk was also inappropriate for Plaintiff's condition, however, because Plaintiff had to get onto his hands and knees and crawl into and out of the floor bunk due to his “severe arthritis and advanced age.” Id. at 8. This caused Plaintiff to suffer from bleeding and swollen knees and significant pain. Id. Plaintiff remained in the floor bunk until June 21, 2022. Id. at 11. Plaintiff further alleges that he suffers from high blood pressure which has caused him to be “‘dizzy' most of the time now,” and he alleges he is “almost blind in [his] right eye . . . but still cannot get treatment” despite being seen by Defendant Taylor multiple times. Id. at 6, 11.
Plaintiff's allegations that he is suffering from severe arthritis and elevated blood pressure, both of which are causing him significant symptoms, can be considered serious medical needs at this early stage. See Carter v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 710 Fed.Appx. 387, 391 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (); Leonard v. Dep't of Corrs. Fla., 232 Fed.Appx. 892, 894 n.3 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) ().[2]Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants Taylor, Deputy Warden Ward, and Jackson refused to provide him with an appropriate bunk and that Defendant Taylor saw him several times for his blood pressure “but nothing was done.” Recast Compl. 7, 9, ECF No. 10. The Court therefore cannot say that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims are entirely frivolous at this stage, and they shall proceed for further factual development against these Defendants.
Plaintiff also asserts that Correct Care, presumably the entity contracted to provide health care to prisoners at WSP, should be held responsible for its failure to ensure Plaintiff had adequate medical treatment. A private contractor who operates a prison service can be held liable under § 1983 only if the alleged constitutional deprivation occurred as a direct result of the contractor's official policies or customs. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129-30 (11th Cir. 1992)); see also Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (). To state a claim against Correct Care, Plaintiff must therefore show that his constitutional rights were violated; that Correct Care had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to those constitutional rights; and that the policy directly caused the violation. See, e.g., Denham v. Corizon Health, 675 Fed.Appx. 935, 940-41 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
As noted above, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that he did not receive adequate medical treatment in violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff also alleges that Correct Care had a “no treatment” policy and that this policy is responsible for over 200 deaths at WSP. Recast Compl. 8, ECF No. 10 (); id. at 13 (...
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