Foster v. Whitley

Decision Date09 May 1990
PartiesMichael David FOSTER v. Garry WHITLEY. Civ. 7427.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

John F. Porter III of Livingston, Porter & Paulk, Scottsboro, for appellant.

W.W. Haralson, Scottsboro, for appellee.

RUSSELL, Judge.

This is an appeal from a finding of paternity entered in a divorce action.

Kimberly Ann Foster (mother) and Michael David Foster (husband) were married November 2, 1985. On May 17, 1986, some six and one-half months after the marriage, a child, Jessie Danielle Foster, was born.

In July of 1987, both parties filed for divorce, seeking custody of Jessie. On August 28, 1987, Garry Whitley filed a petition to intervene, claiming to be the natural father of Jessie. The trial court granted the petition and ordered blood tests of all parties on the authority of Finkenbinder v. Burton, 452 So.2d 880 (Ala.Civ.App.1984), which holds that a putative father has the right to intervene in a divorce action to establish his paternity of a child.

On February 21, 1989, a hearing was conducted on the question of paternity, and on March 16, 1989, the court issued an order finding that Whitley is the biological father of Jessie. However, following another hearing in August 1989, the trial court granted primary custody to the husband.

The husband appeals the finding that Whitley is the father of Jessie. We reverse.

The dispositive issue is whether Whitley has standing under the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), §§ 26-17-1 through -21, Ala.Code 1975 (1986 Repl.Vol.), to commence proceedings to have himself declared the natural father of Jessie.

We must first consider that the UPA provides for the right to intervene to establish paternity for all actions commencing after May 7, 1984, and, therefore, as to that issue, supersedes Finkenbinder and is controlling here.

Section 26-17-5(a) of the UPA describes who may be considered a presumed father and states in pertinent part:

"(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:

"(1) He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation is entered by a court;

"....

"(4) While the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home or otherwise openly holds out the child as his natural child;"

Section 26-17-6(a)-(c) addresses who may bring an action to determine the father and child relationship and provides in pertinent part:

"(b) Any interested party may bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or non-existence of the father and child relationship presumed under subdivision (4) or (5) of section 26-17-5(a)."

We note that a similar question was addressed in Ex parte Presse, 554 So.2d 406 (Ala.1989), wherein the supreme court declared the dispositive issue to be as follows:

"Does a man claiming to be the father of a child conceived and born during the marriage of its mother to another man have standing under the UPA to initiate an action to establish that he is the father of the child, where the presumed father persists in the presumption that he is the father? Under the facts of this case, we answer this first impression issue in the negative...."

Id. at 411 (emphasis supplied).

The court further addressed the question by stating:

"This is not permitted under the UPA, as long as there is a presumed father, pursuant to § 26-17-5(a)(1), who has not disclaimed his status as the child's father; consequently, another man, though he later marries the mother and lives with the mother and child, has no standing to challenge the presumed paternity of that child. Put another way, so long as the presumed father persists in maintaining his paternal status, not even the subsequent marriage of the child's mother to another man can create...

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  • Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Privette
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 8 d4 Abril d4 1993
    ...P.2d 710 (Utah 1990); Monroe v. Monroe, 88 Md.App. 132, 594 A.2d 577, cert. granted, 325 Md. 18, 599 A.2d 90 (1991); Foster v. Whitley, 564 So.2d 990 (Ala.Civ.App.1990); In re Marriage of Klebs, 196 Ill.App.3d 472, 143 Ill.Dec. 363, 554 N.E.2d 298 (1990); In re Marriage of Ross, 13 Kan.App.......
  • JWO v. CAP
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 15 d5 Março d5 1996
    ...has previously considered the AUPA presumption in a case involving a child conceived prior to the mother's marriage. Foster v. Whitley, 564 So.2d 990 (Ala. Civ.App.1990). The law clearly states that the husband is presumed to be the natural father of a child born to his wife during their ma......
  • Z.W.E. v. L.B.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 7 d5 Fevereiro d5 2020
    ...the word 'birth' as the benchmark for establishing presumptions of paternity, not the time of conception. See also Foster v. Whitley, 564 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990), in which Whitley sought to intervene in a divorce proceeding, claiming to be the father of a minor child of the marriag......
  • Cravens v. Cravens
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 9 d5 Setembro d5 2005
    ...the husband is the presumed father under that section.'" Ex parte C.A.P., 683 So.2d 1010, 1012 (Ala.1996)(quoting Foster v. Whitley, 564 So.2d 990, 991 (Ala.Civ.App.1990)). 3. "`When a party without standing purports to commence an action, the trial court acquires no subject-matter jurisdic......
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