Fouch v. Bates

• Decision Date: 27 June 1910
• Citation: 110 P. 265,18 Idaho 374
• Parties: FRANK R. FOUCH, Respondent, v. M. A. BATES and PARMA STATE BANK, LTD., Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

110 P. 265

18 Idaho 374

FRANK R. FOUCH, Respondent, v. M. A. BATES and PARMA STATE BANK, LTD., Appellants

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 27, 1910

MOTION TO STRIKE-ACTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND TO QUIET TITLE-PLEADINGS-ISSUES MADE BY-ANSWER-ADMISSIONS IN - FINDINGS OF FACT-SUFFICIENCY OF-JUDGMENT.

(Syllabus by the court.)

1. Under the provisions of subd. 2, sec. 4556, Rev. Codes, all bills of exceptions settled and filed prior to the rendition of judgment become a part of the judgment-roll, and on an appeal from the judgment, under the provisions of sec. 4818 Rev. Codes, become a part of the transcript. However, where a bill of exceptions is a part of the judgment-roll and not relied upon on the appeal, it may be omitted from the transcript by stipulation of counsel, but will not be stricken from the transcript on motion of respondent.

2. There is no necessity for findings upon immaterial issues nor upon facts alleged in the complaint and admitted by the answer.

3. Findings should be of ultimate facts and not of probative facts; but a finding of probative facts is sufficient if the required ultimate fact necessarily results from the probative facts.

4. Held, that a return of a deed by the grantor to the grantee under the facts of this case, leaves the legal title to the real estate described in the deed in the grantor.

5. Held, that the issues tendered by the allegations of the complaint and not denied by the answer in connection with the findings of fact made by the court are sufficient to sustain the judgment.

6. Held, that the description of the real estate in the judgment or decree, required to be conveyed by the defendant to the plaintiff, is sufficient.

7. Findings must be liberally construed in support of the judgment.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Canyon County. Hon. Ed. L. Bryan, Judge.

Action for an accounting and to quiet title. Judgment for the plaintiff. Affirmed.

Judgment sustained. Costs awarded to the respondent.

Griffiths & Griffiths, and Martin & Martin, for Appellants.

"A judgment must be supported by the verdict or findings in the case, and a judgment which goes beyond the verdict is erroneous." (11 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 904, par. 10; Richards v. Scott, 7 Idaho 726, 65 P. 433; Butte Electric Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 34 Mont. 487, 87 P. 460; Bowman v. Ayres, 2 Idaho 305, 13 P. 346; Wuchumna Water Co. v. Ragle, 148 Cal. 759, 84 P 162; Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah 87, 95 Am. St. 815, 69 P. 465, 60 L. R. A. 294; Village of Hailey v. Riley, 14 Idaho 481, 95 P. 686, 17 L. R. A., N. S., 86; Leggat v. Blomberg, 15 Idaho 496, 98 P. 723; Ponting v. Isaman, 7 Idaho 581, 65 P. 434.)

The court must find upon all the material issues in the case, and if it fails to do so, the judgment must be reversed. ( Standley v. Flint, 10 Idaho 629, 79 P. 815; Sandstrom v. Smith, 12 Idaho 446, 86 P. 416; Brown v. Macey, 13 Idaho 451, 90 P. 339; Later v. Haywood, 14 Idaho 45, 93 P. 374; Leggat v. Blomberg, 15 Idaho 496, 98 P. 723; Wood v. Broderson, 12 Idaho 190, 85 P. 490.)

A judgment must be specific and certain and such that the defendant may readily understand, and be capable of performing. (Alexander v. Leland, 1 Idaho 425; 2 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 933; 23 Cyc. 671, and cases cited.)

The findings of fact upon which the judgment is based must be sufficiently comprehensive, certain and consistent to sustain the judgment, and justify it as a matter of law, and cannot be aided by the evidence. (23 Cyc. 822; 8 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 941.)

Where the finding of facts is contradictory and uncertain, and the intention of the court cannot be ascertained therefrom, the judgment will be reversed. (Frederickson v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 15 Idaho 41, 96 P. 117; Whalen v. Stuart, 194 N.Y. 495, 87 N.E. 819.)

Rice, Thompson & Buckner, and Smith & Scatterday, for Respondent.

Findings should be reconciled and harmonized whenever possible, and should not be declared contradictory except where absolutely necessary. (Schultz v. McLane, 93 Cal. 329, 28 P. 1053; Jacks v. Este, 139 Cal. 507, 73 P. 247; Heaton-Hobson etc. v. Arper, 145 Cal. 285, 78 P. 721.)

When the facts admitted in the pleadings and findings of fact made by the court sustain the judgment, the judgment will not be set aside because the findings alone do not sustain the judgment. (Bank v. Lake View Town Co., 4 Cal.App. 630, 89 P. 360.)

Findings are not necessary when the facts are admitted or denied in the pleadings. (Fox v. Fox, 25 Cal. 588; Burnett v. Stearns, 33 Cal. 468; Gruhn v. Stanley, 92 Cal. 86, 28 P. 56; Walker v. Brem, 67 Cal. 599, 8 P. 320; Taylor v. Central P. R. Co., 67 Cal. 615, 8 P. 436; Miller v. Luco, 80 Cal. 257, 22 P. 195.)

The redelivery of a deed by a grantee to the grantor, even with the intention to reinvest the grantor with title, does not reconvey any title to the grantor. (Zoerb v. Paetz, 137 Wis. 59, 117 N.W. 793; Slaughter v. Bernards, 97 Wis. 184, 72 N.W. 977; Walker v. Renfro, 26 Tex. 142; Bailey v. Campbell, 82 Ala. 342, 2 So. 646; Jeffers v. Philo, 35 Ohio St. 173; Cranmer v. Porter, 41 Cal. 462; Potter v. Adams, 125 Mo. 118, 46 Am. St. 478, 28 S.W. 490; Hyne v. Osborne, 62 Mich. 235, 28 N.W. 821; 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 164, and cases there cited; Miser Gold Min. & Mill. Co. v. Moody, 37 Colo. 310, 86 P. 335.)

SULLIVAN, C. J. Ailshie, J., concurs.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, C. J.

This action was brought for an accounting and to quiet title to certain real estate described in the complaint. After alleging the corporate existence of the Parma State Bank, the complaint alleges that on or about the 31st of August, 1895 the plaintiff conveyed to the defendant Bates, in trust, certain real estate (describing it as per government survey), excepting a tract thereof alleged to have been conveyed to one James B. Mansell, comprising about one acre; also excepting a part of said land conveyed to the Oregon Short Line Railway Co. comprising about one acre; that at the time the said property was so conveyed to the defendant Bates, it was encumbered by a mortgage to the state of Idaho as security for the payment of the sum of $ 2,000; that in the month of October, 1899, the said Bates and his wife executed and delivered to the plaintiff a deed reconveying to him said real estate and thereby terminated said trust; that in the month of February, 1900, the plaintiff returned said last-mentioned deed to the defendant Bates, under and by virtue of an oral agreement to the effect that said defendant Bates should sell portions of the property and the purchase price obtained therefor should be applied on the mortgage debt above referred to, and after said mortgage should have become liquidated, the purchase price of the remaining portions of said property to be so sold by the said Bates was to be divided, two-fifths to Bates and three-fifths to the plaintiff; that on the 20th of February, 1900, the said Bates platted a portion of said land as lots and blocks of the town of Parma, Canyon county; that said Bates filed said plat with the county recorder of said county; that on or about the 26th of January, 1901, said Bates platted another portion of said land as lots and blocks of the said town of Parma and filed said plat with the county recorder; that numerous lots of said real estate so platted were sold under said agreement by said Bates and the proceeds were applied to the payment of said mortgage debt until the mortgage debt was reduced to the sum of $ 250; that in the month of June, 1903, said Bates and the plaintiff made an oral agreement in regard to the division of the proceeds of the sale of the then remaining portion of said real estate after said mortgage debt encumbering said property should become liquidated; that after said debt should be liquidated, it was agreed that the remaining portion of said land sold by Bates was to be divided equally, one-half received therefor was to be paid to plaintiff and Bates was to retain the other half; that under said agreement Bates paid said mortgage debt and paid to plaintiff the sum of $ 1,100 out of the proceeds of the sale of certain portions of said real estate; that since the last-mentioned agreement the defendant Bates has sold other portions of said real estate, the amount of such sales being unknown to the plaintiff and the proceeds of which have been retained by the said Bates and no account of same has been made by him to the plaintiff; that there has been sold by said defendant to various and sundry purchasers certain lots (describing them) of the land so platted; that on the 12th day of November, 1904, the said Bates and his wife executed a deed to the Parma State Bank, one of the defendants, to secure the payment of $ 4,341.30, and conveyed by said deed a considerable portion of said real estate (describing a part of it by legal subdivisions and a part by lots and blocks); that upon the receipt of said deed by said bank, it executed to said Bates a contract to reconvey the said property upon certain conditions set forth in such agreement, which contract was attached to and made a part of the complaint; that since the execution of said contract said bank has conveyed to divers purchasers portions of said property (describing it by lots and blocks); that the sum of $ 4,341.30, for the payment of which said property was transferred to the bank, is the debt of the defendant Bates and no part of it the debt of the plaintiff; that the amount still due the plaintiff from the proceeds of the sale of portions of said real estate by Bates under said agreement cannot be stated by plaintiff without an accounting between Bates and the plaintiff; and the prayer is that an accounting be had and that the plaintiff have judgment against Bates for the amount found due; that ...