Fountain v. State
Citation | 107 A. 554,135 Md. 77 |
Decision Date | 17 July 1919 |
Docket Number | 39. |
Parties | FOUNTAIN v. STATE. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Talbot County; Wm. H. Adkins and Lewin W Wickes, Judges.
Isaiah Fountain was convicted of rape, and he appeals. Reversed, and new trial awarded.
Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON, and URNER, JJ.
Eugene O'Dunne, of Baltimore (James C. Mullikin, of Easton, on the brief), for appellant.
Ogle Marbury, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Albert C. Ritchie, Atty. Gen (Charles J. Butler, State's Atty., of Easton, on the brief), for the State.
In the course of the trial of the appellant for rape, in the circuit court for Talbot county, he filed a motion for a postponement of the trial on the ground that it could not be fair and impartial under the conditions then existing. The motion alleged and offered to prove, in substance and effect, that when the court adjourned at 10 o'clock at night on the first day of the trial about 2,000 persons were assembled on the courthouse grounds, on which the county jail was also located, and while the appellant was being taken from the courthouse to the jail through the crowd a determined effort accompanied by personal violence inflicted upon him, was made to take him from the custody of the officers of the law and lynch him, this purpose being openly declared by members of the crowd, some of whom were armed with various weapons and provided with ropes; that the officers attempted to hold the crowd at bay with their pistols as it surged upon the porch of the jail while the appellant was pushed through the outer door of the building, and that, prompted by his fear and the immediate danger of lynching, he took advantage of an opportunity to escape in the dark through an open window, and was not retaken until two days later; that the fact of his escape was announced by the court to the jury as a reason for the suspension of the trial until his recapture; and that a reward of $5,000 was offered by the court for the rearrest of the appellant and his safe return to the courtroom. It was at the time of the resumption of the trial on the morning after the recapture of the accused that his motion just referred to was filed. In addition to the allegations already summarized the motion averred that the defendant, "by reason of the interruption of the orderly procedure of the administration of justice due to mob violence actually perpetrated upon him while in the custody of the law and in the actual trial of his case (from which mob violence he attempted to escape by flight because of insufficient protection of law), finds himself so prejudiced in the further progress of said case as to be utterly and hopelessly unable to receive a fair and impartial trial by any further action in the present so-called trial and proceeding; and that the same amounts to a denial of due process of law, to a denial of all constitutional guaranty of a fair and impartial trial, or to the constitutional right of a jury trial." It was further alleged that the defendant was confronted with the alternative of "being prejudiced before the jury by the announcement made to the jury, by the court, that the defendant had made his escape from the authorities during the progress of the trial, from which the inference of guilt as a cause for flight may be drawn by the jury," or of "rebutting said presumption by proof of flight from mob violence perpetrated upon him in the courthouse grounds within five minutes of the adjournment of court and while the jury was still in the box," but that "by adopting the latter course he becomes prejudiced in the trial of said case by injecting into the minds of the jury the intensity of the feeling of the populace surrounding the courthouse to such an extent that the jury itself becomes thereby intimidated and unable fully and freely to do its duty in the premises, as it may see it, solely from the standpoint of the law and the evidence given under oath in open court."
The application of the defendant for a stay of the proceedings was refused, and the trial was continued, resulting in his conviction and a sentence of death.
The record contains a certificate of the trial court, signed at the instance of the defendant's counsel, as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Golden
... ... a fair and impartial trial at that time. Art. 2, Sec. 22, Mo ... Constitution; 14th Amend., U.S. Constitution; 22 C.J.S., sec ... 497; Seay v. State, 93 So. 403, 207 Ala. 453; ... McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 205 S.W. 915, 181 Ky. 766; ... Fountain v. State, 107 A. 554, 135 Md. 77, 5 A.L.R ... 908; State v. Rasor, 167 S.E. 396, 168 S.C. 221, 66 ... A.L.R. 1237; Mickle v. State, 213 S.W. 665, 85 Tex ... Cr. 560; 16 C.J., p. 484, note 25; 22 C.J.S., sec. 482, pp ... 741, 742; State v. Taylor, 8 S.W.2d 29; 16 C.J., p ... 484, ... ...
-
State v. Newsome
...there, also, the appellant's counsel asked for a bill of exceptions to the court's refusal to suppress the demonstration. Fountain v. State, 135 Md. 77, 107 A. 554, 5 A. R. 908, presents a case of attempted domination by a mob, but the questions reviewed arose upon the refusal of the trial ......
-
Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State
...This kind of prejudice is actually intensified by efforts of this court to combat it after the event. Cf. Dutton v. State, supra; Fountain v. State, supra; Lee v. State, supra, 163 Md. 56; Jones v. State, supra. Reversals on such 'technicalities' as denial of due process, and consequent new......
-
Ware v. State
...used were contrary to law. 2 Blackstone, Com. (3 ed., by Cooley), p. 325. See 154 U.S. 34-45; 162 Id. 566; 121 Ark. 220-226; 37 S.E. 627; 107 A. 554; 132 Cal. 631; 100 N.Y.S. 126; 69 S.W. 536; Id. 1093; 85 P. 63. 6. The court erred in instructions 9 and 10 for the State, and the giving of N......