Fountainbleau, LLC v. Hire US, Inc.
Decision Date | 07 June 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2D18-4068 |
Citation | 273 So.3d 1152 |
Parties | FOUNTAINBLEAU, LLC, a South Carolina limited liability company and Noam Pyade, individually, Petitioners, v. HIRE US, INC., a Florida limited liability company and Aero Diversified Services, Inc., a Florida profit corporation, Respondents. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nicholas A. Brown, Jaret Fuente, and Jeffrey A. Cohen of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioners.
Tyler S. Wolas of Wolas Law Group, PLLC, Largo, for Respondents.
Fountainbleau, LLC, and Noam Pyade, defendants in a lawsuit filed by Hire Us, Inc., and Aero Diversified Services, Inc., seek certiorari review of an order declining to rule on pending motions, including a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and instead sua sponte ordering the parties to arbitrate the motion to dismiss as well as the merits of the lawsuit. Fountainbleau and Mr. Pyade contend that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by exercising jurisdiction over the parties—ordering them to arbitration—without first determining whether it had personal jurisdiction over Fountainbleau, a South Carolina corporation, and Mr. Pyade, a South Carolina resident. We grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the order on review.
As relevant to the resolution of the petition before us, Hire Us and Aero Diversified (together, Hire Us) filed a second-amended complaint against Fountainbleau and Mr. Pyade (together, Fountainbleau) for breach of oral contract, fraudulent inducement, and unjust enrichment. Contemporaneously, Hire Us served interrogatories and a request for production on Fountainbleau. Fountainbleau immediately filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.061 and 1.140, arguing forum non conveniens and lack of personal jurisdiction as required pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2018). Affidavits from Mr. Pyade individually and as the owner and registered agent of Fountainbleau were attached. Fountainbleau also filed a motion to stay merits discovery until the pending jurisdictional challenge was resolved. Fountainbleau's motion to dismiss was set for hearing, and Hire Us filed a motion to continue the hearing until the discovery-related motion to stay was heard. Ultimately, the motion to dismiss and motion to continue were heard together.
At the hearing, after listening to argument from the parties, the court stated, "I'm taking both motions under advisement and I'm setting [the case] for arbitration." In response to Fountainbleau's objection to the court's decision, the court stated: The court then confirmed that the arbitration was to address the merits of the case, the jurisdictional issues, and attorneys' fees. On further objection by Fountainbleau, the court reiterated that the arbitrator would decide the jurisdictional challenge as well as the merits of the lawsuit. The September 14, 2018, order rendered by the court comports with the ruling orally pronounced, referring "the entire action to arbitration, including [the] pending motion to dismiss asserting a lack of personal jurisdiction," directing "that the parties themselves" appear in person "at all future hearings," and "otherwise tak[ing] under advisement" the pending motion to dismiss.
Fountainbleau timely filed this petition seeking certiorari review of the order or otherwise requesting appropriate relief. As an initial matter, we conclude that a petition for writ of certiorari is the appropriate mechanism for review. Although the trial court's order requires the parties to attend arbitration, it is not an order determining the "entitlement" of a party to arbitration such that it would be a nonfinal appealable order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv). See Ebbitt v. Terminix Int'l Co. Ltd. P'ship, 792 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ; cf. Avatar Props., Inc. v. Greetham, 27 So. 3d 764, 765 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ( ).1 Similarly, the order is not an appealable nonfinal order determining the court's jurisdiction over Fountainbleau because the order specifically refers the issue of jurisdiction to the arbitrator and otherwise takes the issue "under advisement." See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) ; Frier v. Frier, 13 So. 3d 145, 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (); cf. Blogwire Hungary Szellemi AlkotástHasznosító v. Bollea, 162 So. 3d 1116, 1117 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) () ; Sprint Corp. v. Telimagine, Inc., 923 So. 2d 525, 527-28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ().
"Before a court may grant certiorari relief ... the petitioner must establish the following three elements: ‘(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.’ " Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004) ). The latter two elements are jurisdictional, id., and certiorari jurisdiction is established "where an ‘order implicates a violation of the parties' constitutional rights which cannot be remedied on plenary review,’ " Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc., 264 So. 3d 304, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (quoting Rodriguez ex rel. Posso-Rodriguez v. Feinstein, 734 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) ). That there exists a mechanism for correcting the error via postjudgment appeal is not determinative of this court's jurisdiction; "rather, the remedy must alleviate the harm that results from the error." Id. at 311 (quoting Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 170 So. 3d 125, 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ).
Here, the trial court has been asked to determine whether the complaint against a South Carolina corporation and a South Carolina resident alleges sufficient facts to comply with the due process and other constitutional considerations set forth in Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989). The material injury which cannot be corrected on plenary review is the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over Fountainbleau by requiring Fountainbleau to appear and participate in arbitration where the court has not yet determined its jurisdiction over Fountainbleau. If orders deferring consideration of motions to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction in favor of ordering the entire action to arbitration—including jurisdictional determinations—are not subject to certiorari review, due process rights and rights afforded by section 48.193 are illusory and the policy inherent in subjecting nonresidents to Florida courts' jurisdiction becomes meaningless. See Gundel, 264 So. 3d at 311 (quoting Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359, 365-66 (Fla. 2012) ); cf. Kauffman v. King, 89 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 1956) ( ).
Having determined that we have certiorari jurisdiction, we next consider whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it ordered the parties to arbitrate the case without first determining whether personal jurisdiction over Fountainbleau has been established.
"Personal jurisdiction refers to whether the actions of an individual or business entity as set forth in the applicable statutes permit the court to exercise jurisdiction in a lawsuit brought against the individual or business entity in this state." Borden v. E.-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006). And personal jurisdiction is "necessary before a defendant, either an individual or business entity, may be compelled to answer a claim brought in a court of law." Id. Section 48.193, Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute, "defines the parameters by which a trial court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a party who is not a Florida resident." Youssef v. Zaitouni, 241 So. 3d 901, 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). A court's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction outside of the limited circumstances set forth in section 48.193 is a departure from the essential requirements of law. See Kauffman, 89 So. 2d at 26 (); Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Trapeo, 136 So. 3d 670, 676 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) .
Courts of this state "simply cannot subvert the statutory requirements or the due process interests that they implicate." Youssef, 241 So. 3d at 903. Those due process interests limit "the State's adjudication authority[,] principally...
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