Four Hundred Andcans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States of America

• Citation: 226 U.S. 172,33 S.Ct. 50,57 L.Ed. 174
• Decision Date: 02 December 1912
• Docket Number: FORTY-THREE,No. 590,590
• Parties: FOUR HUNDRED ANDCANS OF FROZEN EGG PRODUCT, H. J. Keith Company, Claimant, Appt and Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
• Court: United States Supreme Court

226 U.S. 172

33 S.Ct. 50

57 L.Ed. 174

FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY-THREE CANS OF FROZEN EGG PRODUCT, H. J. Keith Company, Claimant, Appt and Plff. in Err.,

v UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

No. 590.

Argued October 24 and 25, 1912.

Decided December 2, 1912.

Mr. Ralph S. Rounds for appellant and plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 172-175 intentionally omitted] Assistant Attorney General Adkins and Mr. Louis G. Bissell for appellee and defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 175-177 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

This case is here on both writ of error to and appeal from a decree of the circuit court of appeals for the third circuit, reversing the judgment of the United States district court for the district of New Jersey, dismissing a libel brought by the United States which had for its object the condemnation of 443 cans of frozen egg product seized under the pure food act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 768, chap. 3915, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1354).

The United States filed its libel alleging that 443 cans of frozen egg product, in the possession of the Merchants' Refrigerating Company at Jersey City, New Jersey, consisted in whole or in part of a 'filthy, decomposed, and putrid animal, to wit, egg substance,' and praying for their condemnation. At the trial the issues were narrowed so as to exclude filthy and putrid substances, leaving the charge to stand as to decomposed substance. Three hundred and forty-two cans were seized. The H. J. Keith Company appeared and claimed the goods, denying the charges concerning them. The case was tried without a jury, to the district judge, who entered a decree dismissing the libel. The United States took an appeal to the circuit court of appeals, and, after consideration in that court, the decree dismissing the libel was reversed, and, upon the facts, a decree of condemnation in favor of the government was entered. (113 C. C. A. 457, 193 Fed. 589.) The claimant, the H. J. Keith Company, thereupon appealed to this court, and also sued out this writ of error to the same decree.

We are met at the outset with a question of jurisdiction. Section 10 of the pure food act provides:

'That any article of food . . . that is adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of this act, and is being transported from one state . . . to another for sale, . . . shall be liable to be proceeded against in any district court of the United States within the district where the same is found, and seized for confiscation by a process of libel for condemnation. . . . The proceedings of such libel cases shall conform, as near as may be, to the proceedings in admiralty, except that either party may demand trial by jury of any issue of fact joined in any such case, and all such proceedings shall be at the suit of and in the name of the United States.'

It will be observed that the last sentence of the section provides that 'the proceedings of such libel cases shall conform, as near as may be, to the proceedings in admiralty, except that either party may demand trial by jury of any issue of fact joined in any such case, and all such proceedings shall be at the suit of and in the name of the United States.' The contention of the government upon this question of jurisdiction is, that the words, 'conform, as near as may be, to the proceedings in admiralty,' mean, except in cases where jury trial is demanded, to include appellate proceedings, as well as original proceedings in the district court, and therefore the review of the judgments of the district court would be by appeal to the circuit court of appeals, as in admiralty cases under the circuit court of appeals act (26 Stat. at L. 826, chap. 517, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 488), and under the Judicial Code (36 Stat. at L. 1087, 1133, sec. 128, chap. 231, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, pp. 128, 193). If that is a proper construction of the statute, then the circuit court of appeals had the right to review the case upon the facts and enter a final decree, which, under the circuit court of appeals act and Judicial Code, would be reviewable here only upon writ of certiorari.

The appellant, also plaintiff in error, contends that the seizure being upon land, the proceeding was at law, and reviewable only upon writ of error in the circuit court of appeals; that the attempted appeal did not give the circuit court of appeals jurisdiction, and that upon the writ of error here this court should reverse the judgment and remand the case to that court, with directions to dismiss the appeal.

The determination of this controversy requires some examination of previous legislation, and of the decisions of this court, interpreting such legislation, as to the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States in seizure cases.

The judiciary act of 1789 (1 Stat. at L. 76, § 9, chap. 20) gave to the district courts:

'Exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within in their respective districts as well as upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it; and . . . also have exclusive original cognizance of all seizures on land, or other waters than as aforesaid, made, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United States.'

In the case of The Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391, 5 L. ed. 644, a libel was filled against 422 casks of wine, alleging a forfeiture by false entry. It appearing in the course of the trial that the seizure was made on land, it was held that his court could not review the case save upon writ of error. Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the court, said (p. 394):

'By the act constituting the judicial system of the United States, the district courts are courts both of common law and admiralty jurisdiction. In the trial of all cases of seizure on land, the court sits as a court of common law. In cases of seizure made on waters navigable by vessels of 10 tons burthen and upwards, the court sits as a court of admiralty. In all cases at common law, the trial must be by jury. In cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it has been settled, in the cases of United States v. La Vengeance (reported in 3 Dall. 297, 1 L. ed. 610), United States v. The Sally (in 2 Cranch, 406, 2 L. ed. 320), and United States v. The Betsy (in 4 Cranch, 443, 2 L. ed. 673), that the trial is to be by the court.

'Although the two jurisdictions are vested in the same tribunal, they are as distinct from each other as if they were vested in different tribunals; and can no more be blended than a court of chancery with a court of common law.'

A statute, practically the same, with some slight changes, was embodied in § 563 of the Revised Statutes subdivision 8 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 457), giving the district courts jurisdiction 'of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . and of all seizures on land and on waters not within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' the subdivision mentioned omitting the provision found in the section of the judiciary act of 1789, to which we have referred, as to seizures 'within their respective districts,' and including cases of 'eizures on land and on waters not within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.' Under this statute it has been uniformly held that the district court, as to seizures on land, proceeds as a court of common law, with trial by jury, and not as a court of admiralty. United States v. Winchester, 99 U. S. 372, 25 L. ed. 479.

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