Fouste v. Department of Employment

• Citation: 540 P.2d 1341,97 Idaho 162
• Decision Date: 07 October 1975
• Docket Number: No. 11835,11835
• Parties: Loretta S. FOUSTE, Claimant-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Page 1341

540 P.2d 1341

97 Idaho 162

Loretta S. FOUSTE, Claimant-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 11835.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Oct. 7, 1975.

Loretta S. Fouste, pro se.

R. LaVar Marsha, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, for defendant-respondent.

McQUADE, Chief Justice.

Claimant-appellant, Loretta S. Fouste, (hereinafter claimant) brings this appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission denying her claim for unemployment insurance benefits. We affirm the order of the Indurstrial Commission.

Claimant was employed as a machinist for Omark, an ammunition manufacturer, in Lewiston, Idaho, for nine years commencing April 14, 1965, and continuing until June 17, 1974, when she terminated her employment. Claimant resided in the Lewiston area during the entire period of her employment, with the exception of the last year when she moved to Starbuck, Washington. This move necessitated a daily round trip to work of approximately 100 miles. Claimant ended her employment with Omark on June 17, 1974, giving as a reason for leaving the job, the long distance she was required to drive to and from work. At the time she left Omark she had no other job prospects.

On July 8, 1974, claimant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with defendant-respondent, Idaho Department of employment (hereinafter Department). Shortly thereafter she left on a trip which the record indicates was a vacation and job-seeking excursion. Her travels took her to the cities Portland, Seattle, Spokane and the State of Montana. While she was away from home, claimant's mail was picked up by friends but was not forwarded to her.

On July 24, 1974, a determination was issued by the Department declaring claimant ineligible for benefits and mailed to her at her home in Starbuck, Washington, the very same day. The reason given for this adverse determination was that claimant had not established good cause for leaving her employment. The determination stated that if an appeal was not taken within 14 days from the date of mailing or from the date of personal delivery, the determination would become final. Claimant had not returned from her trip by the time the determination denying her claim was mailed to her home. The record discloses that claimant did not advise the local employment office she would be out of the area prior to her departure, nor did claimant leave a forwarding address where she could be contacted.

Claimant filed a request for redetermination on September 11, 1974, after she arrived at home and found the letter from the Department denying her claim. An order was issued on September 20, 1974, wherein the Department ruled that the redetermination examiner was without authority to rule on claimant's request because the determination issued July 24, 1974, was not protested within the 14-day statutory time limit after mailing. Claimant next appealed the redetermination ruling to the appeals examiner of the Department. The appeals examiner upheld the redetermination ruling. Claimant then appealed to the Industrial Commission for review. The Industrial Commission affirmed the decision of the appeals examiner and ordered claimant's appeal be dismissed. The Industrial Commission ruled that pursuant to I.C. § 72-1368, claimant's request for a redetermination was not timely filed and that therefore the appeals examiner was without jurisdiction to review the merits of her case. Claimant appeals from the order of the Industrial Commission.

In her sole assignment of error, claimant argues first that I.C. § 72-1368(c) ¹ and (e) ² violate the Social Security Act because these statutory provisions are not reasonably calculated to insure payment of unemployment compensation 'when due', and second, that the appeals procedure set forth in I.C. § 72-1368(c) and (e) deprive a claimant of the hearing that the Supreme Court of the United States has found to be necessary in order for a state to be in compliance with the Social Security Act. Claimant places primary reliance upon the case of California Department of Human Resources v. Java ³ to substantiate her position. For reasons which will appear hereafter, we do not agree with claimant's assertions.

The relevant section of the Social Security Act which claimant maintains Idaho law does not comply with is 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1). This section provides in pertinent part that a state program for administering unemployment compensation must:

'. . . be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation when due;'

before the Secretary of Labor may make certification for payment of federal funds. This section was first construed by the United States Supreme Court in the case of California Department of Human Resources v. Java, where the Court said:

'. . . 'when due' was intended to mean at the earliest stage of unemployment that such (unemployment compensation benefit) payments were administratively feasible after giving both the worker and the employer an opportunity to be heard.' ⁴

In Java a challenge was brought against a California statute which suspended the payment of unemployment compensation benefits to a claimant when an employer appealed from an initial determination of eligibility. ⁵ The United States Supreme Court concluded that this California provision was violative of 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1). In so holding, the Court reasoned as follows:

'We conclude that the word 'due' in § 303(a)(1) (42 U.S.C. § 503 (a)(1)) when construed in light of the purposes of the Act means the time when payments are first administratively allowed as a result of a hearing of which both parties have notice and are permitted to present their respective positions; any other construction would fail to meet the objective of early substitute compensation during unemployment. Paying compensation to an unemployed worker promptly after an initial determination of eligibility accomplishes the congressional purposes of avoiding resort to welfare and stabilizing consumer demands; delaying compensation until months have elapsed defeats these purposes. It seems clear therefore that the California procedure, which suspends payments for a median period of seven weeks pending appeal, after an initial determination of eligibility has been made, is not 'reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation when due. '' (Emphasis added.) ⁶

We do not believe that the Java case, although heavily relied upon by claimant, supports her position. The Java case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this appeal, and therefore inapposite. In Java, a party whose claim for benefits was initially approved was faced with the prospect under California law of being deprived of payments for a period of several weeks, pending her employer's appeal from this determination of eligibility. Claimant Fouste faces no such prospect. She has never been determined to be eligible for benefits. Thus there is no question of not being paid promptly for benefits that have been found to be due.

Idaho's scheme for administering its unemployment compensation system conforms in all respects with the letter and spirit of 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1). There is no provision in the Idaho Code which delays the prompt payment of benefits after an initial determination of eligibility is made. Nor is there a provision which suspends or withholds the payment of benefits pending an appeal by the employer after an initial determination of eligibility is made.

On the contrary I.C. § 72-1368(j) provides:

(j)(1) Benefits shall be paid promptly in accordance with a determination, redetermination, appeals examiner decision or board findings allowing such benefit rights, regardless of:

(a) The pendency of a time period for requesting a redetermination, filing an appeal or petitioning for board review, or

(b) Pendency of a request for determination, appeal, or petition for review.

(2) Such payments shall not be withheld until a subsequent redetermination, appeals examiner decision, or board findings modifies or reverses the previous decision, in which event benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with such decision.' (Emphasis added).

The statutory provisions claimant attacks do not deny payment of benefits 'when due' as this phrase was construed by the United States Supreme Court in Java. These provisions simply establish the procedures for filing a claim for umemployment compensation benefits and for appealing an adverse determination. They do not unlawfully impede or delay the prompt payment of benefits which have been determined by a claims examiner to be due, so as to be violative of the 'when due' provision of the Social Security Act.

Claimant next contends she has been denied the hearing that the United States Supreme Court has found necessary (presumably in Java) before a state's unemployment compensation system will be found to conform with the Social Security Act. Claimant argues that the initial filing of a claim does not meet the requirements of a hearing, and that this defect is not cured at the redetermination or appeal level in those cases where a claimant has failed to file a timely appeal. We cannot agree with this contention.

In Java, the United States Supreme Court found no infirmity with the California procedure for evaluating eligibility claims:

'Although the eligibility interview is informal and does not contemplate taking evidence in the traditional judicial sense, it has adversary characteristics and the minimum obligation of an employer is to inform the interviewer and the claimant of any disqualifying factors. So informed, the interviewer can direct the initial inquiry to identifying a frivolous or dilatory contention by either party.' ⁷

This procedure is essentially equivalent to that followed in this state, and we find it to be valid. It affords a claimant the kind of a hearing she is entitled to at the initial eligibility stage.

Nor can we conclude that claimant...