Fowel v. Cont'l Life Ins. Co., 554.

• Citation: 55 A.2d 205
• Decision Date: 20 October 1947
• Docket Number: No. 554.,554.
• Parties: FOWEL v. CONTINENTAL LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

55 A.2d 205

FOWEL

v.CONTINENTAL LIFE INS. CO.

No. 554.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Oct. 20, 1947.

Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division.

Action by Continental Life Insurance Company, landlord, against Redge Fowel, tenant, to recover possession of store occupied by tenant under a five-year lease which had expired. From a judgment for landlord, the tenant appeals.

Affirmed.

Mark P. Friedlander, of Washington, D. C. (Leroy A. Brill, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.

William H. MacDonald, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.

CLAGETT, Associate Judge.

Appellee as landlord sued appellant as tenant for possession of a store in the Investment Building used by the tenant as a flower shop under a five-year lease which had expired. The trial court, sitting without a jury, gave judgment for the landlord and the tenant appeals.

The tenant defended the action upon two principal grounds: first, that at the time of obtaining the five-year written lease in 1942 he had been promised an option for a five-year extension of such lease and in reliance upon such promise had made large expenditures upon the premises; and, second, that the suit had not been authorized by the landlord. The tenant assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to find that he was entitled to the five-year extension of his lease; the finding that the suit had been authorized; the exclusion of testimony as to the reasons why the action was brought; the exclusion of a copy of the five-year lease which was in the tenant's possession; and, finally, the refusal by the trial court to permit cross-examination of two of the landlord's witnesses regarding the sobriety of the president of plaintiff corporation when testifying at the trial.

The lease was negotiated between the tenant and a representative of a real estate company, which, the evidence showed, had managed the office building for many years, but such lease was signed by the president of the owning corporation. The tenant testified that when the lease was negotiated he had sought a ten or twelve year lease but had been told by the representative of the real estate company that he could obtain only a five-year lease at that time but would be given an option to extend for an additional five years and that the lease as signed by him contained such option; also that when he discovered shortly before the expiration of the lease that the copy in his possession contained no reference to the option his wife had discussed the matter with the president of the insurance company and had been assured an extension would be given. His wife testified to the same effect as to the latter point. The representative of the real estate company who had negotiated the lease denied he had ever promised a five-year extension, and the president of the insurance company also denied he had made such promise. The original lease, signed by the president of the owning corporation and the tenant himself, was received in evidence. It contained no reference to an extension or option to extend. The issue of fact as to whether there had been a promise of an extension was resolved against the tenant by the finding of the trial court and, of course, may not be disturbed on appeal.

The tenant's contention that the action was not authorized by the insurance company is based upon the fact that although the complaint was filed in the name of that company it was signed by a vice president of the real estate company; also upon testimony by tenant's wife that the president of the insurance company had told her on several occasions that he approved of her husband as a tenant and hoped the real estate company would extend the lease. Conceding that the president of a corporation may authorize litigation in its behalf, the tenant urges that the president may not delegate such authority to another without prior approval of his board of directors and that such approval had not been given.

The principle invoked by the tenant, how ever, has no application to the facts of this case. D.C.Code 1940, § 11-735, applying to such actions, provides that the complaint may be verified by the plaintiff or ‘by his agent or attorney, having knowledge of the facts.' ¹ The president of the insurance company testified that he had personally authorized the filing of the action. The evidence was undisputed that the real estate company was the agent of the insurance company in the management of the building. Thus the only act performed by the agent was the signing of the complaint. While, in general, the president of a corporation may not, unless authorized, delegate to a subagent functions involving the exercise of discretion, it is fundamental that he may delegate the doing of mere ministerial acts. ² The testimony showed that the Investment Building includes about 500 rooms, and it seems obvious that the president of the insurance company which owned the building could not be expected personally to pass upon what tenants were to occupy each of said rooms. Under the circumstances, therefore, there was ample evidence to support the trial...