Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc., 77-1179

• Decision Date: 15 June 1979
• Docket Number: No. 77-1179,77-1179
• Citation: 596 F.2d 1276
• Parties: 19 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1701, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,023 Marlon Louis FOWLER, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BLUE BELL, INC., a corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1276

596 F.2d 1276

19 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1701,

20 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,023

Marlon Louis FOWLER, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BLUE BELL, INC., a corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 77-1179.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 15, 1979.

William H. Ng, Atty., E.E.O.C., Washington, D. C., amicus curiae.

Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Charles A. Powell, III, Birmingham, Ala., W. T. Cranfill, Jr., Whiteford S. Blakeney, Charlotte, N. C., Richard Moore Warren, Secretary & Gen. Counsel, Blue Bell, Inc., Greensboro, N. C., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before THORNBERRY, GODBOLD and HILL, Circuit Judges.

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:

This is a Title VII case. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant after finding that laches barred plaintiff's claim. Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc. 14 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1009 (N.D.Ala.1976). We reverse.

Plaintiff Fowler applied for a job with defendant Blue Bell, Inc. in March and again in November, 1970. Defendant did not hire him. Fowler then filed a charge with the EEOC in December, 1970, alleging that Blue Bell had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e Et seq., by refusing to hire him because of his race. The EEOC notified Blue Bell of the charge in July, 1971, and served its Field Director's Findings of Fact on the company in December, 1971. Blue Bell entered exceptions to these findings, but in June, 1972, the EEOC informed Blue Bell that the exceptions were "non-meritorious." At the invitation of the EEOC, Blue Bell agreed to participate in settlement discussions. Fowler, however, refused to participate. In July, 1972, the EEOC's Birmingham district office informed Blue Bell that Fowler "declined the Director's invitation to engage in settlement discussions. Accordingly, this office is forwarding the full investigation file to the Commission for determination as to reasonable cause. As soon as the determination is made, you will be notified." One year after it received this letter, having heard nothing else from the EEOC or Fowler, Blue Bell concluded "that the entire matter had been closed administratively by the EEOC" and destroyed all records relevant to Fowler's claim. Affidavit of Richard M. Warren, General Counsel to Blue Bell, Inc. The EEOC had not terminated its consideration, however, and issued a determination of reasonable cause in March, 1975. After further correspondence between the EEOC and Blue Bell, the EEOC decided not to file a civil action itself. It informed both Fowler and Blue Bell of this decision and sent Fowler a Notice of Right-to-Sue in January, 1976. Fowler filed this suit in March, 1976, within 90 days of receiving the EEOC Notice.

In Bernard v. Gulf Oil, Inc., 596 F.2d 1249 (5 Cir. 1979), also decided today, we recognize that laches may apply to Title VII suits brought by private plaintiffs if the evidence indicates both that the plaintiff delayed inexcusably in bringing the suit and that this delay unduly prejudiced defendants. Id. at 1256. As in Bernard, we hold that the evidence before the court on this summary judgment does not allow a finding that either of these elements exists.

Blue Bell argues that this conclusion is improper. First, it asserts that after it presented affidavits in support of its summary judgment motion, Fowler had the duty of submitting contrary evidence in order to raise an issue of fact. Blue Bell argues that since its affidavits alleged delay and prejudice and Fowler failed to dispute these allegations the summary judgment was proper. This argument is without merit. Fowler does not dispute that more than five years lapsed between the filing of his charge with the EEOC and the commencement of this suit. Nor does he disagree with Blue Bell's contention that it has lost personnel and destroyed records that would be helpful in deciding Fowler's claim. Fowler's argument is that these facts do not permit a finding of laches in this case. Therefore, his failure to submit controverting evidence to the trial court is irrelevant.

Blue Bell also argues that the district court's ruling was correct on the merits. It asserts that Fowler delayed inexcusably because he could have initiated this suit 60 days after filing the EEOC charge rather than waiting for five years while the EEOC investigated the claim. Although the EEOC regulations in 1970 did allow the claimant to withdraw his charge from the EEOC and file a private suit 60 days after he filed the charge, 35 Fed.Reg. 10006 (June 18, 1970) (currently at 29 C.F.R. 1601.25b(c) (1977)), this provision did not require Fowler to file suit at that time. As we noted in Bernard, 596 F.2d at 1256, the legislatively and judicially favored method of resolving Title VII claims is through the EEOC administrative process. Therefore, we should not penalize a claimant for awaiting the end of that process. Blue Bell argues, however, that this analysis is not applicable to the present case because Fowler's refusal to participate in settlement negotiations in July, 1972, was an abandonment of the EEOC and proved that he no longer wished to rely on the normal administrative process. This conclusion is also incorrect. EEOC regulations provide that after the field director issues findings of fact, the EEOC may invite the parties to engage in settlement discussions. 35 Fed.Reg. 3163 (Feb. 19, 1970) ...