Fowler v. Eddy

• Citation: 110 Pa. 117,1 A. 789
• Decision Date: 05 October 1885
• Docket Number: 88
• Parties: Fowler v. Eddy
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

1 A. 789

110 Pa. 117

Fowler v. Eddy

No. 88

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 5, 1885

Argued May 11, 1885

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of McKean county: Of January Term 1885, No 88.

This was, in the court below, a certiorari, by Frank Fowler, to review the record of the Recorder of Bradford City, wherein judgment was entered against said Fowler and in favor of G W. Eddy, for $225.94.

The facts were substantially as follows: Eddy, who had leased certain premises to Fowler, distrained upon the goods of the latter, claiming $241.22 for rent in arrear. Fowler then caused a summons to be issued by the Recorder, who by Act of March 24th, 1877, was given jurisdiction of all causes of action to the amount of $400, that justices and aldermen have to the amount of $100, and who is subject to the same laws against Eddy so that Fowler's alleged account against Eddy might be defalcated against the rent as provided by the Act of March 20th, 1810, § 20, which reads as follows:

"That the power of justices of the peace shall extend to all cases of rent not exceeding one hundred dollars, so far as to compel the landlord to defalcate or set off the just account of the tenant out of the same, but the landlord may waive further proceedings before the justice and pursue the method of distress in the usual manner, for the balance so settled but if any landlord shall be convicted, after such waiver, in any court of record, of distraining for and selling more than the amount of such balance and of detaining the surplus in his hands, he shall forfeit to the tenant four times the amount of the sum detained. Provided, That no appeal shall lie in the case of rent, but the remedy by replevin shall remain as heretofore."

Upon the hearing, the Recorder adjudged the amount of rent due to be $225.94. Fowler then sued out a writ of replevin for the goods distrained and subsequently, on May 1st, 1884, Eddy caused an execution to issue against Fowler for the amount adjudged by the Recorder to be due. Fowler then took the writ of certiorari bringing into the Common Pleas the record of the Recorder to which he filed the following objections: --

1. That no judgment was rendered publicly by the Recorder of Bradford City, upon which an execution could legally issue.

2. That the said Recorder had no jurisdiction to enter a judgment and issue an execution in an action to defalcate, under the Act of 1810.

3. That the adjudication of the rent by said Recorder was not publicly done, after hearing the proofs and allegations of the parties, as required by Act of Assembly.

4. That said execution issued to A. H. Weaver, constable, after the service of a writ of replevin upon him and the defendant, G. W. Eddy, the goods replevied and the goods distrained, in the proceedings out of which the said action to defalcate arose, being the same.

The court, OLMSTED, P.J., overruled the foregoing objections and affirmed the proceedings of the Recorder. Fowler then took this writ assigning for error the action of the court in overruling the above objections and in affirming the proceedings of the Recorder.

Judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is reversed; the judgment of the Recorder and all subsequent proceedings thereon are reversed and set aside.

McClure (Mullin with him), for the plaintiff in error. -- The jurisdiction of justices is only such as is given by statute and should be strictly construed: Taylor v. Manderson, 1 Ash., 130; Herrigas v. McGill, 1 Ash., 152; Gould v. Crawford, 2 Barr, 89; Summeril v. Elder, 1 Binn., 106.

The twenty-second section of the Act of March 20th, 1810 increases the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in all cases of rent, to one hundred dollars, "so far as to compel the landlord to defalcate or set off the just account of the tenant out of the same." Thus far it is a re-enactment of the third section of the Act of March 1st, 1799, except as to amount. Then follow the words, "but the landlord may waive further proceedings before the justice, and pursue the method of distress in the usual manner for the balance so settled," and from this language the learned judge of the court below implies the power of the justice to enter a judgment and issue execution thereon. Why, if this power was intended by the legislature to be given to the justice, were the words "the balance so settled" used? Would not "the judgment so rendered" have been more natural? And why use the limiting words "so far," if it was intended that the justice should have the power, not only to settle the balance, id est, "to defalcate or set off the just account of the tenant" out of the landlord's claim for rent, but to...