Fowler v. Smithkline, 99-3804

Decision Date12 April 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-3804,99-3804
Parties(8th Cir. 2000) Virginia Fowler, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc., Defendant - Appellant. Submitted:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Virginia Fowler became a courier for SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories in 1993, picking up laboratory samples from, and delivering test results to, medical service providers in southeast Arkansas. Four years later, SmithKline told Fowler she could no longer use her own car and receive a mileage allowance. Instead, SmithKline would provide and maintain a company car. Fowler worked for eighteen months under the new arrangement and then quit. In the interim, she commenced this action for breach of contract and fraud, alleging that SmithKline had falsely promised she would receive a mileage allowance for as long as she worked for the company. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing Fowler's contract claim. After a trial, the court submitted her fraud claim to the jury, denied SmithKline's timely motions for judgment as a matter of law, and entered judgment on the jury verdict awarding Fowler $200,000 in compensatory and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. SmithKline appeals. Concluding that Fowler failed to offer sufficient evidence of fraud as a matter of law, we reverse.

We view the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000). In late 1992, SmithKline recruited Fowler, then a courier for rival National Health Laboratories. SmithKline hoped that, if Fowler changed employers, her clients would follow. Fowler was interested in joining SmithKline, but only if she could be an employee, rather than an independent contractor, and could use her own car and be paid a mileage allowance. Although most SmithKline employees drove company cars, field manager John Mayer agreed to Fowler's terms at a meeting in January 1993. Fowler started work in February 1993, and within a few months, Fowler's clients transferred their business from National Health to SmithKline.

After joining SmithKline, Fowler heard rumors that Mayer wanted to take away her car allowance, and she pressed him repeatedly for written confirmation of their initial understanding. Finally, in August 1995, Mayer sent Fowler a memorandum stating that she would be paid a mileage allowance for the use of her personal vehicle "for the duration of your employment with SmithKline." Despite this written assurance, Mayer sent Fowler a letter in February 1997 stating that, as of March 3, her car allowance would end and she must begin driving a company car.1 When Fowler told her immediate supervisor that this would result in a financially ruinous reduction. in Fowler's income, the supervisor replied, "I'm sorry if you don't like it. You have your option of quitting." Fowler began looking for other employment, but she continued working as a SmithKline courier until she resigned in September 1998.

Under Arkansas law, the elements of an action for fraud are "(1) a false representation of a material fact; (2) knowledge that the representation is false or that there is insufficient evidence upon which to make the representation; (3) intent to induce action or inaction in reliance upon the representation; (4) justifiable reliance on the representation; and (5) damage suffered as a result of the reliance." Goforth v. Smith, 991 S.W.2d 579, 586 (Ark. 1999). In this case, we conclude that Fowler's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law for at least two reasons.

First, Fowler failed to prove the second element of an action for fraud, knowledge that a material misrepresentation was false when made. The alleged misrepresentation was Mayer's January 1993 assurance that Fowler would be paid a mileage allowance for use of her own vehicle for the duration of her employment as a SmithKline courier.2 Fowler's fraud theory is that Mayer offered Fowler the mileage allowance planning to take it away after that offer persuaded her to become a SmithKline courier. The obvious problem with the theory is that Mayer kept his word for over four years, paying Fowler a mileage allowance until March 1997. As direct evidence of Mayer's alleged deceit, Fowler relies on the testimony of Michael Hickey, a SmithKline area business manager who discussed the possible hiring of Fowler with John Mayer prior to Mayer's January 1993 meeting with Fowler:

Q. Were you involved in that decision [to hire Fowler]?

A. No. Actually, it was pretty much John [Mayer]'s decision as to whether we could do it or not. One of the complicating factors was the fact that she owned her own vehicle, and . . . . actually owed more for her car than I think it was worth.

* * * * *

Q. So was the proposal that she continue in that car?

A. The proposal to John was, which was obviously adverse to existing SmithKline policy, was that we pay her mileage until such time as she had her car paid off.

Q. All right. Did John run this proposal by you?

A. Actually, I ran it by him, and then he was the one that made the decision on whether we could do it or not.

* * * * *

Q. Was there any discussion with John about how long this arrangement would be in place?

A. Actually, when John and I talked, it was to be in place until Virginia's car was paid off.

Q. Do you know when that was going to be?

A. I can't remember. I don't remember whether it was a few months, a year. I can't remember how long it was.

Q. All right. And what was the plan for when the car was paid off?

A. Then she would become just like the rest of the...

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    ...verdict, we affirm in part and reverse in part the jury verdict on the various fraud claims. See Fowler v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 225 F.3d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir.2000) (standard of I. Factual Background Dennis Damrow ("Damrow") and his brother and father began operating DCC a......
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    ...evidence, the circumstances must be so strong and well connected as to clearly show fraud.” Fowler v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 225 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Allred v. Demuth, 319 Ark. 62, 890 S.W.2d 578, 580 (1994)). This case turns on whether Razorback produce......
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    ...justifiable reliance on the representation; and (5) damage suffered as a result of the reliance. Fowler v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc., 225 F.3d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Goforth v. Smith, 991 S.W.2d 579, 586 (Ark. 1999). Defendants argue that Plaintiff's fraud c......

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