Fowler v. State

• Decision Date: 08 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 40302,40302
• Citation: 255 So.2d 513
• Parties: Jerry Dwayne FOWLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 513

255 So.2d 513

Jerry Dwayne FOWLER, Appellant, v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 40302.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 8, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

This is a direct appeal from a verdict and judgment convicting appellantJerry Dwayne Fowler of the crime of murder in the first degree (Fla.Stat. § 782.04(1), F.S.A.) without a recommendation of mercy by the jury.Jurisdiction over the appeal attached under Fla.Const. Article V, § 4(2), F.S.A.

Initially, we are concerned with the contention of appellant that the Court below committed error in finding the defendant competent to stand trial.In this regard appellant is primarily concerned with the failure of the court to hold a formal sanity hearing as required by CrPR1.210(a), 33 F.S.A. and former Fla.Stat. § 917.01, F.S.A. ¹ prior to ruling on the issue of competency.

A study of the record reveals that defense counsel, by 'Motion for Appointment of Expert Witnesses' dated December 30, 1969, requested, inter alia, a hearing under CrPR 1.210(a).

On February 6, 1970, the court responded to this motion by appointing Drs. Spoto and Frierson, recognized experts in the field of psychiatry, to examine defendant with a view to rendering opinions both as to defendant's sanity at the time the offense was committed, and as to his competency to stand trial.Both doctors submitted formal written reports concluding that defendant was a dangerous paranoid schizophrenic, that he probably did not know right from wrong at the time he committed the offense, and that he was Not competent to stand trial.

At this juncture the State, contending that a serious issue with regard to defendant's sanity had been raised, moved for the appointment of a third expert, Dr. O'Brien.This motion was granted by the Court.It appears from the record that Dr. O'Brien in fact examined defendant two times, both times rendering the opinion that although defendant was a dangerous paranoid schizophrenic, he was nevertheless competent to stand trial.Dr. O'Brien also recommended that defendant undergo psychological testing under the supervision of Dr. Hicks.The recommended testing was administered pursuant to order of the Court, and Dr. Hicks submitted a formal evaluation of the results.Dr. Hicks did not state an opinion as to defendant's competency to stand trial.

On June 16, 1970, with the above-described reports before it, the Court entered an order in the presence of counsel for both sides finding defendant competent to stand trial.No formal hearing prior to entry of such order is disclosed by the record.

We conclude that the ruling of the trial judge that defendant was competent to stand trial was not an abuse of discretion in and of itself.The reports of the doctors were conflicting on this crucial point, and it was and is the function of the trial Court to resolve such factual disputes.Brock v. State, 69 So.2d 344(Fla.1954).

However, we must inquire whether the failure of the trial judge to hold a plenary hearing on the question of competency prior to ruling on the issue was an abuse of discretion sufficient to infect the whole of the pre-trial proceedings with regard to competency.In the circumstances, we think it was.

CriminalRule 1.210(a), recites, in pertinent part:

'If before or during trial the court, of its own motion, or upon motion of counsel for the defendant, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is insane, the court Shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's mental condition.'(Emphasis supplied)

In construing this rule, we attach prime significance to the words 'shall' and 'immediately'.The mandatory verb 'shall' makes it obligatory on the court to fix a time for a hearing if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is insane.Brock v. State, Supra.Moreover, the mandatory 'shall' is followed by the word 'immediately' which lends urgency and significance to the duty of the judge to conduct the required hearing.The framers of the rule (which tracks the language of former Fla.Stat. § 917.01, F.S.A.) obviously did not regard lightly the necessity for a hearing.

In the case sub judice, defense counsel moved for a hearing under the rule.Thereupon, the trial Court appointed two psychiatrists to examine defendant.Both concluded that he was insane both at the time the offense was committed and on the dates of the examinations.Both felt he was incapable of aiding or assisting counsel in the preparation of his defense.These two reports clearly constituted reasonable grounds to believe defendant insane, and should have alerted the trial judge to set a hearing date.His failure to do so was error.Accordingly, we are not confronted with the question of whether or not reasonable grounds to believe defendant insane existed at the time the motion for a hearing was made by defense counsel.

Our decision on this issue is not to be construed as making the hearing requirement non-waivable, even in situations where reasonable grounds to believe...