Fowler v. Uezzell, 10475

• Decision Date: 10 July 1972
• Docket Number: No. 10475,10475
• Citation: 500 P.2d 852,94 Idaho 951
• Parties: Wesley F. FOWLER and Juanita Fowler, husband and wife, et al., Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, and Respondents, v. Leona M. UEZZELL, Defendant, Counter-Claimant and Appellant, and Fred C. Farmer, Defendant and Counter-Claimant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 852

500 P.2d 852

94 Idaho 951

Wesley F. FOWLER and Juanita Fowler, husband and wife, et al., Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, and Respondents, v. Leona M. UEZZELL, Defendant, Counter-Claimant and Appellant, and Fred C. Farmer, Defendant and Counter-Claimant.

No. 10475.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

July 10, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 1972.

James Annest, Burley, for appellant.

Rayborn, Rayborn, Webb & Pike, Twin Falls, for respondents.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This appeal results from an action by plaintiffs-respondents seeking rescission of a lease for farming ground and for damages, all on the grounds of fraud and deceit. Following trial to a jury and a verdict, judgment was entered thereon for plaintiffs-lessees, rescinding the lease and awarding damages. Defendant-appellant Uezzell appeals therefrom. We affirm.

Wesley and Juanita Fowler are the principal parties involved and, unless otherwise noted, they alone will be considered as 'plaintiffs.' Plaintiffs moved to Idaho in 1966. Shortly after their arrival they entered into discussions with the defendants regarding the rental of the property herein involved. The property is a tract of farming land, located near Murtaugh, Idaho, which is owned by Defendant Uezzell. Defendant Farmer was agent and manager of the land for Defendant Uezzell. During the discussions leading up to the lease, Wesley Fowler, together with the defendant Farmer, inspected the house and discussed the layout, grade, irrigation ditches and other characteristics of the farm. Thereafter the plaintiffs entered into a three year lease of the property with an option to purchase. The rental therefor was $8,000 per annum with the power bill for the pumping of irrigation water to be divided equally between plaintiffs and Defendant Uezzell.

Plaintiffs moved onto the property in May of 1966 and crops were planted. It soon became apparent that there was a water shortage for irrigation purposes. Plaintiffs complained to Defendant Farmer about the water shortage and it is alleged that Farmer reassured plaintiffs that sufficient water would soon be forthcoming. During the first growing season sufficient water was not available and plaintiffs' crops suffered from lack of water. During that first growing season, upon plaintiffs' complaint to Farmer, Farmer promised that he would guarantee more water for the second season and that in the interim plaintiffs need only pay one-half of the rental otherwise due for the first growing season.

Approximately one year later, in the middle of the second growing season, plaintiffs filed the present action for rescission of the lease and for damages. Various counterclaims were filed by defendants, however, such are not at issue in this appeal. The central issue at the trial and here is the alleged lack of irrigation water and whether the statements of Farmer during the preliminary lease negotiations regarding available and abundant water for the farm amounted to fraud and deceit.

Defendant-appellant Uezzell contends that plaintiffs failed to prove all of the essential elements of fraud which are:

'(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted on by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on its truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his consequent and proximate injury.' See: King v. McNeel, 94 Idaho 444, 489 P.2d 1324 (1971); Gillingham v. Stadler, 93 Idaho 874, 477 P.2d 497 (1970); Walker v. Nunnenkamp, 84 Idaho 485, 373 P.2d 559 (1962).

We note at the outset:

'* * * where a jury's verdict is supported by substantial and competent though conflicting evidence, a judgment based thereon cannot be set aside on appeal. (citations omitted) And on appeal, evidence must be viewed most favorably toward respondent and against appellant.' Cahill v. Logue, 93 Idaho 533, 537, 466 P.2d 573, 577 (1970).

We need then only examine the evidence to determine if there was and is substantial and competent evidence to support the finding of the jury.

There was ample evidence that a representation was made by Farmer that there was ample and even more than ample water for proper irrigation. The evidence also supports a finding that such representation was false. Plaintiffs testified to the lack of water and several other nearby farmers also testified that the failure of the crops was due to lack of water. It is undisputed that the representation was material since proper crops cannot be raised on the land in question without sufficient irrigation water. Shrives v. Talbot, 88 Idaho 209, 217, 398 P.2d 448 (1965). Farmer had farmed or managed the property in question for many years, and therefore there is evidence of Farmer's knowledge of the falsity of his representations. The representations were made in the place, time and manner for the purpose of inducing plaintiffs to enter into the lease, and therefore it is clear that Farmer intended plaintiffs to rely upon his representations. It is abundantly clear that plaintiffs were ignorant of the falsity of the representations made by Farmer. Damages resulting from the false representations of Farmer and the plaintiffs' reliance upon such representations are clearly shown by the evidence.

Defendant-appellant further contends that the plaintiffs have not shown that plaintiffs had a right to rely upon the representations of Farmer and points to certain evidence which she suggests indicates that they did not in fact rely upon the representations of Farmer. Defendant stresses certain language in the contract of lease, wherein it is stated that 'lessees acknowledge and agree that they have examined said premises; that they know the boundaries and acreages thereof * * *.' Defendant suggests that such language proves independent investigation by plaintiffs and the fact that plaintiffs acted on their own judgment. Such is not the case. The language refers to a physical examination of the topography and borders of the property. It is obvious that certain factors such as water supply, particularly at the time of the investigation in early spring, could not be determined. The record is replete with testimony by the plaintiffs that they relied upon Farmer's unique knowledge of the available water supply. The fact that plaintiffs investigated the capacity of the pumps by checking with the installer of the pumps does not militate against plaintiffs' position. Such an investigation merely indicated what volume of water could be pumped, assuming the existence of water. No showing has been made that plaintiffs knew or should have known of the existence or nonexistence of available water in the wells.

Defendant next contends that plaintiffs 'waived' any right to sue for fraudulent misrepresentation by remaining on the property during the first summer growing season and through the following winter. We note, however, that the evidence, although controverted, indicates that Farmer continued to make representations of adequate water and induced plaintiffs to remain on the property past the first growing season by representing that he would deepen the wells or otherwise increase the water supply during the coming year. Plaintiffs were further induced to remain upon the property by the reduction in rent for the first growing season. Plaintiffs' action in attempting to salvage as much value as possible from the crops already planted during the first growing season could plainly be construed as an attempt to mitigate their damages. Of this defendants cannot complain.

Defendant Uezzell next contends that the evidence did not show that Defendant Farmer was her agent and that she was not to be bound by any representations made by Farmer. The evidence, however, unequivocally brands Farmer as the agent of the Defendant Uezzell and the representations were within the scope of his agency. Defendant argues that her position is sustained by the case of King v. McNeel, Inc., 94 Idaho 44, 489 P.2d 1324 (1971). King v. McNeel is clearly limited to real estate agents. In the present case Farmer was not a real estate agent but an agricultural agent and manager for Defendant Uezzell and therefore his actions and representations were binding upon Uezzell.

Defendant Uezzell next contends that certain instructions of the trial court relating to the liability of a principal for acts of an agent were not broad enough to cover the issues in the present case. As heretofore noted defendant's...