Fowler v. United States

• Citation: 258 F. Supp. 638
• Decision Date: 21 September 1966
• Docket Number: No. 66-1469.,66-1469.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: William V. FOWLER, State Chairman of the California Committee Called the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America and its Officials, State of California and its Officials, Attorney General Lynch, Los Angeles County Sheriff Peter Pitchess, Defendants.

258 F. Supp. 638

William V. FOWLER, State Chairman of the California Committee Called the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America and its Officials, State of California and its Officials, Attorney General Lynch, Los Angeles County Sheriff Peter Pitchess, Defendants.

No. 66-1469.

United States District Court C. D. California.

September 21, 1966.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William V. Fowler, in pro. per.

Manuel L. Real, United States Atty., Frederick M. Brosio, Jr., Richard J. Dauber, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants United States and its officials.

Miles J. Rubin, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., State of California, S. Clark Moore, James Kline, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants State of California and its officials and Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen. of California.

Irvin C. Taplin, Jr., Deputy Los Angeles County Counsel, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant Peter J. Pitchess, Sheriff of County of Los Angeles, California.

HAUK, District Judge.

Plaintiff, who identifies himself as "Rev. William B. Fowler, State Chairman of the California Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a California Committee", and "Chaplain in this Religious State Educational Committee", and "Honorary State Cyclops", has filed a complaint for $100,000 damages and for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction. As defendants he has named "United States of America and its Officials, State of California and its Officials", the Attorney General of the State of California, Thomas C. Lynch, and the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, Peter Pitchess. He seeks to enjoin the defendants, their agents, servants and employees and all persons acting under or in concert with them from blocking entry to or exit from private property, or in any manner whatsoever interfering with an alleged "right of peaceful assembly on private property". Plaintiff further seeks an injunction that the defendants employ sufficient law enforcement strength to "prevent any attempt by anyone to disrupt, disturb, or to interfere in any way with the right of peaceful assembly."

Upon plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause why preliminary injunction should not issue, this matter came on for hearing on September 13, 1966, was briefly argued by defendants after lengthy statements and testimony by plaintiff, and was then continued for further hearing to September 15, 1966, at which time plaintiff filed and served an amendment to the complaint, withdrawing his alleged claim for damages and limiting his action strictly to one for injunctive relief, further testified at great length and presented two exhibits. Defendant Sheriff Peter J. Pitchess submitted an affidavit and the matter was argued at length by defendants and plaintiff.

The Court having heard the arguments and having examined the evidence and proofs offered by the respective parties as aforesaid, and the cause having been argued and submitted to the Court for its decision, the Court now makes its decision, findings and conclusions denying plaintiff's application for temporary restraining order and order to show cause why preliminary order should not issue, and ordering judgment for the defendants.

The determination of this matter is dependent upon the facts before the Court and the conclusions of the Court upon two issues:

1. Must the Court empanel a three-judge court, or may the Court decide the matter as a single-judge court?

2. Has the plaintiff made sufficient showing to warrant the issuance of a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re preliminary injunction?

FACTS

Examination of all of the evidence and proofs presented, both oral and documentary, including the complaint and its amendment, all the other pleadings, plaintiff's sworn testimony, the two exhibits introduced by plaintiff and received in evidence by the Court, and the affidavit of Sheriff Peter J. Pitchess, the facts clearly and unequivocally show the following:

Plaintiff, Rev. William V. Fowler, as California State Chairman of a group whom he calls "The California Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a California Committee", and as "Chaplain in this Religious State Educational Committee", is planning to hold a meeting or rally on the night of Saturday, September 17, 1966, at 6:00 p. m., on land located at the corner of Soledad Canyon Road and Capra Road, consisting of some fourteen hundred (1,400) acres. According to the complaint and plaintiff's testimony in support of his application for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re preliminary injunction, this land, or at least the portion of it upon which plaintiff and his group desire to hold their meeting and rally, is owned by the United States of America and is administered by the United States Forest Service, a division of the United States Department of Agriculture. Plaintiff claims that because the meeting and rally is being organized and held by the Ku Klux Klan the defendants acting under color of legality and by various means are engaged in, are attempting to engage in, and are threatening to engage in, activities to harass, hinder, disrupt, disturb, and even prevent plaintiff and his group from holding a lawful meeting upon "private property".

While the land upon which the meeting is to be held is Government-owned land, plaintiff claims to have a sub-permit or sublease from one Gerald C. Broderson, who in turn holds a sub-permit or sublease from parties named Anton Lambert and Thomas P. Regis, who in turn are holders of a Special Use Permit from the United States Forest Service for orchard-growing purposes and uses.

Plaintiff does admit that this permission given to him by Broderson, under the sub-permit or sublease to use this orchard area on National Forest land for the September 17th Ku Klux Klan meeting and rally, was rescinded and revoked by Broderson on September 8, 1966, by a written revocation (Plaintiff's Exhibit One) sent from Broderson to plaintiff, returning the $1.00 which plaintiff had paid Broderson for the permission. In the same revocation, plaintiff was notified by Broderson that he had been advised by the United States Forest Service that his issuance of the permission to plaintiff for the Klan meeting and rally was in violation of Paragraph 14 of the aforesaid Special Use Permit issued to Anton Lambert and Thomas P. Regis by the Forest Service.

Plaintiff states that this Broderson revocation is but one phase of the defendants' activities of which he complains. Yet, despite intensive questioning of the Court, plaintiff could not and did not describe or produce the United States Forest Service's basic Special Use Permit to Lambert and Regis, nor their sub-permit or sublease to Broderson, nor the sub-permit or sublease from Broderson to plaintiff.

At the hearing on September 13, 1966, when asked by the Court for any additional evidence of any possible harassment, hindrance, disruption, disturbance, prevention, interference, or other activities of any kind threatening or proposing to threaten the holding of his proposed meeting and Ku Klux Klan rally or attendance at the meeting and rally, plaintiff could not and did not describe, indicate, or refer to any other action or activities of any kind by any of the defendants.

At the second hearing on September 15, 1966, when plaintiff filed his amendment to the complaint striking his claim for damages, and limiting the action to injunctive relief, he submitted his second exhibit, which is the only other action of defendants which plaintiff was able to bring to the attention of the Court as constituting interference or threatened interference with the proposed Ku Klux Klan meeting and rally. Plaintiff's Exhibit Two consists of a Complaint For Injunction filed by the State of California against plaintiff Fowler, Los Angeles County Superior Court No. 893,571, on September 14, 1966, the day between the two hearings here in Federal Court, together with a temporary restraining order issued therein by the Superior Court Judge Ralph H. Nutter and restraining plaintiff from making any representations that he and his group are entitled to collect any money or solicit any members or hold any meetings or act in any way as the "Ku Klux Klan, a Georgia Corporation", which had been declared defunct with its corporate franchise forfeited in a quo warranto proceeding in the Superior Court more than twenty years ago, Judgment No. 513,041 of Judge Alfred E. Paonessa, entered May 22, 1946.

As part of the Superior Court temporary restraining order, plaintiff was ordered to appear in that court on September 28, 1966, two weeks hence, to show cause why he should not be enjoined pendente lite, from representing that the "Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a Georgia Corporation", is now lawfully entitled to act as a corporation in the State of California; from collecting any money for the benefit or use thereof; and from soliciting new members therein.

It is plaintiff's contention that this Superior Court complaint and temporary restraining order also constitute some sort of harassment or interference with the proposed Ku Klux Klan rally on Saturday, September 17, 1966. But nowhere in the Superior Court complaint, or in the temporary restraining order, or in the entire Exhibit Two, is there the slightest indication of any such activity. The temporary restraining order is solely against making representations, collecting money, or soliciting members in the "Ku Klux Klan, a Georgia Corporation". Nowhere is there any showing of any restraint, harassment or interference, or threats thereof of any kind upon plaintiff, or his group, or the proposed Ku Klux Klan meeting and rally in Soledad Canyon on the night of September 17, 1966.

By way of contrast, it is undisputed, and the affidavit of Sheriff Pitchess in opposition to plaintiff's application clearly and unequivocally shows, that the Sheriff has in no way...