Fox ex rel. Citizens v. Cnty. of Clearfield

• Decision Date: 15 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 1328 C.D. 2010,1328 C.D. 2010
• Parties: David W. Fox, Individually and on Behalf of a Committee of Concerned Citizens, Appellant v. County of Clearfield, Board of Commissioners of the County of Clearfield, Joan Robinson McMillen, John A. Sobel, Mark B. McCracken, and Clearfield County Board of Assessment Appeals
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

David W. Fox, Individually and on Behalf of a Committee of Concerned Citizens, Appellant v. County of Clearfield, Board of Commissioners of the County of Clearfield,Joan Robinson McMillen, John A. Sobel, Mark B. McCracken,and Clearfield County Board of Assessment Appeals

No. 1328 C.D. 2010

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Submitted: March 7, 2011

July 15, 2011

BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER

David W. Fox, Individually and on Behalf of a Committee of Concerned Citizens (Committee), appeals from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County (trial court) that granted the preliminary objections (POs) filed by the County of Clearfield (County), the Board of Commissioners of the County (Board of Commissioners), Joan Robinson McMillen, John A. Sobel, Mark B. McCracken,¹ and the County Board of Assessment Appeals (Board of Appeals) (collectively, Defendants) and dismissed Mr. Fox's Action in Mandamus and for Declaratory Relief (Complaint) with prejudice. On appeal, Mr. Fox argues that the trial court erred in concluding that: (1) he did not have standing to proceed in this matter; and (2) he had to exercise or exhaust his statutory remedies and could not invoke the trial court's equitable jurisdiction.

Mr. Fox filed the Complaint on January 28, 2010, seeking declaratory judgment from the trial court stating that the County's current taxation system is unconstitutional and illegal on the grounds that it violates article VIII, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (commonly known as the Uniformity Clause).² The Complaint also seeks an order from the trial court directing the County to perform a county-wide reassessment, and award of any other relief, such as attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and costs of suit. The Complaint alleged, in relevant part, the following. Mr. Fox is a citizen of the County, owns and resides in a single-family residence in the County, and pays real estate taxes in the County. (Complaint ¶¶ 1-2.) The County is a Sixth Class County subject to The Fourth to Eighth Class County Assessment Law (Law),³ formerly 72 P.S. §§ 5453.101-5453.706, and, to the extent not inconsistent, The General County Assessment Law (General Law),⁴ 72 P.S. §§ 5020-101-5020-602. (Complaint ¶¶ 3, 5.) The last county-wide reassessment was performed in 1989. (Complaint ¶ 16.) The "Defendants are charged with the legal responsibility to determine real property values . . . in [the County] and to levy and collect taxes" in compliance with the Uniformity Clause, as well as the Law and the General Law. (Complaint ¶ 6.) The Complaint set forth the text of the Uniformity Clause, as well as case law interpreting the Uniformity Clause that "a taxpayer is entitled to relief under the Uniformity Clause where his property is assessed at a higher percentage of fair market value than other properties throughout the taxing district." (Complaint ¶¶ 9-12 (quoting Clifton v. Allegheny County, 600 Pa. 662, 689, 969 A.2d 1197, 1213 (2009) (quoting Downingtown Area School District v. Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals, 590 Pa. 459, 466, 913 A.2d 194, 199 (2006))).) Mr. Fox alleged that, upon information and belief, his property "is being taxed at a higher percentage of [its] fair market value than other properties throughout the taxing district," which is unconstitutional pursuant to Clifton, and the appropriate relief is to order a "county-wide reassessment of property values for real estate taxation purposes." (Complaint ¶¶ 13-14.) The Complaint avers numerous ways in which the current assessment system used by the County results in the creation and perpetuation of a system that has an illegal, discriminatory effect among the County's taxpayers, which has permeated and pervaded the entire taxing system. (Complaint ¶¶ 15-18, 31-32.) The Complaint cites various statistical standards recognized by Pennsylvania courts in determining the uniformity of taxation, particularly the Price-Related Differential (PRD), Coefficient of Dispersion (COD), and the Common Level Ratio (CLR), which set forth maximum values under which a county's assessments can be compared to determine the constitutionality of an assessment system, and avers that the County's numbers greatly exceed the maximum values.⁵ (Complaint ¶¶ 19-30.) For example, the Complaint cites decisions from this Court in which we recognized that a COD of 15% represents the maximum allowable deviation among assessments for acceptable uniformity. (Complaint ¶ 23.) According to the Complaint, the County's COD was 49.4% in 2006, 54.9% in 2007, and "has exceeded 35% every year since 1989." (Complaint ¶ 25.) Mr. Fox alleged that he has no adequate remedy at law through the Defendants' assessment appeals process, and mandamus⁶ is the only appropriate remedy because the appeals process is unavailable and the Board of Commissioners is not interested in performing a county-wide reassessment at the request of a group of the County's residents, the Committee, as evidenced by the Board of Commissioners' response to a letter sent by Mr. Fox and the Committee. (Complaint ¶¶ 34-36.) Mr. Fox attached a copy of that letter to the Complaint.

Defendants filed POs requesting the dismissal of the Complaint. Defendants' first PO, based on Rule 1028(a)(4) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, was that the Complaint was legally insufficient in that Mr. Fox filed the Complaint purportedly acting "on behalf of a Committee of Concerned Citizens," none of whom are identified, and that the failure to identify these individuals violates Rules 1701-1704 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure (relating to the filing of class actions). (POs ¶ 1.) Thus, Defendants requested that Mr. Fox's designation in the caption as a representative of the "Committee of Concerned Citizens" and corresponding averment in paragraph one of the Complaint be stricken as legally immaterial and the Complaint dismissed. (POs ¶¶ 1-3.) Defendants' second PO asserts that the Complaint should be dismissed because Mr. Fox did not exhaust his statutory remedy by appealing his assessment under the Law and that equity jurisdiction is not appropriate here because "[a] uniformity challenge to a particular assessment can and must be raised in a statutory appeal." (POs ¶¶ 4-8 (citing Beattie v. Allegheny County, 589 Pa. 113, 907 A.2d 519 (2006)).) The third PO again attacks the legal sufficiency of the Complaint, asserting, inter alia, that "[b]eyond conclusory allegations of disparity of uniformity, . . . [Mr.] Fox's [C]omplaint contains no allegation of actual empirical studies or statistical proofs prepared by [Mr. Fox] or available to [Mr. Fox] demonstrating disparities in actual assessments" and that the use of the CODs and CLRs are legally insufficient to state a substantial constitutional issue to justify equitable relief. (POs ¶¶ 9-11, 13.) Additionally, the Complaint's allegations are insufficient because the Law permits the use of the County's CLR to replace the County's predetermined ratio (PDR) in the absence of a recent county-wide assessment, which may cause some inequitable assessments. (POs ¶ 12 (citing Appeal of Armco, Inc., 515 A.2d 326 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).) In the fourth PO, Defendants asserted, pursuant to Rules 1019 and 1028(a)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, that the attachment of the letter that Mr. Fox and the Committee sent to the Board of Commissioners was legally impertinent matter that must be struck and the Complaint dismissed. (POs ¶¶ 17-20.)

After argument and briefing on Defendants' POs, the trial court granted the first and second POs and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice on those grounds. With regard to the first PO, related to Mr. Fox's representational status, the trial court concluded that Mr. Fox did not have representational standing under the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7531-7541, because the Complaint failed to sufficiently allege how the unidentified members of the Committee had a direct, immediate, and substantial injury such that they would have standing to proceed in this equitable action. (Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4.) Thus, the trial court sustained Defendants' first PO and dismissed the Complaint. The trial court did not examine Mr. Fox's standing in his individual capacity. As for Defendants' second PO, that Mr. Fox failed to exercise or exhaust his statutory remedy, the trial court agreed and held that, pursuant to Beattie and the Law, Mr. Fox could not circumvent the statutory appeal process to present his uniformity challenge in the trial court's equitable jurisdiction. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4.) The trial court held that, although equitable jurisdiction is available if a taxpayer raises a substantial constitutional issue, such as a frontal attack on an underlying tax statute, and lacks an adequate remedy through the administrative appeal process, the Complaint did not satisfy these requirements and it would not invoke its equitable jurisdiction. (Trial Ct. Op. at 5 (citing Beattie, 589 Pa. at 128-29, 907 A.2d at 528-29, and Borough of Green Tree v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals, and Review of Allegheny County, 459 Pa. 268, 274, 328 A.2d 819, 822 (1974).) The trial court concluded that Mr. Fox failed to support his contention that his property is being taxed at a higher rate of fair market value than other properties, relying only on generalized and conclusory allegations of "taxation inequality," which were insufficient to confer equitable jurisdiction here. (Trial Ct. Op. at 5.) Additionally, the trial court distinguished Clifton on the grounds that the court in that case was exercising equitable jurisdiction to implement a series of ordinances providing for reassessment, the taxpayers were challenging the legality of the particular ordinance and the underlying taxing statute, and the holding...