Fox-Morris Associates, Inc. v. Conroy
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | Author: O'brien |
| Citation | Fox-Morris Associates, Inc. v. Conroy, 333 A.2d 732, 460 Pa. 290 (Pa. 1975) |
| Decision Date | 18 March 1975 |
| Docket Number | FOX-MORRIS |
| Parties | FOX-MORRIS ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellant, v. Robert CONROY et al. |
Seymour Kurland, Ian A. L. Strogatz, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Edward Gerard Conroy, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, William H. Lamb, Lamb, Windle & McErlane, West Chester, for appellees.
Before JONES, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
This appeal arises from the denial of a preliminary injunction which was sought to enforce a restrictive covenant in certain employee contracts.
The facts surrounding this appeal are as follows. In 1969 appellees Joseph H. Mulqueen, Jr. and Robert Conroy became employed by appellant, Fox-Morris Associates, Inc., which was in the business of executive placement. Pursuant to their employment, Conroy and Mulqueen signed employment contracts which contained the following restrictive covenant:
'Employee acknowledges that the above restrictions placed upon him are necessary for the reasonable and proper protection of Company's business and that in the event such restrictions become operative, he will be able to engage in other businesses for the purposes of earning a livelihood.'
From 1970 to 1973, Conroy and Mulqueen renewed their employment contracts and each contract contained the identical restrictive covenant as previously quoted. In June of 1974, Conroy and Mulqueen, while still covered by the 1973 employment contract, gave notice of their intention to resign their positions. Thereafter, Conroy and Mulqueen entered the employment of K. Robert Brian, Inc., a corporation formed by another former employee of appellant, and engaged in the same executive placement field. On July 23, 1974, appellant filed a complaint in equity seeking to enforce the restrictive employment covenants against appellees Conroy and Mulqueen and against K. Robert Brian, Inc. The chancellor took testimony and denied the preliminary injunction on the grounds that the covenant was too broad for enforcement, making it subject to modification, and thus appellant's right to the preliminary injunction was not clear. This appeal followed.
Initially, we must point out that since this case arises from the denial of a preliminary injunction, our scope of review is limited to whether there were reasonable grounds for the action of the court below and we will not consider the merits of the case or pass upon reasons for or against such action, unless it is plain that no such grounds existed or that the rules of law relied on are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable. See Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 207 A.2d 768 (1965).
Examining the record and the chancellor's decision in light of the above, we are convinced that the chancellor reached the correct result.
The covenant in the instant case restricted appellees from engaging in a competitive business within a one-hundred-mile radius not only of their places of employment in Philadelphia, but also within a one-hundred-mile radius of any place where appellant had offices. Under these circumstances, the enforcement of the restrictive covenant and its implications are not susceptible to the drastic action of a preliminary injunction.
Decree affirmed. Appellant to bear costs.
EAGEN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The chancellor based his denial of the preliminary injunction on two alternate grounds. He concluded that the covenant, as written, was too broad, so that it could not be enforced without severance. From this he reasoned that appellant's right to relief was not clear, as is required for issuance of a preliminary injunction. See Alabama Binder & Chemical Corp. v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 410 Pa. 214, 189 A.2d 180 (1963). He also concluded that appellant had failed to show that irreparable harm would result from the denial of the injunction. Solely because I believe that there were 'apparently reasonable grounds,' see Credit Alliance Corp. v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Car Wash Corp., 450 Pa. 367, 370--71, 301 A.2d 816, 818 (1973), for the latter conclusion, I concur in the result.
There was evidence from which the chancellor could have concluded that appellees were conducting their business in a manner which did not exploit any customer relationships developed while in appellant's employ or any trade secrets belonging to appellant which might have been known to them. If their business was so operated, appellant would apparently not suffer any legally cognizable harm (much less irreparable harm). Consequently, the chancellor could properly conclude that a preliminary injunction would be unjustified.
Appellant contends that the present mode of operation of appellees' business is designed solely to avoid issuance of...
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Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz
...question. IV. Equity Injunctive relief will lie where there is no adequate remedy at law. Fox-Morris Associates, Inc. v. Conroy, 460 Pa. 290 at 294, 333 A.2d 732 at 734 (1975) (Roberts, J. concurring). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo as it exists or pre......
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Wolk v. Sch. Dist. of Lower Merion
...no such grounds existed or that the rules of law relied on are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable." Fox-Morris Associates, Inc. v. Conroy , 460 Pa. 290, 333 A.2d 732, 733-34 (1975). Where, as here, the preliminary injunction appealed is mandatory in nature, which commands the performanc......
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Hempfield Tp. v. Hapchuk
...relief is necessary to prevent a legal wrong for which there is no adequate redress at law. See Fox-Morris Associates, Inc. v. Conroy, 460 Pa. 290, 333 A.2d 732 (1975) (Roberts, J., concurring).7 Section 87-13 of the zoning ordinance states:Districts designated for Agricultural A-1 are to b......
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Soja v. Factoryville Sportsmen's Club
...is necessary to prevent a legal wrong for which there is no adequate redress at law. Fox-Morris Associates, Inc. v. Conroy, 460 Pa. 290, 294, 333 A.2d 732, 734 (1975) (Roberts, J., concurring). There is no requirement that a bond be filed in connection with a final injunction. See Pa.R.Civ.......