Fox v. Fox, 74-149-A
| Decision Date | 29 January 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-149-A,74-149-A |
| Citation | 350 A.2d 602,115 R.I. 593 |
| Parties | Charles J. FOX, Jr. v. Dorothy F. FOX. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
The litigants in this Superior Court civil action are married to each other. On April 9, 1970, the wife filed a petiion in the Family Court for a bed and board divorce and also asked that she be given such ancillary relief as custody of the minor child, exclusive use of the marital domicile and separate maintenance for herself and support for the child. Almost a year later, February 25, 1971, the husband countered with a cross-petition in which he asked for an absolute divorce and custody of the child. On the same date, he filed this civil action which asked that the couple's real estate be partitioned. Commissioners were appointed and a justice of the Superior Court ordered a sale of the property. In her appeal the wife challenges the denial of her motion which sought to either dismiss this action or transfer it from the Superior to the Family Court.
Her motion is premised on the contention that when the General Assembly at its January, 1972 session gave the Family Court jurisdiction to entertain partition proceedings, the Superior Court was then divested of any jurisdiction to proceed further in this controversy. We do not agree.
To place the 1972 legislation in a somewhat historical perspective, we will first allude to the holding in Rogers v. Rogers, 98 R.I. 263, 201 A.2d 140 (1964). There, the issue was whether or not the Family Court could order a husband to make an accounting to the wife and give her a proportionate share of the profits realized from the operation of a motel that stood in their joint names. The trial justice in Rogers maintained that the Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any controversy that arose between a husband and wife, including partition of their real estate, the appointment of receivers and the reaching of a spouse's interest in trust property. The pertinent legislation under the review in Rogers was G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 8-10-3. It read as follows:
'There is hereby established a family court * * * to hear and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage and from bed and board; all motions for allowance, alimony, support and custody of children, * * * and other matters including all petitions and motions relative to real and personal property in aid thereof affecting the parties and children wherein jurisdiction is acquired by the court by the filing of such petitions for divorce * * *.' (Emphasis added.)
In Rogers we disagreed with the view expressed by the trial justice and pointed out that the Family Court was a statutory tribunal possessing only such jurisdiction as was explicitly conferred upon it by the Legislature. Moreover, we found that the Legislature, in authorizing the court to hear and determine motions and petitions relative to real or personal property in divorce proceedings, intended that the court's power over property owned by the husband be restricted to those instances where it was necessary to use the property as security for the payment of alimony or support. The 1972 amendment might be considered as a rather belated reply to our holding in Rogers. It amended § 8-10-3 so that the Family Court could hear and determine '* * * other matters arising out of petitions and motions relative to real and personal property in aid thereof, including, but not limited to, partitions, accountings, receiverships, sequestration of assets, resulting and constructive trusts, impressions of trust, and such other equitable matters arising out of the family relationship, wherein jurisdiction is acquired by the court by the filing of petitions for divorce, bed and board and separate maintenance * * *.'
The amendment became law on April 12, 1972. At that time, the partition action had been pending in the Superior Court for over a year and the order directing the commissioners to sell the property had been outstanding for almost 6 months.
The jurisdictional issue raised by the wife can be resolved by a brief reference to the relevant canons of statutory construction. As a general rule, statutes and their amendments are construed to operate prospectively unless a specific contrary intent is expressed by the Legislature, or retroactivity must necessarily be inferred from the language employed by the law makers. Norton v. Paolino, 113 R.I. 728, 327 A.2d 275 (1974); Town of Warren v. Frost, 111 R.I. 217, 301 A.2d 572 (1973); ...
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