Fox v. Franciscan All.
| Decision Date | 23 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22A-CT-2114 |
| Parties | Marjorie K. Fox, Stephanie Heggemeier, James Kahrhoff, and Nancy Owens, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc. d/b/a Franciscan Health-Indianapolis, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Kurt M Eisgruber, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D06-1810-CT-43502
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS Neal F. Eggeson, Jr. Eggeson Privacy Law Fishers, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Brian L. Park Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC Indianapolis, Indiana
Tavitas Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] Marjorie Fox, Stephanie Heggemeier, James Kahrhoff, and Nancy Owens ("Plaintiffs") appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Franciscan Alliance, Inc. d/b/a Franciscan Health Indianapolis ("Franciscan"). Plaintiffs contend that Laura Vardaman, an employee of Franciscan, improperly accessed Plaintiffs' medical records. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Franciscan, and the trial court granted summary judgment to Franciscan. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment and that the trial court abused its discretion during the discovery process. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment and did not abuse its discretion during the discovery process. Accordingly, we affirm.
Issues
[¶2] Plaintiffs raise multiple issues, which we revise and restate as:
Facts
[¶3] Beginning in 2008, Vardaman was employed by Franciscan as a scheduling assistant. Vardaman's position required that she have "access to patient records." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 168. Franciscan provided Vardaman with training on patient privacy and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), and Vardaman "signed an agreement acknowledging that she would only access patient information for business reasons." Id.
[¶4] Vardaman was married to Tad Brewer until 2016. Prior to the divorce, Vardaman often told Brewer about the private health information of their friends and family members. Vardaman learned this information through her employment with Franciscan.
[¶5] In June 2018, Vardaman sent harassing emails to Brewer, which led Brewer to suspect that Vardaman accessed the medical records of his then-girlfriend, Stephanie Heggemeier. Brewer reported his concerns to Franciscan and other friends and family members. Franciscan discovered that Vardaman improperly accessed the medical records of: (1) Heggenmeier on four occasions in 2016 and 2017; (2) Marjorie Fox, Brewer's mother, on thirteen occasions in 2013 and 2014; (3) Nancy Owens, Brewer's sister, on one occasion in 2013; and (4) James Kahrhoff, Heggenmeier's ex-husband, on one occasion in 2017. Franciscan then terminated Vardaman's employment.
[¶6] In October 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Franciscan before both the trial court and the Indiana Department of Insurance. The complaint included the following counts: (1) vicarious liability for Vardaman's "invasion of privacy via public disclosure of private facts, invasion of privacy via intrusion, traditional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of professional duty, and breach of fiduciary duty"; (2) negligent supervision and retention; (3) negligence by breach of a non-delegable duty; and (4) punitive damages. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29, 52. The matter was stayed until May 2019 due to the Department of Insurance filing.
[¶7] On December 28, 2018, Plaintiffs propounded sixteen interrogatories and seventeen requests for production of documents to Franciscan. Franciscan objected to many of the interrogatories and requests for production, and in July 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel. The trial court granted the motion to compel and gave Franciscan twenty days to supplement its responses to address the concerns raised in the motion to compel. The discovery dispute, however, continued.
[¶8] Franciscan sought reconsideration of the order granting the motion to compel, and Plaintiffs responded by filing a motion for default judgment due to Franciscan's failure to obey the trial court's discovery order pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 37. The trial court stayed all discovery and set the matter for a hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment and set the matter for a follow-up hearing. Franciscan then filed a motion for a protective order. The trial court held a hearing on November 4, 2019, and ordered the parties to submit a joint order, but the trial court did not issue an order regarding the pending discovery matter.
[¶9] In March 2020, Plaintiffs filed a praecipe for withdrawal of the submission from the trial court judge due to the trial court's delay in ruling on the discovery matters pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 53.1. The trial court then issued a discovery order on March 20, 2020. The trial court held a hearing on July 21, 2020, and issued an order on July 22, 2020, which directly addressed certain of the interrogatories and requests for production. The trial court's order gave Franciscan thirty days to comply with the order. Franciscan supplemented its discovery on August 21, 2020, but Plaintiffs alleged the responses were unsatisfactory and filed a second motion to compel on September 14, 2020. Franciscan then filed an additional response to the discovery requests. After a hearing, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' second motion to compel.[1]
[¶10] In November 2020, Franciscan filed a motion for summary judgment, but the trial court stayed the proceedings pending our Supreme Court's decision in Community Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368 (Ind. 2022). In May 2022, following the McKenzie decision, Franciscan filed an amended motion for summary judgment. Based upon McKenzie, Franciscan argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on: (1) all negligence claims because Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the modified-impact rule; (2) the public disclosure of private facts claim because the facts were not disclosed to the public or a large group and there is no evidence that the facts were highly sensitive; (3) the invasion of privacy via intrusion claim because such a claim is not recognized under these circumstances; and (4) the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because there was no intent to cause severe emotional harm.
[¶11] Plaintiffs responded and argued that: (1) Franciscan failed to meet its burden of demonstrating it was entitled to summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; and (2) Franciscan was likely entitled to summary judgment on the public disclosure of private facts claim, negligence-based claims, and intrusion claim but encouraged the "examination/reconsideration" of these issues. Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 181.
[¶12] The trial court granted Franciscan's motion for summary judgment because: (1) as to the negligence-based claims, the Plaintiffs' damages were limited to emotional, non-pecuniary loss; (2) as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Vardaman did not act with the requisite intent to cause the Plaintiffs emotional distress; (3) as to the claim of invasion of privacy via public disclosure of private facts, the medical information was not disclosed to the public and the Plaintiffs were not "seriously aggrieved" by the disclosure; (4) Plaintiffs' claim for invasion of privacy via intrusion is not recognized in Indiana; and (5) the claim for punitive damages is moot. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25. Plaintiffs now appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[¶13] Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Franciscan. "'When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court.'" Minser v. DeKalb Cnty. Plan Comm'n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (quoting Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020)). "Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting Murray v. Indianapolis Public Schools, 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 2019)); see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).
[¶14] The summary judgment movant invokes the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 851. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve "[a]ny doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom . . . in favor of the non-moving party." Id.
[¶15] We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, and we take "care to ensure that no party is denied his day in court." Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013). "We limit our review to the materials designated at the trial level." Gunderson v. State, Ind Dep't of Nat. Res., 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 1167 (2019). Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we also reiterate that findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court aid our review, but they do not bind us. Matter of...
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