Fox v. Higgins
Citation | 149 N.W.2d 369 |
Decision Date | 13 February 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 8366,8366 |
Parties | Jack FOX, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Milton K. HIGGINS and William Higgins, Defendants and Appellants. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where separate and dissimilar wrongful acts are alleged, such as an act of arson, an act of assault and battery, an act of malicious prosecution, and others, each wrongful act constitutes a separate cause of action, and the statute of limitations runs from the time of the commission of each wrongful act.
2. Separate and wholly dissimilar wrongful acts do not constitute a continuing tort.
3. Where separate and wholly dissimilar acts, committed by defendants in allegedly attempting to advance or protect their own claims to property, are wrongful, each such act would constitute a separate cause of action, and the statute of limitations would run from the time of the commission of each act.
4. The record is examined, and, no probative evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury being found, the judgment is reversed and the complaint is dismissed.
William R. Mills, Bismarck, for plaintiff and respondent.
Vogel & Bair, Mandan, for defendants and appellants.
This is an action brought against the defendants for malicious interference with the plaintiff's business. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff against both of the defendants jointly for actual damages in the sum of $20,000, and for punitive damages in the sum of $7,500 against the defendant William Higgins and for $39,500 against the defendant Milton K. Higgins.
The defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. This motion was denied, and this appeal is taken from the judgment entered on the verdict and from the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
The defendants list a large number of specifications of error of law which they complain of, and also specify that the evidence is wholly insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.
This action was brought to recover damages for interference by the defendants with plaintiff's business as a farmer and rancher. The plaintiff specifically alleges that the defendants engaged in a concerted and joint effort, without just cause or excuse, to viciously and maliciously injure the plaintiff in his trade and business. The action was not based on the acts of tort which the defendants were alleged to have committed, nor was it for damages for interference with existing contracts.
That this was an action based entirely on the theory of interference by the defendants with the plaintiff's business as a farmer and rancher can be gathered from the trial court's memorandum denying the defendants' motion for new trial. In that memorandum the trial court says:
The trial court goes on to point out:
'The plaintiff as this Court understands the pleadings is not claiming interference, malicious or otherwise on the part of the defendant or defendants which prevented or induced a third party to violate a written or verbal contract with the plaintiff, although this type of case appears to be more frequent according to the authorities.'
The type of action which the plaintiff attempted to bring against the defendants in this case is one which the courts of this State have not heretofore entertained. Some English courts have held that an action against a defendant for interference with the trade or calling of the plaintiff could be maintained where the defendant's purpose was to injure the plaintiff in his trade, as distinguished from the purpose of legitimately advancing his own interests. Even that theory would not sustain the plaintiff's basis for action here, because everything which the defendants did in this case was on the theory that they had an interest in the property in dispute.
Had the complaint stated a cause of action for interference with existing contracts, or for damages caused by some wrongful act such as arson, assault with a dangerous weapon, false arrest, malicious mischief, or any of the other unlawful acts which the plaintiff mentions in his complaint, he clearly would have stated a cause of action. But the plaintiff does not rely on such alleged wrongful acts due, no doubt, to the fact that most of such causes of action were outlawed by statutes of limitation. The plaintiff commenced his action in 1964. An act of arson allegedly was committed by the defendants in 1957 or 1958, and any cause of action based thereon would clearly...
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Curtis v. Firth
...causes of action and the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the commission of each wrongful act. Fox v. Higgins, 149 N.W.2d 369 (N.D.1967). Thus it is important to distinguish between separate acts which may be assault, defamation, or battery, and a continuing course of w......
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Trade'N Post v. World Duty Free Americas
...law unlawful interference with business claim in this state, although we have discussed the tort on prior occasions. In Fox v. Higgins, 149 N.W.2d 369 (N.D.1967), the Court concluded the plaintiff had failed to plead and prove the elements of the Our decision does not, as contended by the p......
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Schneider v. Schaaf
...prospective business advantage. See generally Fankhanel v. M & H Const. Co., Inc., 1997 ND 20, ¶ 11, 559 N.W.2d 229; Fox v. Higgins, 149 N.W.2d 369, 370-71 (N.D. 1967); Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts § 130 (5th ed. 1984) ("Prosser and Keeton"). The Schneiders allege the presentation b......
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BASF Corp. v. Symington
...the statute of limitations commences to run from the commission of a wrongful act giving rise to the cause of action. See Fox v. Higgins, 149 N.W.2d 369 (N.D.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 873, 88 S.Ct. 160, 19 L.Ed.2d 153 (1967). In a products liability case, the general rule is that the cause ......