Fox v. Royce

JurisdictionOregon
PartiesFOX v. ROYCE et al.
Citation242 P.2d 190,194 Or. 419
CourtOregon Supreme Court
Decision Date02 April 1952

Norman L. Easley, Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Griffith, Phillips & Coughlin, Portland.

Ernest J. Burrows, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was George Layman, Newberg.

LATOURETTE, Justice.

This is an appeal by defendants from an order setting aside the verdict in their favor and granting plaintiff a new trial.

Defendants have submitted a number of assignments of error. This opinion turns on the following: 'Under all of the evidence, plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and this court should enter judgment for the defendants.', and it will, therefore, be unnecessary to consider the others. At the end of plaintiff's case, defendants moved for a nonsuit, and, at the conclusion of the taking of the evidence, defendants moved for a directed verdict, both motions being based on the proposition that there was no evidence of defendants' negligence, and that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Both motions were denied. Defendants in their answer charged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in that, 'He failed to keep and maintain a proper or any lookout for his own safety.'

The facts follow: Plaintiff Fox had been in the meter repair business in Portland since 1920 and had been under contract to service and repair all meters in the cabs owned by the defendant, Yellow Cab Company, from 1940 up to the date of the accident. Plaintiff performed his work on the company's premises, the repair shop being in the northeast corner of the building. On the morning of July 17, 1947, he entered defendants' premises to engage in his repair work on one of defendants' cabs. There were three parallel hydraulic hoists in the company's shop, all facing the east wall of the building, which were used by mechanics in making repairs to taxicabs. The hoists were about eight feet apart and about eight feet from the east wall of the building. Next to the east wall were mechanics' workbenches, and there were windows above these benches.

The cab upon which plaintiff was to work was located over the middle hydraulic hoist, the hoist at that time not being elevated. Plaintiff entered the cab, reclining on the front seat with his feet projecting southerly from the right front door and his head being under the dashboard from where he proceeded to repair the meter. Shortly thereafter he sat in a more or less upright position and noticed that his cab had been elevated some six feet in the air. It is undisputed that defendant Irwin raised the cab in order to make some repairs on it. Plaintiff testified that there was no running board on his cab, and that as he looked down he saw mechanic Hall standing at the head of the cab on which he was about to work which was on the south hoist next to him and flush with the floor. Plaintiff did not see Irwin but called out, 'Hey, let me down out of here.' He heard laughter and assumed that a joke was being played on him. Plaintiff then lay back down on the seat and completed his work. While he was engaged in the second phase of his work, Hall's cab was elevated on the south hoist to a position directly across from the cab in which plaintiff was working so that work could be done on it. After plaintiff had completed his work, which, in all, took about ten minutes, he raised his body on the seat, looked across to the Hall cab, assumed that he was on the floor and slid out of the cab without looking further. He fell some six feet to the concrete floor, causing the injuries complained of. The accident happened early in the morning while it was daylight, and the place was well lighted. There was evidence that the operation of raising and lowering the hoists was noiseless.

In regard to the hoists, plaintiff testified as follows:

'Q. Had you ever seen a car raised or lowered on the hoist? A. Oh, yes.

'Q. More than once? A. Yes.

'* * *

'Q. And I believe that you must have known then that their [mechanics] work did necessitate using hoists from time to time? You knew that? A. Yes.

'* * *

'Q. Now, isn't it a fact, Mr. Fox, that you knew that the adjoining cab, the one that you looked at, you knew, did you not, that it was on that hoist for a purpose? A. Surely.

'* * *

'A. * * * I have never been up in a car working on a meter working on a hoist, but I have raised a car up to get at a cable drive underneath the car.'

As to plaintiff's movements at the time of the accident, we quote from his evidence:

'Q. What did you do when the job was finished, Mr. Fox? A. I stepped out of the cab. It all happened so quick. I looked over and saw the other car sitting right beside me.

'* * *

'Q. * * * You didn't look at the floor before you attempted to get out? A. Oh, I didn't bend over and look at the floor, no, because I figured I was about four inches from it, and if you were sitting on the edge of the seat and had just, have about four inches to step, and I was * * *

'* * *

'Q. But in any event you didn't stick your head out of the cab to see where you were. A. No, I just stepped out, because I knew I was on the floor.

'Q. Well, then, I take it that you didn't look at anything but the cab which was across the way from you before you started to get out when your job was finished? A. Well, I was busy, and I just naturally looked and saw the cab there, and I thought I was on the floor and stepped out.

'* * *

'Q. And if you had looked out and down before you stepped out, you would have seen the floor then, isn't that correct? A. I imagine.

'Q. And if your eyesight is good, why, you could have seen the floor if you had looked? A. Absolutely.'

As to plaintiff's knowledge of his surroundings, we have the following testimony:

'Q. Now, then, do you recall, Mr. Fox, about the benches onto the north side of the building, the work benches? Do you remember seeing those on the north side of the building that I have indicated on the map over there? A. North side? You mean east side?

'Q. East side. I am sorry. A. East side.

'Q. And you remember seeing those there? A. Yes, absolutely.

'Q. And they are right on to the east of the hoist? A. Yes.

'Q. How high would you say that they were, some three feet or so? A. The work benches?

'Q. Yes, the work benches. A. I imagine ordinary height, as high as one of those tables (indicating).

'Q. At least this high (indicating)? A. I imagine so. I never measured them.

'Q. Some three feet or so, roughly? A. I imagine.

'Q. And now, do you recall those windowns over the benches? A. absolutely.

'Q. Do you recall how many windows there were over the benches? A. No.

'Q. But in any event--A. (interrupting) I think they were twelve-inch windows. They are in a steel frame, and they can let them in or out.'

It is a well-settled rule of law that, if the negligence of the plaintiff proximately contributed in the slightest degree to the injury complained of, he will not be allowed to recover. It is true that contributory negligence is ordinarily for the jury, and only in exceptional cases has the court been warranted in determining such issue as a matter of law. The rule is well-stated by Mr. Justice Bailey in Martin v. Harrison, 182 Or. 121, 137, 180 P.2d 119, 186 P.2d 534, 537, as follows: 'In passing upon defendant's motions for a nonsuit and for a directed verdict, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. It is elementary law that contributory negligence becomes a question of law when, and only when, from the facts, reasonable men can draw but one inference and that inference points unerringly to the negligence of plaintiff contributing to the injury. In all other cases the question of contributory negligence is one of fact for the jury. The question whether plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence which will defeat his recovery for injuries sustained in an...

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4 cases
  • Farley v. Portland Gas & Coke Co.
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • March 2, 1955
    ...law concerning the duty of storekeepers to invitees is well established in this jurisdiction and need not be repeated here. Fox v. Royce, 194 Or. 419, 242 P.2d 190; Lee v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 600, 114 P.2d 136; Lopp v. First National Bank of Portland, 151 Or. 634, 51 P.2d 261; Briggs......
  • Shelton v. Paris
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1953
    ...of an act is the conduct of the reasonably prudent man. Sullivan v. Mountain States Power Co., 139 Or. 282, 9 P.2d 1038; Fox v. Royce, 194 Or. 419, 242 P.2d 190. In instances where a legislative body has acted to declare what shall or shall not be done, the triers of fact no longer determin......
  • O'BRIEN v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • February 24, 1960
    ...in like circumstances would have acted similarly. See Biddle v. Mazzocco, 1955, 204 Or. 547, 554, 284 P.2d 364, 368; Fox v. Royce, 1952, 194 Or. 419, 428, 242 P.2d 190, 194; 2 Harper & James, Torts, § Even if we assume that the trial judge stated a rule of law which he thought would obtain ......
  • Clark v. Strain et al
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • January 8, 1958
    ...question of contributory negligence is one of fact for the jury." (Emphasis ours.) Martin v. Harrison, supra (182 Or 137); Fox v. Royce, 194 Or 419, 425, 242 P2d 190; Whisler v. U.S. Nat. Bank of Portland, 160 Or 10, 16, 82 P2d Our examination of the facts respecting the plaintiff's speed, ......

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