Foxwell v. State

• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: THOMPSON
• Citation: Foxwell v. State, 281 A.2d 123, 13 Md.App. 37 (Md. App. 1971)
• Decision Date: 01 September 1971
• Docket Number: No. 701,701
• Parties: James Gilbert FOXWELL v. STATE of Maryland.

Page 37

13 Md.App. 37

281 A.2d 123

James Gilbert FOXWELL v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 701.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 1, 1971.

Livingston W. Yourtee, Pasadena, for appellant.

Gilbert Rosenthal, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Raymond G. Thieme, State's Atty., for Anne Arundel County, Vincent A. Mulieri, Lynn Kromminga and Martin A. Wolff, Asst. State's Atty., for Anne Arundel County, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before THOMPSON, MOYLAN, and CARTER, JJ.

THOMPSON, Judge.

James Gilbert Foxwell, the appellant, was convicted by a jury of being an accessory before the fact to an armed robbery. Judge Matthew S. Evans, presiding in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, imposed a sentence of ten years. On appeal, appellant raises one contention: That the testimony of an accomplice who testified against him was not corroborated. We agree.

There is no dispute that on the night of December 19, 1968, James Farrow, Jr., the manager of a store in Anne Arundel County, was robbed at gun point while making a night deposit at a bank. One Elroy Baker was convicted of this robbery, as was stipulated. Likewise, there is no dispute that Charles Eugene Perry was an accomplice.

Perry's testimony was that he had met appellant while he was a customer at a gas station Perry managed. At one time, appellant asked Perry if he knew 'a mugger or somebody who would be interested in making some money.' Perry did. Baker was recruited, and with Perry's assistance, a car was stolen and the robber, Baker, transported to the appropriate location. After the robbery, the money was hidden and later divided among the three persons. Perry also testified that appellant was the one who planned the robbery. As to the crime itself, Perry's testimony was corroborated by Farrow as to the color of the car, the dress of the robber, the description of the bag that the money was in, and the approximate amount stolen.

Corroboration for Perry's identifying appellant with the prepetrators of the crime comes only from appellant himself. Appellant admitted to a police officer he had talked to Perry several hours before the robbery, at the store where he worked. The store was about eight blocks from the scene of the crime, and, the night deposit taken in the robbery was the property of appellant's employer. In testimony appellant stated he was unsure whether the conversation occurred on the day of the robbery or the day before. Perry testified as to the same conversation, claiming that it was on the day of the robbery and several hours prior thereto; at that time appellant gave the details of the robbery. Appellant testified the conversation concerned a car he acquired from Perry which had broken down.

An accomplice is one who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common criminal intent with the principal offender, unites with him in the commission of the crime either as a principal or as an accessory before the fact. Burley v. State, 5 Md.App. 469, 248 A.2d 404. The law of Maryland is clear that an accused may not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Although only slight corroboration is necessary, the corroborative testimony must tend either: (1) to identify the defendant with the perpetrators of the crime, or; (2) to show the defendant's participation in the crime itself. Spies v. State, 8 Md.App. 160, 162, 258 A.2d 758.

General corroboration not relating to the identity of the defendant is insufficient; otherwise, a witness could be corroborated by giving his name and birth date. Sutton v. State, 10 Md.App. 353, 356, 270 A.2d 497. If the evidence corroborating an accomplice merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof without corroborating appellant's identity, it is insufficient. Middleton v. State, 6 Md.App. 380, 251 A.2d 224.

The reason for the rule requiring the testimony of an accomplice to be corroborated is that it is the testimony of a person who admits his participation in the...