Fraase v. Fraase, 10057
| Decision Date | 21 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 10057,10057 |
| Parties | Jewel M. FRAASE, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Mark R. FRAASE, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Irvine, Ramstad, Quam & Briggs, Detroit Lakes, Minn., for plaintiff and appellee; argued by John C. Quam, Detroit Lakes, Minn.
Wegner, Fraase, Nordeng & Johnson, Fargo, for defendant and appellant; argued by Mervin Nordeng, Fargo.
Jewel M. Fraase commenced an action for divorce from Mark R. Fraase on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Mark counterclaimed on the grounds of irreconcilable differences and later amended his counterclaim to request a divorce on the grounds of adultery. Both parties sought custody of the children. The trial was held in the District Court of Traill County. The court granted the divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences, awarded custody of the children to Jewel, set the child support, and divided the property. Mark moved for a new trial and to amend the findings of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment, and judgment. Those motions were denied. Mark has appealed from the judgment and the orders denying his motions.
On appeal, Mark contends that the trial court erred in awarding custody of the children to Jewel, that the property distribution was inequitable, and that the established child support payments are too high. In divorce actions, the trial court's determination on matters of child custody, child support, and division of property are treated as findings of fact and will not be set aside unless they are "clearly erroneous". DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919, 923 (N.D.1975); Bender v. Bender, 276 N.W.2d 695, 697 (N.D.1979). We have reviewed the trial court's findings and affirm in part, modify in part, and remand with instructions.
Jewel and Mark were married on June 26, 1970, at Jacksonville, North Carolina. At the time of the marriage, Jewel was in the Marine Corps and pregnant with Mark's child. Jewel miscarried that child three days after the marriage. The couple eventually had two children during their 11-year marriage.
Mark was 35 years old at the time of the marriage. He was engaged in the practice of law and had accumulated real and personal property which he brought into the marriage. Jewel had essentially no assets at the time of the marriage. After their marriage in 1970, Jewel worked for a time at Northwestern Bell and, in 1977, started babysitting full time. During the 11-year marriage, the couple accumulated additional property.
The trial court, in essence, described, evaluated, and divided the property in its findings of fact as follows:
To Mark Fraase Value
------------------------------------- -----------
Farm land, 320 acres
(Mark owned at time of marriage)
Value at marriage $ 52,800.00
Appreciation $170,000.00 $222,800.00
-----------
1/6 of furniture $ 1,000.00
1976 Fiat automobile $ 1,500.00
Condominium at Detroit Lakes $ 18,000.00
Lake Lot $ 3,500.00
(Mark owned at time of marriage)
Alice Elevator stock $ 10,000.00
Second Investment home in West Fargo $ 5,000.00
Increase in equity in law partnership $ 35,000.00
Tractor and attachments $ 2,500.00
Savings Account $ 52.00
-----------
$299,352.00
Less mortgage of $25,000 $25,000.00
($10,000 of which was used to
pay Mark's debt at the time
of marriage)
Less $10,000 marital debt
on note owing First National
Bank $10,000.00 $ 35,000.00
----------- -----------
Net amount received $264,352.00
To Jewel Fraase
-------------------------------------
The marital home in West Fargo net
value after mortgages deducted $ 38,000.00
5/6 of furniture $ 5,000.00
1978 Fiat automobile $ 3,500.00
Savings account $ 2,000.00
-----------
Net amount received $ 48,500.00
Mark argues that this division of property was not equitable and therefore did not fall within the guidelines enumerated in Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 52 N.W.2d 107 (1952) and Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D.1966) (Ruff-Fischer guidelines). Specifically, he argues concerning the division of property:
1. The trial court ignored the fact that some property he brought into the marriage no longer exists.
2. The trial court erred by including in the marital estate the amount of $35,000 which the court set as the value of Mark's interest in his law firm.
3. The court did not include in its findings of values several debts which it imposed upon Mark.
In its conclusions of law, the trial court said it applied the guidelines of Ruff-Fischer. Those guidelines are as follows:
"In determining the question of alimony or division of property as between the parties, the court, in exercising its sound discretion, will consider the respective ages of the parties to the marriage; their earning ability; the duration of and the conduct of each during the marriage; their station in life; the circumstances and necessities of each; their health and physical condition; their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value at that time, its income-producing capacity, if any, and whether accumulated or acquired before or after the marriage; and from all such elements the court should determine the rights of the parties and all other matters pertaining to the case." (Citations omitted.) Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d at 852.
We first address Mark's argument that the court erred by ignoring in its distribution of property certain property brought into the marriage by him. He takes issue with the trial court's finding that he "ends up the marriage with ... all the property he owned at the time of the marriage...." He asserts that the court ignored $4,000 worth of growing crops, $4,200 worth of stored grain, a ring worth $600 and a life insurance policy cashed in during the marriage of a value of $6,000, all of which he brought into the marriage.
The Ruff-Fischer guidelines do encourage trial courts to consider the property owned by the parties and whether it was "accumulated or acquired before or after the marriage...." Id. Although we have recognized that the time of the acquisition of property and its source is significant, we have nevertheless held that property acquired prior to the marriage by one spouse should be considered as part of the marital estate in determining what an equitable division would be. Fine v. Fine, 248 N.W.2d 838, 841 (N.D.1976); Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 44 (N.D.1977). We have never said that the trial court must make an express finding as to each of the factors enumerated by the guidelines. Instead, we have said that the guidelines are solely an aid to the equitable division of marital property. Nastrom v. Nastrom, 284 N.W.2d 576, 581 (N.D.1979).
The ultimate objective in dividing the marital estate in a divorce case is to make an equitable distribution, and the determination of what is an equitable division lies within the discretion of the trial court. Id. at 580; Piper v. Piper, 239 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1976). After reviewing the findings of fact, we conclude that the trial court did consider the items disputed by Mark. The court, however, said it had "very little information as to other assets in that no evidence was presented to establish value." In reviewing the evidence presented, we do not conclude the court's findings to be clearly erroneous or the division of property inequitable.
The trial court discussed in its findings of fact all the property brought into the marriage by Mark and in its award distributed approximately $215,000 more in property to Mark than to Jewel. The $215,000 is accounted for by the farm land and lake lot owned by Mark prior to the marriage. While Mark did bring additional property into the marriage, the trial court is not required to award all that property to him. The fact that property subject to distribution was acquired by one of the parties prior to the marriage is a consideration weighing in favor of that party, but it does not prevent the court from awarding part or all of the property to the other party should an equitable distribution require it. Fine v. Fine, 248 N.W.2d 838, 841 (N.D.1976); Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 44 (N.D.1977).
Except for the farm land valued at approximately $223,000, and the lake lot valued at $3,500, Mark received approximately $38,000 in value and Jewel received approximately $48,000 in value. When we consider that the court treated $10,000 of the $25,000 mortgage as an obligation incurred by Mark prior to marriage, the values are approximately equal. The court could reasonably have concluded that Jewel's contributions to the marriage as a homemaker justify such a share, notwithstanding that Mark brought into the marriage or contributed to the marital estate another $14,800 which may or may not be traceable at this time. The court might also have reasonably considered that Jewel gave up career opportunities to care for Mark and their children and that her resulting earning capacity is much less than Mark's.
Mark's second argument concerning the property distribution is that the trial court erred in finding that Mark's interest in his law firm had...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wadlow v. Wadlow
...Leftwich v. Leftwich, 442 A.2d 139 (D.C.App.1982); In re Marriage of Butler, 346 N.W.2d 45 (Iowa Ct.App.1984); Frasse v. Frasse, 315 N.W.2d 271 (N.D.Sup.Ct.1982). Assuming that the Chancery Division had the authority to order the parties to file a joint return, we discern no sound basis com......
-
Bock v. Dalbey
...Theroux v. Boehmler, 410 N.W.2d 354 (Minn.App.1987); Bursztyn v. Bursztyn, 379 N.J.Super. 385, 879 A.2d 129 (2005); Fraase v. Fraase, 315 N.W.2d 271 (N.D.1982); Ahmad, supra note 9. See, also, In re Marriage of LaFaye, 89 P.3d 455 (Colo.App.2003). 16.Bursztyn, supra note 15. 17.Id. at 398, ......
-
Buckl v. Buckl
... ... Fraase v. Fraase, 315 N.W.2d 271 (N.D.1982) held that in a divorce action the court properly included an ... ...
-
Mertz v. Mertz
...guidelines. Instead, we have said that the guidelines are solely an aid to the equitable division of marital property.” Fraase v. Fraase, 315 N.W.2d 271, 274 (N.D.1982). “The district court must adequately explain the basis for its decision, but we will not reverse a district court's decisi......