Fradella v. Town of Mount Pleasant

• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: Fradella v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 325 S.C. 469, 482 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. App. 1996)
• Decision Date: 07 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 2615,2615
• Parties: John Garland FRADELLA, Respondent, v. TOWN OF MOUNT PLEASANT, Appellant. . Heard

Page 53

482 S.E.2d 53

325 S.C. 469

John Garland FRADELLA, Respondent, v. TOWN OF MOUNT PLEASANT, Appellant.

No. 2615.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Nov. 7, 1996.

Decided Jan. 13, 1997.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1997.

Certiorari Denied Dec. 22, 1997.

Mark A. Mason, of the Mason Law Firm, Mount Pleasant; and C. Mac Gibson, Jr., Charleston, for Appellant.

Stacy L. Slotchiver and Mark C. Brandenburg, Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The Town of Mount Pleasant (Town) appeals the circuit court's reversal of a jury's conviction of John Garland Fradella (Fradella) for driving under the influence, first offense (DUI). We reverse the circuit court.

I. FACTS

Early in the morning hours of November 19, 1994, Fradella wrecked his vehicle on the Cooper River Bridge near Mount Pleasant. Fradella's car was inoperable and he began walking off the bridge. Another driver, Kenneth Copeland, was travelling across the bridge shortly after the accident. Upon seeing Fradella walking along the side of the bridge, Copeland offered him a ride. Fradella accepted, and Copeland drove him home. Copeland remained for a few minutes with Fradella, and then drove back to the scene of the accident.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Gragg of the Mount Pleasant Police Department responded to a dispatcher's report of an accident on the bridge. Gragg arrived at about 2:04 a.m. to discover Fradella's car as well as a separate two-car collision on the bridge. The police used the license tag number on Fradella's vehicle to obtain the phone number of the registered owner of the car. The owner gave them Fradella's phone number and told them Fradella was in possession of the car. The police officers then cross-referenced Fradella's number and obtained his address.

While the officers were investigating the accident, Copeland approached officers Gragg and Bolin at the scene and advised them he gave the driver of the abandoned vehicle a ride home. Further, Copeland told the officers that the driver smelled of alcohol, and he agreed to lead the officers to the address where he left Fradella. Meanwhile, the dispatcher informed the officers that Fradella had called 911 to report he was involved in the accident on the bridge. The officers arrived at Fradella's residence approximately twenty minutes after Gragg first responded to the accident. Gragg called Fradella outside to discuss the accident and Fradella readily admitted he was the driver of the wrecked vehicle. Copeland also identified Fradella as the man to whom he had given a ride.

After observing Fradella's bloodshot eyes and the smell of alcohol on his breath, Gragg told Fradella he was under investigation for possible DUI. According to Gragg, when questioned, Fradella initially said he had one beer, but afterwards admitted he had three beers. Gragg then had Fradella perform several field sobriety tests. Gragg did not feel that Fradella completed the tests satisfactorily and was of the opinion that Fradella was "definitely impaired." Bolin substantially concurred in Gragg's assessment of Fradella's performance on the field sobriety tests, and agreed Fradella was impaired. At that time Fradella was arrested for DUI.

A third officer, Officer Gibson, testified that Fradella smelled of alcohol, his eyes were bloodshot, and he slurred his words when Gragg and Bolin brought Fradella to the squad room. Fradella was offered a breathalyzer test but refused. Fradella was then transported and booked at the Charleston County Jail.

At trial, Copeland testified that while he did tell the police that Fradella smelled of alcohol, on later reflection he believed the smell was coming from a shirt in his truck. Copeland said Fradella was not drunk, his eyes were not bloodshot, and his speech was not slurred. Finally, Copeland testified that Fradella said he wrecked his vehicle while attempting to avoid a motorcycle.

Gragg and Bolin admitted that they did not know exactly when the accident occurred, and that they had no witnesses who saw the accident or saw Fradella driving. However, Bolin testified that Fradella claimed not to have had anything else to drink prior to the time he and Gragg arrived at Fradella's home.

Officer Washington of the Charleston County Detention Center testified as to booking procedures at the Detention Center. He stated that if a prisoner is intoxicated, it is usually noted on the booking report. He had no knowledge of Fradella's condition the night of his arrest.

One of Fradella's roommates at the time of the incident, William Early, testified that Fradella was not drinking when Early saw him at a sports bar that evening. Early was awakened when Copeland brought Fradella home, and Early stated Fradella was panicky but not drunk. Early also stated he would have remembered if Fradella had admitted to the officers that he drank three beers. Early said Fradella performed the various sobriety tests well enough even though the two officers were "tag teaming" him.

Before trial, Gragg, Bolin, and Copeland testified in a hearing on Fradella's motion to dismiss based on lack of probable cause to arrest and Fradella's motion to suppress statements pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). All of the witnesses related substantially the same story to which they testified at trial. However, Gragg stated that before he arrived at Fradella's house, he only had identified Fradella as the driver of the wrecked vehicle, not as a DUI suspect. Gragg believed Fradella had been drinking, though, once Fradella stepped from the house. Gragg stated that he informed Fradella he was investigating a possible DUI when Fradella stepped from the house, but that Fradella was not in custody and was free to leave. Gragg testified to some of Fradella's statements about drinking as well as the cause of the accident. Bolin testified that he gave FradellaMiranda warnings once arrested, and that Fradella said he understood them.

Fradella also testified at the hearing on these motions. Fradella said Gragg told him that "he had to come outside now," and Fradella felt he had no choice but to cooperate with Gragg's directions. Fradella claimed he did not know his statements could be used against him.

The city court excluded as prejudicial some of Fradella's statements, and the judge also excluded as prejudicial testimony about the subsequent accident on the bridge caused by Fradella's abandoned car. However, the city court admitted Fradella's other statements, reasoning that Fradella made the statements when he either was not in custody or was already "mirandized."

A jury convicted Fradella of DUI. However, the circuit court reversed the conviction on appeal, holding that (1) the warrantless arrest of Fradella for a misdemeanor violated the "presence requirement" of S.C.Code Ann. § 17-13-30 (1985), (2) Fradella's statements and the results of field sobriety tests had to be excluded as "fruits of the poisonous tree," and (3) the charge against Fradella had to be dismissed as a sanction for the Town's failure to comply with a discovery request and turn over a photograph and the second page of a booking report from the Charleston County Jail. The Town appeals these rulings and argues that in any event the alleged errors were harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of Fradella's guilt.

II. "PRESENCE" REQUIREMENT

The Town argues that the circuit court should not have reversed Fradella's conviction because the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident satisfy the requirement that a misdemeanor be committed in an officer's presence in order to justify a warrantless arrest. We agree.

South Carolina Code Ann. § 17-13-30 (1985), states that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs "may arrest without warrant any and all persons who, within [the officers'] view, violate any of the criminal laws ... if such arrest be made at the time of such violation of law or immediately thereafter." However, in State v. Martin, 275 S.C. 141, 268 S.E.2d 105 (1980), the court noted that the rule in § 17-13-30 must be interpreted in light of S.C.Code Ann. § 23-13-60 (1989), which provides that such officers "may for any suspected freshly committed crime, whether upon view or upon prompt information or complaint, arrest without warrant...." Thus, Martin holds "an officer can arrest for a misdemeanor [not committed within his presence] when the facts and circumstances observed by the officer give him probable cause to believe that a crime has been freshly committed." 275 S.C. at 146, 268 S.E.2d at 107 (emphasis in original). Our Supreme Court has extended the operation of these statutory rules to town policemen. State v. Clark, 277 S.C. 333, 287 S.E.2d 143 (1983) (citing State v. Retford, 276 S.C. 657, 281 S.E.2d 471 (1981)).

In Martin, the officer discovered (1) two cars which obviously appeared to have recently collided, (2) a highly intoxicated man who admitted to being one of the drivers, and (3) a group of people gathered at the scene. 275 S.C. 141, 268 S.E.2d 105. The court held these circumstances sufficient to justify the warrantless arrest. Id. A number of subsequent opinions have construed Martin. See Retford, 276 S.C. 657, 281 S.E.2d 471 (1981) (holding a warrantless arrest justified when (1) the subject fit the description of the perpetrator of a recent auto theft, (2) a witness identified the subject as one who was entering automobiles, and (3) the subject was behaving in a disorderly manner); State v. Sullivan, 277 S.C. 35, 282 S.E.2d 838 (1981) (holding that an undercover agent serving as a lookout could arrest subjects without a warrant when he arrived at the drug-laden plane's landing site); Clark, 277 S.C. 333, 287 S.E.2d 143 (holding that a warrantless arrest for discharge of a firearm was permissible when (1) officers arrived at the scene shortly after being summoned, (2) officers found the subject armed and an expended shell nearby, and (3) the subject's mother told the...