Frafinals v. Postmater General
| Decision Date | 24 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-20905-CIV.,02-20905-CIV. |
| Citation | 265 F.Supp.2d 1309 |
| Parties | Vincent FRAGINALS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. POSTMASTER GENERAL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Brian David Albert, Esq., North Miami Beach, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Bob Bondi, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorneys Office, Miami, FL, for Defendan
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the motion of the Defendants, John E. Potter, Postmaster General, and the United States Postal Service, requesting dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. The Court, after having considered the motion, the responses thereto, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, enters this order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
The sixty-four (64) named Plaintiffs initially were employed by Emery Worldwide Inc. ("Emery"), a mail processing and distribution company. Pursuant to a contract, Emery provided out-sourced mail processing services to the Postal Service at the Miami, Florida, Priority Mail Processing Center ("Miami PMPC"). Under this arrangement, the Plaintiffs were employees of Emery.
The Postal Service terminated its outsourcing contract with Emery effective January 7, 2001. Effective that same date Emery permanently terminated the Plaintiffs' employment with Emery. In the meantime, the Postal Service hired the Plaintiffs for temporary, non-career, at will, positions to be effective January 7, 2001.
The Plaintiffs allege that in the first quarter of 2001, after beginning work for the Postal Service as temporary employees, Mike Ciruzzi, Plant Manager of the Miami PMPC, informed the Plaintiffs they would be granted full-time (career) employment with the Postal Service if they took and passed the postal entrance examination. Plaintiffs also allege Mr. Ciruzzi and Karen Smith, Manager of Distribution Operations at the Miami PMPC, both ret peated the conditional offer of full-time employment to Plaintiffs on several occasions throughout 2001.
Plaintiffs further allege they all registered for, took, and passed the postal entrance examination in reliance on the Postal Service's conditional offer of employment; they did not look for other employment, left other part-time employment, and rejected offers of employment from other employers in reliance on the conditional offer of employment from the Postal Service. Instead of being offered career employment with the Postal Service, they were terminated from their temporary positions on December 27, 2001.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim merely tests the sufficiency of the complaint; it does not decide the merits of the case. Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765 (11th Cir.1984). On such a motion to dismiss, the Court notes that it must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept the factual allegations as true. SEC v. ESM Group, Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Tew, 486 U.S. 1055, 108 S.Ct. 2822, 100 L.Ed.2d 923 (1988). Further, the Court should not grant a motion to dismiss "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (citations omitted); The South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 406 (11th Cir.1996). Specifically, "[i]t is a well-settled principle of law that `a complaint should not be dismissed merely because a plaintiffs allegations do not support the particular legal theory he advances, for the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.'" Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 201-02, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.1997). Nonetheless, to withstand a motion to dismiss, it is axiomatic that the complaint must allege facts sufficiently setting forth the essential elements of a cause of action.
The First Amended Complaint contains one count alleging wrongful termination/breach of contract. Plaintiffs allege Defendants conveyed a conditional offer of employment to Plaintiffs; Plaintiffs met the condition required of the offer (taking and passing the postal examination), thereby accepting the employment contract; Defendants failed to meet their obligations under the employment contract, thereby breaching the employment contract; and Defendants terminated Plaintiffs in violation of the contract, which constituted wrongful termination.
The Court concludes the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As explained more fully below, Postal Service employees are not employed pursuant to employment contracts. They are appointed to positions. Such appointments can be lawfully revoked at any time up to the point an employee actually commences the duties of the position to which he or she was appointed.
In Boyd v. United States Postal Service, et al, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1217 (W.D.Wash.1983), affd on other grounds, 752 F.2d 410 (9th Cir.1985), the plaintiff, who had previously worked for the Postal Service and then resigned to attend school, subsequently sought reinstatement with the Postal Service several years later. His request for reinstatement was denied. When Mr. Boyd later filed suit, he alleged a personnel assistant had promised him he would be reinstated. Mr. Boyd brought a claim for breach of an implied contract. Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment for the Postal Service.
The Court finds that no such promise [of reinstatement] was made to plaintiff by Linda Smith. But even if such a promise of employment was made, no cause of action arises from the promise. It is well settled that employees of the federal government derive the benefits and obligations of their official positions from the fact of appointment rather than from any contractual relationship. Le land v. United States, 213 F.2d 732, 733 (1977). The United States Postal Service is "an independent establishment within the executive branch of the government of the United States" (39 U.S.C. § 201), whose officers and employees serve through "appointments" (39 U.S.C. § 1001(a)).1 Accordingly as postal employees receive their employment rights through appointments to positions, and not as a result of personal contracts of employment, plaintiffs claim that his failure to be reinstated to a position in the Postal Service breached an "implied contract of employment" is without merit.
The Court also concludes that plaintiff was never in fact "appointed" to a position in the Postal Service. Even if the Court found that plaintiff had somehow, as a result of his conversations with Linda Smith, received an appointment, that appointment was clearly revoked by Marjorie Cochran's letter of September 11, 1980, informing plaintiff that he would not be reinstated. As employment officer, Cochran clearly had the authority to revoke the appointment. As an appointment to a federal job may be revoked at any time up to the point the employee actually commences the duties of the position to which he has been appointed, no action arises in this case from the fact of revocation.
In McLean v. United States, 538 F.2d 346, 1976 WL 23846 (Ct.C1.1976)(unpublished disposition), the plaintiff sued for lost wages on his claim of breach of contract and for specific performance of the alleged contract, alleging he was promised a job as a mail handler by the Postal Service. Before he could begin work, he was informed the job was no longer available. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding the plaintiff never had a contract, because 39 U.S.C. § 1001(a) provides that all officers and employees of the Postal Service are required to be appointed rather than hired by contract.
Baade v. United States Postal Service, 664 F.Supp. 627 (D.Me.1987), involved a plaintiff who had worked for the Postal Service as a letter carrier, and after injuring his foot, went on disability retirement. He subsequently requested reinstatement in a "light-duty" position, which was denied. After he filed an EEO complaint, the Postal Service extended a written offer of full-time employment to the plaintiff, conditioned on medical approval by the Office of Personnel Management. Plaintiff accepted the offer, obtained the required medical approval, but was not rehired by the Postal Service. He filed suit, alleging a breach of contract, among other claims. The court granted summary judgment on the contract claim, finding that employees serve by appointment pursuant to 39 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Applicants for employment, even if promised a position, have no claim for breach of contract under 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) when they are denied postal employment.
In view of the statutory requirement that Postal Service employees be appointed to their positions, see 39 U.S.C. § 1001(a), and the well-established law governing the power to appoint and the concomitant power to revoke an appointment, see generally NTEU, 663 F.2d at 246-47, it would be anomalous to conclude that 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) implicitly grants an applicant for employment the right to sue for breach of contract.
Baade v. United States Postal Service, 664 F.Supp. at 631.
Similarly, Campbell v. United States Postal Service, 1990 WL 36132 (E.D.La. 1990), affd without op., 925 F.2d 1459 (5th Cir.1991), involved a plaintiff who previously worked for the Postal Service, and applied for reinstatement thirteen years later in four Louisiana locations. His requests for reinstatement were denied in three locations, and from the fourth, he received a letter approving his request for reinstatement as positions became available. The...
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