Fragola v. The Kenific Grp.
| Decision Date | 03 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-1423 (RDM) |
| Parties | ALICE FRAGOLA, Plaintiff, v. THE KENIFIC GROUP, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Alice Fragola brings this action against her former employer The Kenific Group, Inc., asserting claims for employment discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C Code § 2-1401.01 et seq., as well as a D.C common-law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant removed the action to this Court, Dkt. 1, and now moves to dismiss the complaint as time barred and for failure to state a claim, Dkt. 3. For the reasons stated below, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendant's motion.
Because this case is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court assumes the truth of the factual allegations in the complaint, from which the following background is drawn. Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
When Plaintiff Alice Fragola commenced this action in May 2021, she was 68 years old. Dkt. 1-1 at 2 (Compl. ¶ 1). Defendant is a privately owned Virginia corporation that provides development, information technology engineering, and management consulting services to various commercial and government clients, including, as relevant here, the United States Coast Guard. Id. (Compl. ¶ 2).
Plaintiff began working for Defendant in October 2019 as a Senior Consultant. Id. at 3 (Compl. ¶ 9). Defendant assigned her to support the Coast Guard's Boat Acquisition Program (“Boat Program”) as part of a large government contract that employs multiple contracting companies, including Defendant. Id. Under this arrangement, the Coast Guard “assigned Plaintiff her functional work, ” but she was “supervised” by employees of Defendant. Id. (Compl. ¶ 10).
Plaintiff alleges that, “[t]hroughout the course of her employment with Defendant, . . . government employees, Defendant employees, and third-party contractor employees” subjected her to “discriminatory comments and treatment . . . on account of her gender and age.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 11). In her complaint, she points to five such incidents. The first occurred in November 2019, shortly after she began her assignment to work with the Coast Guard. Id. (Compl. ¶ 12). Around that time, Plaintiff alleges that the Boat Program's assistant program director, Myung Park, a government employee, discouraged Plaintiff from attending meetings with a contract vendor because Plaintiff “would be the only woman there.” Id. Plaintiff ultimately attended those meetings, but she says that, while there, she was “treated disparately from her male peers and discouraged from speaking.” Id. at 3-4 (Compl. ¶ 12). After the meetings, Plaintiff asserts that she “complained to Defendant” that “she was not being taken seriously by the client.” Id. at 4 (Compl. ¶ 12).
The second incident took place around January 2020, during a meeting between Plaintiff, Park, and Toby Burke, an employee of another contractor working on the Boat Program. Id. (Compl. ¶ 13). During that meeting, Plaintiff claims that she handed a presentation deck to Park and that Park “threw the presentation at Plaintiff, striking her on the chest.” Id. Plaintiff says that she reported this incident “to the government and to Defendant.” Id.
The third incident also occurred “in and around January 2020.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 14). When Plaintiff informed Defendant about the presentation incident, Defendant allegedly warned Plaintiff that the incident “could affect her continued employment with Defendant” and “advised her to speak to . . . Park” about it, which she did. Id. During that conversation, Park allegedly “commented that his mother was Plaintiff's age and . . . she was at home.” Id. Plaintiff then shared this comment with one of her cubicle mates, Darren Liu, who was an employee of another contractor. According to Plaintiff, Liu responded by asking Plaintiff her age and then replied, “You're too old to be working, you should retire.” Id. Plaintiff reported these comments to Defendant. Id.
The fourth incident Plaintiff identifies did not occur until some seven months later. Id. (Compl. ¶ 15). In August 2020, Plaintiff was tasked with onboarding one of Defendant's new hires, Teoman Kahraman, whom Plaintiff would be supervising. Id. During that onboarding process, Plaintiff apparently missed a required document, which prompted a government employee to tell Plaintiff, “Maybe you should retire [because] you can't remember anything.” Id. As with prior incidents, Plaintiff reported this comment to Defendant. Id.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that, after Kahraman joined Plaintiff's team, he “frequently berated [her] or otherwise exhibited hostility toward Plaintiff when Plaintiff tried to give him direction and/or feedback during one-on[]-one conference call meetings.” Id. at 5 (Compl. ¶ 16). Plaintiff subsequently “complained to Defendant about Mr. Kahraman's ongoing hostility.” Id.
In addition to these incidents, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant provided Kahraman with compensation and perks that she herself did not receive, including “a relocation package, a salary that was higher than hers, and a company-issued cell phone.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 17). When Plaintiff eventually learned this information, she complained to Defendant about this disparate treatment. Id.
Defendant placed Plaintiff on administrative leave on October 30, 2020, and terminated her employment four days later, on November 3, 2020. Id. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-19). Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated “because she complained about the treatment she endured on account of her gender and age.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 21). She also alleges that, throughout her tenure with Defendant, she “was subjected to a hostile work environment on account of her gender and age.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 20).
On May 3, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. Because Plaintiff is a citizen of Florida, Defendant is a citizen of Virginia, and Plaintiff's claims seek more than $75, 000 in damages, Defendant removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. Dkt. 1 at 2, 4-5. Shortly after removal, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss, Dkt. 3; see also Dkt. 4, which Plaintiff opposed, Dkt. 9. The Court now turns to that motion.
A motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is designed to “test[] the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff['s] favor.” Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Well-pleaded complaints include “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Raising the “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is insufficient, id.; instead, the complaint's “[f]actual allegations, ” accepted as true, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, while “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if” it appears that “actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that recovery is very remote and unlikely, '” id. at 556 (citation omitted), the complaint must nevertheless “possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief, '” id. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
Defendant first argues that Counts One and Two must be dismissed as time barred because, in Defendant's view, those claims are principally based on events that occurred in November 2019 and January 2020, and Plaintiff did not bring suit until May 2021-months after the one-year statute of limitations for those events had expired.[1] Dkt. 4 at 7-11; see also D.C Code § 2-1403.16(a) (statute of limitations). Plaintiff has a response at hand. As she points out, due to the judicial emergency created by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Superior Court for the District of Columbia “suspended, tolled, and extended, ” all D.C. Code statutes of limitations from March 18, 2020 through March 30, 2021, and therefore each of the events described in her complaint supports a timely claim under the DCHRA. Dkt. 9 at 12; see Order, Superior Court of the District of Columbia (amended Jan. 13, 2021), at 3, https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/matters-docs/General%20Order%20pdf/Amended-Order-1-13-21FINAL.PDF; see also D.C. Code § 11-947 (). In its reply brief, Defendant “acknowledges that the [Superior] Court tolled the statute of limitations in...
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