FRAIN v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

• Decision Date: 30 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 87-677,87-677
• Citation: 572 A.2d 447
• Parties: J. George FRAIN, et al., Appellants, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

572 A.2d 447

J. George FRAIN, et al., Appellants, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,Appellees.

No. 87-677.

District of Columbia of Appeals.

Argued February 21, 1990.

Decided March 30, 1990.

Appeal from the Superior Court, Richard S. Salzman, J.

Elaine Mittleman, Falls Church, Va., for appellants.

Edward E. Schwab, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Herbert O. Reid, Sr., Acting Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees.

Before ROGERS, Chief Judge, and TERRY and SCHWELB, Associate Judges.

SCHWELB, Associate Judge:

Appellants are residents of the Adams-Morgan area of northwest Washington. In 1986, claiming that existing parking facilities in their neighborhood were inadequate as a result of various alleged acts and omissions by the executive and legislative branches of the District of Columbia government, they brought this action in the Superior Court against the District and certain of its officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They requested, among other things, that the Mayor be ordered to implement the Neighborhood Off-Street Parking Act, D.C.Code §§ 40-803 et seq. (1986 Repl.), which authorizes but does not require the Mayor to acquire land for off-streetparking; that the District be compelled to expend for parking purposes at least 50% of revenues from "all parking matters"; that the court declare unconstitutional the Stable and Reliable Source of Revenue for WMATA Act, D.C.Code § 1-2466 (1987), upon the ground, among others, that users of automobiles are denied equal protection by the use of parking revenues for the Metro system; and that District officials be precluded from "booting" automobiles for non-payment of parking tickets without prior notice to the owner.¹ After some preliminary skirmishes, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiffs either lacked standing or were "wrong as a matter of law."

The function of the courts is to adjudicate rather than to legislate or to exercise executive responsibilities. We are impressed by the District's argument that most or all of appellants' complaints would be properly addressed to the legislative and executive branches of our government rather than to the judiciary. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251, 46 S.Ct. 248, 250, 70 L.Ed. 566 (1926) (Brandeis, J.) ("[t]o supply omissions [in a statute] transcends the judicial function"). Appellants' standing to assert their claims is likewise questionable. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). We need not and indeed cannot decide the merits of appellants' contentions, however, because we are satisfied that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.

The notice of appeal in this case was filed almost five months after the trial court entered judgment against appellants, and no effective action was taken to toll the running of the 30-day period prescribed by D.C.App.R. 4(a)(1). We are unable to agree with appellants that they were lulled into inaction by any statement or act of the trial court, or that there is any basis here for invoking the "unique circumstances" exception articulated in Thompson v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 384, 84 S.Ct. 397, 11 L.Ed.2d 404 (1964) (per curiam), and other authorities discussed below. Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed.²

I

On January 17, 1987, Judge Richard S. Salzman signed an order granting summary judgment in favor of the District and its officials. Three days later, that order was entered on the docket. On January 29, 1987, asserting that she was forced to do so by the press of other litigation, counsel for appellants filed a motion for an extension of time until March 10, 1987 to submit what she characterized only as a "motion for reconsideration." The government filed no opposition to the motion for an extension. On February 18, 1987, twenty-nine days after the docketing of the judgment in the District's favor, Judge Shellie F. Bowers entered an order granting the motion for an extension as unopposed. This order was mailed to counsel on February 19, 1987, thirty days after the entry of summary judgment.

On March 9, 1987, again citing the burden of other litigation matters, appellants' attorney filed a motion to extend until April 6, 1987 the time for filing a motion for reconsideration. The trial judge did not act on the second motion. On April 6, 1987, appellants filed the anticipated motion for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment. They contendedthat they had standing to bring the action, that the Cokinos decision³ cited by the judge was distinguishable, and that the judgment was unclear "in that it is not possible to determine which holdings apply to the various claims raised by plaintiffs."

On May 14, 1987, Judge Salzman issued an order which stated in pertinent part that

the motion to reconsider is granted and on reconsideration, the award of summary judgment to defendants is granted for the reasons stated in the initial ruling.

A notice of appeal from the May 14, 1987 order was filed on June 11, 1987.

II

Our Rule 4(a)(1) provides that a notice of appeal in a civil case shall be filed within thirty days after the entry of judgment in the Superior Court. This time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional. In re C.I.T., 369 A.2d 171, 172 (D.C. 1977); Valentine v. Real Estate Comm'n, 163 A.2d 554, 556 (D.C. 1960); see also Browder v. Director, Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 560, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). The notice of appeal in this case, as we have noted, was not filed within thirty days of the judgment.

Our Rule 4(a)(2) provides, however, that the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal is terminated as to all parties by the timely filing of any of the following motions:

[f]or judgment notwithstanding the verdict; to amend or make additional findings of fact . . .; to vacate, alter or amend the order or judgment; for new trial; for reconsideration if authorized by the rules of the Superior Court; and any other motion seeking relief in the nature of the foregoing.

See generally Coleman v. Lee Washington Hauling Co., 388 A.2d 44, 45 (D.C. 1978).

In the motion for reconsideration which they belatedly filed in the trial court, appellants did not identify the specific Rule under which they were proceeding. Although litigants often style their requests to trial judges to take a second look at their contentions as "motions for reconsideration," the Superior Court's Civil Rules make no explicit provision for such a motion. Cf. In re Alexander, 428 A.2d 812, 815 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1149, 102 S.Ct. 1014, 71 L.Ed.2d 303 (1982). Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e), however, authorizes the filing of a motion to alter or amend a judgment and specifies that such a motion must be served within ten days after the entry of judgment. Civil Rule 60(b)(1) provides that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.⁴

In Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union No. 730, 482 A.2d 801, 804 (D.C. 1984), this court explained that if

the movant is requesting consideration of additional circumstances . . . the motion is properly considered under Rule 60(b), but if the movant is seeking relief from the adverse consequences of the original order on the basis of error of law, the motion is properly considered under Rule 59(e). Coleman v. Lee Washington Hauling Co., supra note 5, 388 A.2d at 46 & n. 5 (citing 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 204.12[1] at 953); Cohen v. Holmes, 106 A.2d 147, 148 (D.C. 1954) (Rule 59(e) motion does not permit alteration of the judgment or order because of an improper factual basis).

In the present case, appellants' motion for reconsideration, although it was accompanied by a stack of newspaper clippings and letters to the editor bemoaning the parking situation, presented no new competent materials to the court for its consideration. See Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(e) (providing that affidavits in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall be made on personal knowledge and shall set forth such facts aswould be admissible in evidence).⁵ The essence of appellants' argument was that Judge Salzman's initial decision was incorrect and that he should reconsider it. This kind of motion is properly brought pursuant to Rule 59(e), and cannot be converted into a Rule 60(b)(1) motion in order to avoid the 10-day filing requirement of Rule 59(e). D.D. v. M.T., 550 A.2d 37, 42 & n. 5 (D.C. 1988). The nature of a motion is determined by the relief sought, not by its label or caption. Wallace, supra, 482 A.2d at 804. Accordingly, we conclude that appellants' motion for reconsideration was a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e).

As this court explained in Wallace, 482 A.2d at 803 n. 5,

[a] timely motion filed pursuant to Rule 59 tolls the time for appeal of the underlying judgment, Coleman v. Lee Washington Hauling Co., 388 A.2d 44, 47 (D.C. 1978); a motion under Rule 60(b) does not, Smith v. Canada, 305 A.2d 521, 522 (D.C. 1973).

We must therefore determine whether the motion was timely and, if not, whether equitable considerations require us to treat it as though it were.

III

As we have noted above, Rule 59(e) requires that a motion to alter or amend be filed within ten days of the entry of judgment. Superior Court Civil Rule 6(b) provides that the court may not extend the time for taking any action under certain enumerated Rules, specifically including Rule 59(c), "except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them." Rule 59(e) contains no such exception. Accordingly, the 10-day period specified in Rule 59(e) cannot be extended.

Appellants' motion for reconsideration...