Frakes v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150
| Decision Date | 26 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-3091.,15-3091. |
| Parties | Michelle FRAKES, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. PEORIA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 150, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Irene K. Dymkar, Attorney, Law Office of Irene K. Dymkar, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Daniel Francis Gallagher, Attorney, Querrey & Harrow, Chicago, IL, Myriam Z. Kasper, Attorney, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, Ruth F. Masters, Attorney, Masters Law, Oak Park, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before Flaum, Easterbrook, and Williams, Circuit Judges.
Michelle Frakes was honorably dismissed from her job as a special education teacher at Peoria School District No. 150 ("Peoria") in a voluntary reduction of force. Because Frakes had received "unsatisfactory" ratings as a teacher, state law placed her on the schedule of teachers to be dismissed. Displeased, Frakes filed a lawsuit against Peoria alleging that her "unsatisfactory" performance rating constituted unlawful interference under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Peoria, finding that Frakes failed to show that she engaged in any protected activity giving rise to a Section 504 claim. We agree. While Frakes provided some evidence that her "unsatisfactory" performance rating may have been unfair and her preferred teaching method may be better suited for disabled students, this does not render Frakes's teaching style a protected activity under Section 504. Frakes provided no evidence that she complained about or discouraged discrimination based on disability or engaged in any other activity protected by law.
In affirming the district court, we also reject Peoria's assertion that this case is barred by the doctrine of res judicata . Peoria waived this defense and agreed to defending lawsuits in both state and federal court by waiting over a year and a half to make a res judicata argument. That was too late.
From August 2002 until May 2012, Frakes was a full-time special education teacher at Peoria. Beginning in August 2006, she was assigned to the Day Treatment Program, where she taught junior high (6-8th grade) students with various disabilities and behavioral and emotional disorders. All of Frakes's students were eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq ., and each student had an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP"), which mapped out their level of performance, goals, benchmarks, accommodations, and modifications. The students were also all prescribed Behavioral Intervention Plans ("BIPs") to address behavior issues which interfered with their learning.
The events giving rise to Frakes's claim began in October of 2011, when Carolyn Nunn assumed the role of Assistant Principal of Day Treatment at Peoria and became Frakes's new supervisor. Nunn had worked as a speech-language pathologist for the school district for 18 years, was a qualified administrator, and had experience evaluating teachers. It was Nunn's responsibility to evaluate Frakes's performance. And, like all of Frakes's former supervisors,1 Nunn observed several deficiencies in Frakes's teaching performance.
On February 1, 2012, Nunn gave Frakes an overall performance rating of "unsatisfactory." In her detailed evaluation, Nunn noted that Frakes struggled with classroom management and was often unprepared and unorganized in the classroom, for IEP meetings, and for faculty presentations. Nunn noted that Frakes did not collect data on her students' performance at the expected frequency, specifically observing that for one student Frakes only had three data points for an 18-week semester. Nunn's evaluation also pointed out that Frakes arrived late to work, leaving her class unsupervised. When she was in class, Frakes's lack of classroom management skills left her classroom "lack [ing] order and discipline" and "extremely chaotic." The evaluation listed several specific examples during one classroom observation, in which Nunn detailed that students "ignore[d]" Frakes, would not comply with her orders, and that Frakes's "inability to effectively manage her classroom results in a significant amount of valuable instructional time being wasted."
When Frakes received this evaluation, she refused to sign it because she felt that the feedback was unfair. She contended that technology issues had affected her performance and were responsible for her problems with a presentation to other teachers, classroom instructions, and preparation of IEPs. She also argued that she was not given notice that she was expected to prepare an IEP by a specific deadline. She asserted that other teachers at the Day Treatment Program taught according to similar principles as she did. To formalize her opposition to her evaluation she drafted a document entitled "Points for Rebuttal." In this document she admitted that she needed improvement in her performance and at times she struggled with classroom management, but she defended her teaching methods and protested Nunn's harsh criticism. Frakes did not mention her students' rights or argue that her methods of teaching were better for her disabled students.
Frakes hand-delivered her "Points for Rebuttal" to the District's Human Resources Department. Still, as a result of her "unsatisfactory" rating, Frakes was placed on a remediation plan. Frakes's remediation plan gave her directions to improve in the areas of deficiency noted in the evaluation. Before the remediation period could begin, however, she informed the District that she was unable to work due to serious health conditions, and she was placed on medical leave status for the remainder of the school year. During the 2011-2012 school year, neither Frakes, nor any parents, guardians, or other Peoria faculty filed an IDEA due process complaint or any formal complaint challenging a violation of a student's IDEA or Section 504 rights. There is no record that Frakes objected to anything in her students' IEPs or BIPs or complained that Nunn's evaluations encouraged discrimination against disabled students.
On April 9, 2012, Frakes was honorably dismissed due to the school district's decision to reduce its teaching force. As a result of her "unsatisfactory" rating, Frakes, along with nine other full-time tenured teachers, was placed in "Group 2" on the "sequence of honorable dismissal list" in accordance with Illinois law. In the voluntary reduction of force, the Board of Education approved the dismissal of 54 teachers, including Frakes. Frakes received notice of her honorable dismissal in a letter dated April 10, 2012. Her last day of employment was on May 31, 2012.
On September 4, 2012, Frakes filed a complaint against Peoria in the Circuit Court of Peoria County in Illinois, asserting wrongful termination based on Section 24-12 of the Illinois School Code. She did not raise any federal claims in this lawsuit, and it was defeated at the summary judgment stage. The state court found that the District did not violate the Illinois School Code.
A week before her state case was filed, on August 28, 2012, Frakes filed this case against Peoria in federal court, claiming violations of Section 504. Specifically, she claimed that her "unsatisfactory" evaluation and subsequent honorable dismissal interfered with her ability to aid students in exercising their rights under Section 504. On April 9, 2015, Peoria moved for summary judgment. The district court granted judgment in favor of Peoria, finding that Frakes did not provide evidence that she engaged in activity protected by Section 504. Because it found summary judgment was appropriate, the district court did not address the District's res judicata argument. This appeal followed.
As an initial matter, Frakes challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment based on the court's application of Central District of Illinois Local Rule 7.1(D). District courts have "considerable discretion in interpreting and applying their local rules" and this court will "intrude on that discretion only where we are convinced that the district made a mistake." Dr. Robert L. Meinders, D.C., Ltd. v. UnitedHealthcare, Inc. , 800 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We review a district court's enforcement of its local rules for an abuse of discretion. Friend v. Valley View Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. , 789 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2015).
At the time Frakes filed her motion opposing summary judgment, Local Rule 7.1(D) stated that a party opposing summary judgment must Loc. R. 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2). Under the rule, a "failure to respond to any numbered fact will be deemed an admission of fact." Loc. R. 7.1(d)(2)(b)(6).
Frakes failed to follow Local Rule 7.1(D). In opposing summary judgment, she did not identify material and disputed facts as required. Instead, she listed admitted facts as disputed and added supplementary explanations to them ( her brief, "Plaintiff admits this matter, but has it listed as disputed."). The district court noted that Frakes's violation of the rule impeded judicial economy, and found "[t]he failure to follow the Local Rules requires the Court to do an extensive scouring of the record to determine if these are actual disputed facts ...." So, the court refused to consider Frakes's supplemental explanations to admitted facts and deemed "admitted, but disputed" facts to be simply admitted. We find the court made no error in doing so.
Contrary to Frakes's contention, Local ...
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