Fraley v. Null, Inc.

Decision Date07 December 1966
Docket NumberNo. 507,507
PartiesRobert FRALEY v. NULL, INC., et al.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Kenneth J. Mackley, Hagerstown (Paul Ottinger, Hagerstown, on the brief), for appellant.

Charles U. Price, Frederick (Seymour B. Stern, Frederick, on the brief), for appellees.

Before HAMMOND, C. J., and HORNEY, OPPENHEIMER, BARNES and FINAN, JJ.

FINAN, Judge.

Robert Fraley, appellant (plaintiff below), for over a year prior to the spring of 1963, had been working farm property in the Creagerstown area, Frederick County, Maryland, consisting of 260 acres which belonged to Eugene Miller. This farm had at one time belonged to the appellant's father, Austin Fraley, who lost it due to financial reverses.

Miller expressed a desire to sell the farm and in March of 1963, the father proposed to Delbert Null, a friend of many years standing and president of Null, Inc., appellee (defendant below), that appellee purchase the farm and enter into an agreement with his son, Robert Fraley, whereby the latter would work the property and eventually purchase it from appellee. Pursuant to this suggestion appellee acquired the farm property from Miller.

In late March or early April 1963 a conference was held in the office of appellee in Frederick at which Delbert Null, David Weinberg, a practicing attorney and half owner of appellee and Robert Fraley were present. The terms of a lease, with an option to purchase, were discussed. It was orally agreed between the parties that appellee, would lease the farm to Robert Fraley for a period of one year beginning April 10, 1963, and terminating April 9, 1964, at a monthly rental of $275, with an option to purchase the property for the sum of $40,000, at anytime within a nine month period dating from April 10, 1963. It was further understood that David Weinberg would reduce the terms to a formal written contract for execution by the parties.

There is a sharp conflict in the testimony, as to the understanding of the parties regarding the payment of rent. The appellant contends that the first payment was due June 10, 1963, and that the next payment was not due until the fall, after the crops were harvested and sold, at which time the rent would be brought up to date.

The appellee contended that there was no such understanding pointing out that there was no real money crop on the farm it being devoted primarily to the raising of beef cattle for which there is a market the year around and that rental payments were to be made in advance on the 10th of each month starting with the 10th day of April 1963.

There was also a conflict in the testimony as to when the lease was to have been ready for execution. Robert Fraley called the appellee's office two days after the meeting at which the oral agreement had been reached thinking that it would have been prepared by that time and testified that he made repeated telephone calls and several visits to the appellee's office, requesting a copy of the agreement, that his mother had called and a Mrs. Fout, who worked for his father, visited the appellee's office in an effort to obtain the lease for him. David Weinberg countered with testimony, that the lease was ready May 22, 1963, but that the Fraleys made no effort to execute it. In any event the lease-option agreement was never signed by either party.

Robert Fraley made his first monthly payment of rent on June 15, 1963. The summer months went by without any further payment and on September 12, 1963, Delbert Null wrote a letter to the appellant's father advising him that the rent was five months in arrears and that if this rent due and owing was not paid within a two week period, 'I will consider the agreement entered into with you with regards to giving you an option to purchase within a certain period of time and a first right of refusal thereafter null and void.' The rent was not forthcoming in two weeks and appellee laid a distraint for rent on the property and on October 10, 1963, the appellant paid $1,375.00 rent in arrears. It should be noted that the appellant had been inducted into military service on July 10, 1963 and was released December 10, 1963. While in the army he hired Robert Ogle to conduct the farming operations. There was evidence to the effect that some repairs were made to the hay barracks, the stone barn and that hog pens were built, however, there is nothing in the record that would indicate that any substantial improvements were made on the property during its possession by the appellant and that these acts constituted no more than usual farm husbandry.

There was evidence that in September or October of 1963 appellee entered into a contract of sale for the farm with a Victor Leisner and that Leisner after learning of appellant's interest in the farm requested cancellation of the contract, with which appellee concurred. Also on November 25, 1963, appellee, entered into a contract with Austin Ward to sell the farm to him for $51,000. On November 27, 1963, appellant had his attorney write David Weinberg a letter delineating his understanding of the transaction between the parties and listing the alleged breaches of contract on the part of the appellee, stating that he had been instructed by appellant to file suit for specific performance, or in the event the property had been sold, to collect damages by way of claiming all consideration received in excess of $40,000. In early December 1963, a meeting was held in the office of the appellee, at which the appellant, two attorneys representing him, his mother, David Weinberg and Delbert Null, were all in attendance. At this meeting those representing the appellant took the position that appellant's contract with appellee was canceled, however, that appellee would also deem the contract with Austin Ward canceled, and that the appellant would have the opportunity to purchase the property for $40,000 on or before January 9, 1964, provided he also paid an insurance bill in the amount of $1,300 owed to the appellee by the appellant's father, which bill had no connection whatsoever with the farm property or its operation. On January 9, 1964 the appellant went to the office of appellee and told David Weinberg he was going to receive financial assistance from a well-to-do neighbor farmer, William R. Seiss, who had agreed to advance the necessary funds and take a purchase money mortgage at 6% as security. The closing was set for that evening January 9, 1964, at 9 p. m. David Weinberg, Delbert Null and a notary public were waiting in the office of the appellee, when, shortly before 9 p. m., appellant's mother called and said her son could not be present that night.

The last payment of rent was made on November 26, 1963; in February 1964 appellee instituted eviction proceedings against appellant for failure to pay rent and he was evicted by court order with judgment entered against him for unpaid rent in the sum of $1,100.

On January 28, 1964, appellee entered into a contract for sale of the property to Austin Ward for $51,000, which was consummated on April 24, 1964. The same day appellant filed this suit for specific performance of his purported option with the appellee for the purchase of the farm. The learned Chancellor in the court below dismissed the bill of complaint with the proviso that the judgment obtained by appellee against appellant, in the sum of $1,100 for rent in arrears, be marked 'settled and off,' as a crop of rye had been planted by appellant, which he would have had the right to harvest and the amount of the judgment was approximately the value of the crop.

The question for this Court to decide is whether or not the Chancellor in the lower court erred in refusing to grant to the appellant a decree for specific performance of the option agreement to purchase the farm.

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10 cases
  • Beall v. Beall, 50
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • September 11, 1981
    ...by him. An option to purchase land concerns the sale of land and is, therefore, governed by the statute of frauds. See Farley v. Null, 244 Md. 567, 224 A.2d 448 (1966); Bank v. Hurst Estate, 187 Md. 333, 50 A.2d 133 (1946). To render a contract enforceable under the statute of frauds, the r......
  • Rooney v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • September 10, 1976
    ...v. Willcoxon, 211 Ga. 462, 86 S.E.2d 507 (1955); Robison v. Moorefield, 347 Ill.App. 508, 107 N.E.2d 278 (1952); Fraley v. Null, Inc., 244 Md. 567, 224 A.2d 448 (1966); Nason v. Morrissey, 218 Miss. 601, 67 So.2d 506 (1953); Stevenson v. Titus, 332 Pa. 100, 2 A.2d 853 (1938); Watkins v. Arn......
  • Montage Furniture Servs., LLC v. Regency Furniture, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • September 4, 2013
    ...law requires unqualified acceptance of the offer for the purported acceptance to be effective. See, e.g., Fraley v. Null, Inc., 244 Md. 567, 224 A.2d 448, 451–52 (1966) (citation omitted); Post v. Gillespie, 219 Md. 378, 149 A.2d 391, 396 (1959) (collecting authority); accord Learning Works......
  • Letke v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., Civil Action No. RDB-12-3799
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • October 19, 2015
    ...Montage Furniture Servs., LLC v. Regency Furniture, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524 (D. Md. 2013); see also Fraley v. Null, Inc., 244 Md. 567, 572, 224 A.2d 448 (1966); Post v. Gillespie, 219 Md. 378, 385, 149 A.2d 391 (1959). Indeed, an acceptance that modifies or alters the terms of perfor......
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