De France et al. v. De France et al.
| Decision Date | 01 January 1859 |
| Citation | 34 Pa. 385 |
| Parties | De France et al. versus De France et al. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Equitable principles are continually insinuating themselves into the system of the law. Our law abounds with principles that were formerly purely equitable. And the process by which this takes place is perfectly natural; for, in the progress of society, and in the natural changes of its customs, exceptional principles are constantly demanding recognition, and continually enlarging their sphere, until they become general, and thus truly legal. In this way, the social system keeps pace with the changes of social purposes and principles, and never requires any violent disruption.
It is often said, that equity is part of our law; yet this does not mean that there is no distinction with us between law and equity. There is a natural and indelible distinction between them in so far as equity is expressive of that form of justice that demands exceptional principles and exceptional remedies, where the general rules of law are inadequate to the proper solution of given cases. And of course there is, and always will be, an intermediate and indeterminate zone of ambiguous principles, which cannot be classified as belonging certainly and exclusively to either law or equity; and this ambiguity will always make them somewhat difficult of administration, and give rise to somewhat inconsistent decisions.
But it was always a rule of practical jurisprudence, however unsteadily adhered to, that where a case is covered by a clear rule of positive law, it is only the court, and not the jury, that can admit or administer any exceptional or equitable principle in its behalf. This rule is a very essential one, for without it we can really have no law. For the ascertainment of matters so transient as facts, a transient and untrained tribunal like a jury is quite adequate; but for the settlement of principles, which in their very nature are enduring, a trained and permanent tribunal is absolutely necessary. There can hardly be a law that is free from equitable exceptions, and if the jury are to be the judges whether a given case is properly within any such exception, then the exceptions, and consequently the law itself, become quite indeterminate.
It is sometimes supposed that, when a principle of equitable exception to law has become recognized, the jury must judge from all the facts of a case, whether it properly falls within the principle, taking the advice of the court to aid them in their duty. But this is not universally true, even in strictly legal questions; for there is scarcely any case that does not abound with facts which are totally inadmissible as evidence, in any proper treatment of the question. These are excluded by the court, especially, if there is any danger that the jury may attach importance to them. This is a mode in which the judge is continually taking facts from the jury, and thus really weighing the importance of them, in the performance of his legitimate and undisputed functions.
In the present case, the judge discussed the facts, and decided their inadequacy, as a ground for an equitable exception to the general rules of law; and yet, in doing so, he was simply performing his own functions. No judge ever assigns reasons for overruling an offer of evidence without discussing the facts involved in it, in order to show that they have no weight or importance in the investigation. The preliminary operation for all the final reasonings on a case, is to get clear of all such facts as ought not to influence the conclusion. No philosopher ever attempts the solution of a case of natural science, without having first eliminated all the facts that are unimportant, or that would tend only to embarrass or mislead. In a juridical case, this preliminary operation is performed by the judge; and in performing it, he is of course dealing with facts, and deciding how far they are proper elements of the case. He performs the same operation in a case stated, when he first sifts out all the irrelevant and immaterial facts, before he begins to reason upon the essential residue. In the early stages of juridical science, this function would, of course, be very rudely performed. Centuries of observation and practice have been constantly improving our skill and science in this respect. The time was, when many facts were admitted as important in given investigations, which are now admitted to be not so, and time may yet work other modifications of our ideas.
A fact, alleged contrary to the well-known laws of cause and effect in nature and in society, is not to be proved by the ordinary evidence that is proper for ordinary facts. The judge weighs all the evidence offered of the fact, and decides upon its competency or adequacy. If the fact really conflicts with a natural law that is not well known, then the law itself becomes matter of evidence by means of...
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