France, In re
| Decision Date | 01 March 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 11036,11036 |
| Citation | 147 Mont. 283,411 P.2d 732 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Glenn Douglas FRANCE, Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Berger, Anderson & Sinclair, Richard Anderson (argued), Billings, for appellant.
Paul F. Reynolds (argued), Helena, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, the Honorable Charles B. Sande, Judge presiding, denying a petition appealing from an order of the Montana Highway Patrol Board suspending petitioner's driver's license. Petitioner's license was revoked pursuant to section 31-147, subds. (a) 3 and 4, R.C.M.1947. Such section probides: 'Authority of board to suspend license or driving privilege or issue probationary license. (a) The board is hereby authorized to suspend the license or driving privilege of an operator or chauffeur without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee: * * *
'3. Has been convicted with such frequency of serious offenses against traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles as to indicate a disrespect for traffic laws and a disregard for the safety of other persons on the highways;
Petitioner's brief lays great stress on the fact that the only evidence offered by the Montana Highway Patrol Board was the official driving record of the petitioner. The record also discloses that at the time of the hearing in the court below petitioner, who seemed so interested in his license, did not appear to testify.
This is his record:
February 16, 1952--violating gross vehicle weight law.
April 27, 1954--violating traffic light law.
May 16, 1954--violating right-of-way.
July 30, 1954--reckless driving.
December 18, 1955--55 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone.
October 2, 1956--75 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone.
November 18, 1956--80 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone.
September 5, 1957--70 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone.
November 7, 1957--70 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone.
July, 1958--70 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone.
June 1, 1959--95 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone.
June 20, 1959--48 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone.
April 18, 1962--35 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone.
March 30, 1963--80 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone.
November 21, 1964--50 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone.
December 10, 1964--72 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone.
It should be noted that the last twelve violations are speeding violations and do not include several other traffic violations.
Almost as interesting as this record of violations are actions taken by the State Highway Patrol in trying to discipline him. After some five years of driving and nine violations appellant was sent a letter on December 16, 1957, advising him of the fact his license was in jeopardy because of his driving history. This first letter seemed to have made an imprint for some six months passed before he was caught going 70 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. However, just one year later on July 25, 1958, he received another letter of warning. As can be seen from the official report, June of 1959, was a bad month for appellant for he received two speeding violations. As as result of these violations he was interviewed by a representative of the Patrol and placed on probation for six months. This probation order was not obeyed and in December of 1959, it was necessary for the Highway Board to issue an order picking up his license for he had not voluntarily turned it in. After six months the Board returned his license in June 1960. Just six months went by before the next letter of warning in January 1961. On April 26, 1963, he was again placed on six months probation by the Patrol Board due to his driving record with this restriction lifted on November 20, 1963. Less than a year passed before he was once more brought to the Board's attention due to his driving habits and on October 26, 1964, his license was suspended for three months. This deterrent did not bother Mr. France for less than one month, on November 21, 1964, he was again convicted of speeding. For some reason, not appearing, no mention was made of the fact he was driving without a license. Again, within 20 days after the speeding violation, he was convicted for speeding on December 10, 1964, still driving during the three months period when his license was suspended. On December 16, 1964, the Board, having before it his November driving record, suspended his license for an additional six months and when the Board met in Junuary they added a full year suspension based not only on the December violation but the whole record. Perhaps too, in view of this record, the Board gave consideration to the general welfare of their fellow man.
As has been previously stated, petitioner said this was the only evidence submitted on the facts. What more should be needed?
In argument and brief, petitioner quite wisely abandoned the facts and asks this court to consider the law, separate and apart from the facts.
He sets forth four spectifications of error.
1. The Board and the Court erred in considering the same evidence twice;
2. The Board and Court erred in considering any violations resulting in a bond forfeiture prior to July 1, 1961, as being tantamount to convictions;
3. Section 31-147 subd. (a) 4, R.C.M.1947 is unconstitutional, as an unlawful delegation of legislative authority and unenforceable as being too vague; and
4. The Board exceeded its authority in suspending appeallant's driver's license for a period in excess of one year.
The petitioner's first specification tries to limit the Board and the Court in their review of his driving record back to his last suspension. In effect, he says I have paid my penalty to society and once that has been done you are limited in examining my record to what has taken place after the last suspension. In brief and argument he stresses the words 'punished' and 'penalized' in section 31-147, subds. (a) 3 and 4. The basis for his argument is the erroneous concept of the legal reason for the driver's license suspension. The purpose and nature of the suspension is for the protection of the unsuspecting public and does not consititute 'punishment' as understood within the meaning of the law. This is well put by the Idaho Supreme Court in the case. State v. Parker, 81 Idaho 51, 54, 336 P.2d 318, 320, when it said: ...
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State v. Marquez, 5536
...537, 428 P.2d 43 (1967); Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 126 N.W.2d 778, 9 A.L.R.3d 746 (1964); In re France, 147 Mont. 283, 411 P.2d 732 (1966); Texas Department of Public Safety v. Richardson, Tex., 384 S.W.2d 128 (1964); Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division, Utah,......
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...unsuspecting individuals using the public thoroughfares, acted properly in suspending his privilege to drive. See In re France (1966), 147 Mont. 283, 288, 411 P.2d 732, 734. Issue 3. Defendant claims that section 31-147, R.C.M.1947, is unconstitutional having been impliedly repealed by the ......
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State ex rel. Griffith v. Brustkern
...and highways of this state." 61-11-201, MCA. This Court considered the same issue under a similar fact situation in In Re France, (1966), 147 Mont. 283, 411 P.2d 732. "The petitioner's first specification tries to limit the Board and the Court in their review of his driving record back to h......