France v. Cnty. of Charleston

• Docket Number: C. A. 2:23-00157-BHH-MHC
• Decision Date: 16 May 2023
• Parties: Christopher J. France, Plaintiff, v. County of Charleston, Alice A. Richter, Thomas T. Hodges, Julie J. Armstrong, Emily G. Johnson, Victoria K. Rhea, Sara Von Schweinitz, Michael H. Leach, Lisa A. France, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

1

Christopher J. France, Plaintiff, v. County of Charleston, Alice A. Richter, Thomas T. Hodges, Julie J. Armstrong, Emily G. Johnson, Victoria K. Rhea, Sara Von Schweinitz, Michael H. Leach, Lisa A. France, Defendants.

C. A. No. 2:23-00157-BHH-MHC

United States District Court, D. South Carolina

May 16, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MOLLY H. CHERRY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff Christopher J. France, a pro se litigant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.

In an Order dated March 21, 2023, Plaintiff was notified of material defects in his Complaint and given the opportunity to cure the defects by filing an amended complaint. ECF No 7. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint involves a South Carolina domestic relations case. He appears to challenge a temporary award of support payments pending resolution of a divorce action brought by his wife,^[1] asks this court to stop the garnishment of his wages, and requests that this court dismiss the state court family law case. Plaintiff also asserts sovereign-citizen type claims in which he alleges he is owed money from his wife and his wife's attorneys because he did not “consent” to the divorce action being brought in the South Carolina family court. He claims he sent attorney Emily Johnston an email informing her of his fee schedule and asserting she owed him $8,000,000 for allegedly depriving him of his rights, he sent some of the Defendants a “Notice of Claim” in which he requested $10,018,125 from each, and these Defendants allegedly failed to respond to Plaintiff's demands. See ECF No. 1 at 3-4, 7, 23; ECF No. 1-4.

Plaintiff asserts that he brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) for violations of rights under Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution (the Contract Clause) as well as violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Thirteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 1 at 4. He also asserts claims under South Carolina law for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, and actual and constructive fraud.

As relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages, termination of the garnishment of his earnings, and dismissal of the state court domestic relations action. ECF No. 1 at 23. He also requests that a grand jury be empaneled to investigate Defendants for alleged criminal actions. Id. at 22.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, this filing is nonetheless subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that a plaintiff has standing; subject matter jurisdiction exists; and the case is not frivolous.^[2] See Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2012); Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-364 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) was not applicable where a pro se party filed an appeal and paid the filing fee, the court had “inherent authority, wholly aside from any statutory warrant, to dismiss an appeal or petition for review as frivolous”). “[I]t is well established that a court has broad inherent power sua sponte to dismiss an action, or part of an action, which is frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad faith.” Brown v. Maynard, No. L-11-619, 2011 WL 883917, at *1 (D. Md. Mar.11, 2011) (citing cases). Therefore, a court has “the discretion to dismiss a case at any time, notwithstanding the payment of any filing fee or any portion thereof, if it determines that the action is factually or legally frivolous.” Id. As such, this case is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous. See, e.g., Carter v. Ervin, No. 14-0865, 2014 WL 2468351 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014); Cornelius v. Howell, No. 06-3387, 2007 WL 397449, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 WL 4952430 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2007), aff'd, 251 Fed.Appx. 246 (4th Cir. 2007).

This Court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

This action is subject to summary dismissal because this court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and a district court is charged with ensuring that all cases before it are properly subject to such jurisdiction. In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Generally, a case can be filed in a federal district court only if there is diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or if there is federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Here, Plaintiff has not alleged diversity jurisdiction.^[3] Nor, as discussed below, has Plaintiff alleged facts to indicate that this court has federal question jurisdiction.

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to appeal the results of a ruling in the state family court action to this court,^[4] the current action should be dismissed because federal district courts do not hear “appeals” from state court actions. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983) (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can only be conducted by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); see also Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2020). To rule in favor of Plaintiff on claims filed in this action may require this court to overrule and reverse orders and rulings made in the state court. Such a result is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Davani v. Virginia Dep't. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719-720 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293-294 (2005); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 1997).

Appeals of orders issued by lower state courts must go to a higher state court.^[5] Secondly, the Congress, for more than two hundred years, has provided that only the Supreme Court of the United States may review (review is discretionary by way of a writ of certiorari and is not an appeal of right) a decision of a state's highest court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491(3d Cir. 1997). In civil, criminal, and other cases, the Supreme Court of the United States has reviewed decisions of the Supreme Court of South Carolina that were properly brought before it under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 or that statute's predecessors. See, e.g.,, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1991) (an example of a South Carolina Supreme Court case that was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court).

Alternatively, to the extent that there is a pending state court action, the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 (1971), and its progeny preclude this Court from interfering with the ongoing proceedings as Plaintiff can raise these issues in the state court proceedings. The Younger doctrine applies to civil proceedings that “implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgment of its courts.” Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief related to the family court matters underlying the action in state court, his claims are barred under the Younger doctrine. However, the abstention principles established in Younger might not require dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for damages. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt., Servs., LLC, No. PWG-15-1031, 2017 WL 167832, at *1, 4 (D. Md. Jan. 17, 2017) (“[C]auses of action for damages, such as Plaintiffs', may be stayed but not dismissed on Younger abstention grounds.”) (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996)).

Plaintiff requests that a grand jury be empaneled to investigate Defendants for alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 513, 514, 876(d), 1001, 1341, and 2073. ECF No. 1 at 22. To the extent that he may be attempting to assert federal court jurisdiction pursuant to these criminal statutes, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to establish that these statutes create a private cause of action, and “[t]he Supreme Court historically has been loath to infer a private right of action from “a bare criminal statute,” because criminal statutes are usually couched in terms that afford protection to the general public instead of a discrete, well-defined group.” Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 447-48 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80 (1975)); see Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (observing that enforcement of statutory violation under § 1983 requires showing that ...