France v. Mackey

• Decision Date: 07 October 2020
• Docket Number: C/A No. 2:20-cv-2424-BHH-MHC
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Christopher James France In Propia Persona, Plaintiff, v. James G. Mackey, acting as CFO for Freddie Mac, and Joseph P. Sheridan, Jr., acting as COO for HomeBridge Financial Services, Inc., Defendants.

Christopher James France In Propia Persona, Plaintiff, v. James G. Mackey, acting as CFO for Freddie Mac, and Joseph P. Sheridan, Jr.,acting as COO for HomeBridge Financial Services, Inc., Defendants.

C/A No. 2:20-cv-2424-BHH-MHC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

October 7, 2020

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Charleston County, South Carolina, alleging various causes of action purportedly related to a mortgage on his property. ECF No. 1-1. Defendants removed the case to this Court on July 10, 2020. ECF No. 1.

Before the Court are four motions: (1) a Motion to Remand to State Court ("Motion to Remand"), filed by Plaintiff on July 6, 2020, ECF No. 19; (2) a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint ("Motion to Dismiss"), filed by Defendants on July 10, 2020, ECF No. 17; (3) a Motion to Enforce, filed by Plaintiff on August 7, 2020, ECF No. 24; and (4) a Motion for Judicial Notice, filed by Plaintiff on August 7, 2020, ECF No. 25. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C. This Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.

I. MOTION TO REMAND

Plaintiff moves to remand this case to state court, arguing that removal was inappropriate because he did not consent to removing the case to federal court, this action falls within South Carolina's jurisdiction, the federal court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the action, and there is no diversity because Defendants do business in South Carolina. ECF No. 19. The undersigned concludes that the Court has original jurisdiction over this action.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and a district court is charged with ensuring that all cases before it are properly subject to such jurisdiction, In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). "The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is placed upon the party seeking removal." Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).

"[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." Id. § 1447(c). The court is "obliged to construe removal jurisdiction strictly because of the 'significant federalism concerns' implicated." Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151). "Therefore, if federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand to state court is necessary." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[C]ourts should resolve all doubts about the propriety of removal in favor of retained state court jurisdiction." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Defendant Freddie Mac is a U.S. corporation chartered by an Act of Congress and existing under the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. Defendants aver that removal was proper in this instance because the Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f)(2). The Court agrees.

Section 1452(f)(2) provides that "all civil actions to which the Corporation [Freddie Mac] is a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, and the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction of all such actions, without regard to amount or value." 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f)(2); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f)(3) ("any civil or other action, case or controversy in a court of a State, or in any court other than a district court of the United States, to which the Corporation is a party may at any time before the trial thereof be removed by the Corporation, without the giving of any bond or security, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where the same is pending"). Thus, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions to which Freddie Mac is a party, and defendants can remove such cases to federal court. See Turner v. US Bank, No. 1:18-CV-3272-LMM-LTW, 2019 WL 2344148, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2019) (finding that defendants had the right to remove to federal court an action in which Freddie Mac was a defendant); Matter of Trusts Established under the Pooling & Serv. Agreements, 241 F. Supp. 3d 905, 924 (D. Minn. 2017) (finding removal by Freddie Mac under § 1452(f) to be proper in case where Freddie Mac was not a named party but was a "party in interest" to a trust that was a named party); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Matassino, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (concluding that defendants could remove action brought by Freddie Mac in state court because "the unambiguous language of the statute gives this court original and removal jurisdiction over a civil action to which Freddie Mac is a party").

Plaintiff brought this action against Freddie Mac, and his Complaint "demands judgement for money damages against . . . FREDDIE MAC/JAMES G MACKEY." ECF No. 1-1 at 50. Because Freddie Mac is a party to this action, the Court has original jurisdiction over this case, which was properly removed to federal court by Defendants. See 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f).

Defendants also aver that removal was proper in this instance because the Court has original jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Under § 1332, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over a case if the action involves citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The complete diversity rule of § 1332 requires that the citizenship of each plaintiff be different from the citizenship of each defendant. See Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 103 (4th Cir. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) ("A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.").

Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, whether a corporation merely conducts business in a state or has a registered agent in the state is not a factor in determining the citizenship of a corporation for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Rather, a corporation is a citizen of the state where it is incorporated and has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (emphasis added). A corporation's "principal place of business" refers to "the place where a corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities . . . [or] the corporation's nerve center," which in practice "should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters." Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010). "In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the district court is to regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff resides in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. ECF No. 1-1 at 6. Thus, for there to be complete diversity, both Defendants must not be citizens of South Carolina. Defendant HomeBridge Financial Services, Inc. ("HomeBridge") is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. See ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 1-1 at 1 (listing address of HomeBridge's headquarters in caption of Complaint); ECF No. 1-2. Defendant Freddie Mac is a U.S. corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia. See ECF No. 1 at 2-3; ECF No. 1-1 (listing address of Freddie Mac's headquarters in caption of Complaint). Therefore, there is complete diversity of the parties.¹

Moreover, in his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks, among other relief, full discharge of a $450,000 mortgage note and cancellation of the mortgage lien. ECF No. 1-1 at 8-10. Thus, the undersigned finds that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter.

For the foregoing reasons,² the Court concludes that removal was proper, and Plaintiff's Motion to Remand should be denied.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 17. The Court agrees and finds that the Complaint should be dismissed.

A. Legal Standard

"The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint." Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d 528, 531 (D.S.C. 2014); see Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) ("A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of [affirmative] defenses."). Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant will have "fair notice of what the claim is and the...