Francen v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue

• Decision Date: 30 June 2014
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 12SC610
• Citation: 328 P.3d 111
• Parties: Tom FRANCEN, Petitioner v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

328 P.3d 111

Tom FRANCEN, Petitioner

v.COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 12SC610

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 30, 2014

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 10CA2382

Attorneys for Petitioner: John Scott, Attorney at Law, LLC John G. Scott, Littleton, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Daniel D. Domencio, Solicitor General, Grant T. Sullivan, Assistant Solicitor General, Cathern H. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Division of Motor Vehicles, a section of the Colorado Department of Revenue (the “Department”), revoked Tom Francen's driver's license, following a hearing officer's determination that Francen had driven a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) in excess of the statutory maximum. See§ 42–2–126(3)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2011). The district court reversed, holding that the initial stop of Francen's vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that the legality of the initial contact between the police and Francen was not relevant in the civil administrative proceeding to revoke his driver's license. The court also held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to suppress evidence of his BAC. Francen petitioned us for certiorari review. ¹ We agree with the court of appeals. We hold that, under section 42–2–126, C.R.S. (2011),² “probable cause” in the context of the driver's license revocation statute, as it existed at the time of the hearing in this case, refers to the quantum and quality of evidence necessary for a law enforcement officer to issue a notice of driver's license revocation, not whether the officer's initial contact with the driver was lawful. We further hold that the exclusionary rule did not apply to suppress evidence of Francen's BAC in the driver's license revocation proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I.

¶ 2 In January 2010, a Littleton police officer stopped behind Francen's vehicle at a traffic light. A passenger from Francen's vehicle got out of the vehicle and attempted to contact the driver of a different vehicle. After the passenger returned to Francen's vehicle, Francen turned left through the intersection. The officer immediately pulled Francen's vehicle over. Upon approaching the window of the driver's seat and engaging with Francen, the officer noticed that Francen had a strong odor of alcohol, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was slurred. Francen told the officer that he had consumed three or four alcoholic beverages. The officer then had Francen perform a variety of roadside sobriety tests, which he failed. The officer arrested Francen, and after being advised of his options, Francen elected to take a breath test. The results of the test indicated Francen had a BAC of 0.115, which was in excess of the statutory 0.08 maximum. In addition to criminal citations, the officer issued Francen a civil notice of driver's license revocation.

¶ 3 Francen requested an administrative hearing, challenging the revocation of his driver's license. He sought to establish that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the initial stop of the vehicle. The hearing officer declined to apply the exclusionary rule to the administrative proceeding and consequently found sufficient evidence to sustain the driver's license revocation. Francen then sought judicial review in the district court. The district court reversed the hearing officer, concluding that the initial stop was unlawful. The district court held that the hearing officer erred in considering the evidence offered by the police officer, and without that, the hearing officer concluded that the revocation was not supported by sufficient evidence.

¶ 4 The Department appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed the district court. The court of appeals held that the legality of the initial contact between Francen and the police officer was irrelevant in the administrative revocation proceeding and further held that the exclusionary rule did not apply.

¶ 5 Francen argues, as he did below, that during the administrative driver's license revocation proceeding, he should have been able to question the legality of the initial contact, and he also argues that the exclusionary rule should have applied. The Department argues that the statute governing the revocation proceeding, in effect at the time of the hearing in this case, does not permit consideration of the initial contact and asks us to decline to extend the exclusionary rule to the driver's license revocation proceeding. We agree with the court of appeals and the Department on both issues.

II.

¶ 6 We hold that “probable cause” in the context of the driver's license revocation statute, as it existed at the time of the hearing in this case, refers to the quantum and quality of evidence necessary for a law enforcement officer to issue a notice of driver's license revocation, not whether the officer's initial contact with the driver was lawful. We further hold that the exclusionary rule did not apply to suppress evidence of Francen's BAC in the driver's license revocation proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 7 Judicial review of a driver's license revocation proceeding is governed by statute. See§ 42–2–126(9)(b), C.R.S. (2013).³ “If the court finds that the department exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record, the court may reverse the department's determination.” Id.

¶ 8 In this case, we must determine whether section 42–2–126, as it existed at the time of Francen's stop, permitted a driver to introduce evidence in a driver's license revocation proceeding regarding the legality of an initial contact by a police officer. The proper construction of statutes is a question of law we review de novo. See, e.g., Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo.2006). When construing a statute, we ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent, reading applicable statutory provisions as a whole in order to accord consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all their parts. People in the Interest of W.P., 2013 CO 11, ¶ 11, 295 P.3d 514, 519; Moffett v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 219 P.3d 1068, 1072 (Colo.2009). We liberally construe statutes to fully carry out the General Assembly's intent. § 2–4–212, C.R.S. (2013). We read the language of a statute in context and give it the commonly accepted and understood meaning. Crandall v. City of Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 662 (Colo.2010); see also§ 2–4–101, C.R.S. (2013). If a statute is unambiguous, we give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning and look no further. Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, ¶ 12, 327 P.3d 891 (citing Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 799 (Colo.2000)).

B. Probable Cause for Driver's License Revocation

¶ 9 The General Assembly enacted a comprehensive administrative regime governing the revocation of driver's licenses for alcohol-related acts. The purpose was “[t]o provide safety for all persons using the highways of this state by quickly revoking the driver's license of any person who has shown himself or herself to be a safety hazard by driving with an excessive amount of alcohol in his or her body ....” § 42–2–126(1)(a), C.R.S. (2013). The purpose of the statute also includes “guard[ing] against the ... erroneous deprivation of the driving privilege by providing an opportunity for a full hearing.” § 42–2–126(1)(b), C.R.S. (2013).

¶ 10 In this case we must ascertain and give effect to the statutory sanction for a licensing violation, which is distinct from any criminal penalty. A law enforcement officer is required to provide the driver with a “notice of revocation”:

[I]f the law enforcement officer determines that, based on a refusal or on test results available to the law enforcement officer, the person's license is subject to revocation for excess BAC or refusal.⁴

§ 42–2–126(5)(b)(1). Only if the police officer has “probable cause to believe that a person should be subject to license revocation” can the officer give the notice of revocation. § 42–2–126(5)(a), C.R.S. (2013). A driver'slicense is subject to revocation if “a person drove a vehicle in this state when the person's BAC was 0.08 or more at the time of driving or within two hours after driving.” § 42–2–126(2)(b), C.R.S. (2013).

¶ 11 After giving the driver the notice of revocation, “the law enforcement officer shall forward to the department an affidavit containing information relevant to the legal issues and facts that shall be considered by the department to determine whether the person's license should be revoked ....” § 42–2–126(5)(a). A driver can then request a hearing to contest whether his or her driver's license should be revoked. § 42–2–126(7)(a), C.R.S. (2013). “The department shall consider all relevant evidence at the hearing, including the testimony of any law enforcement officer and the reports of any law enforcement officer that are submitted to the department.” § 42–4–126(8)(c), C.R.S. (2013). After the driver is given a full hearing, the Department must make a final ruling on the revocation. § 42–2–126(8)(d)(X), C.R.S. (2013). If the driver's license is revoked, the driver can seek judicial review. § 42–2–126(9)(a), C.R.S. (2013).

¶ 12 Interpreting the language of the statute in light of the General Assembly's intent, we conclude that the legality of the initial stop of the driver by the police officer is irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether to sustain the revocation of a driver's license under section 42–2–126,...