Frances-Colon v. Ramirez
Decision Date | 07 November 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 96-1293,FRANCES-COLON,96-1293 |
Citation | 107 F.3d 62 |
Parties | Leila, et al., Plaintiffs--Appellants, v. Dr. Efrain RAMIREZ, et al., Defendants--Appellees. . Heard |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Kevin G. Little, Fresno, CA, with whom Law Offices of David Efrn was on brief, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Jose Angel Rey, Jackson Heights, NY, for defendants-appellees.
Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and DiCLERICO, * District Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants Leila Frances-Coln and Juan Enrique Rodrguez brought a malpractice action on behalf of their minor son Eric Rodrguez-Frances ("Eric") against two doctors, a municipal hospital and the municipality of San Juan, on both federal and state law grounds. They alleged that the doctors' mishandling of Eric's delivery 1 amounted to a violation of Eric's substantive due process rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the defendants were liable for negligence under Puerto Rico tort law. The district court granted defendants' summary judgment motion as to all counts, for the following reasons: (1) the plaintiffs failed to identify a protected substantive due process liberty interest giving rise to their federal civil rights claim; (2) the defendants' actions were not state conduct that shocks the conscience for the purposes of sustaining their federal civil rights claim; (3) the defendant doctors are immune from liability under Puerto Rico law; (4) the tort claim against the municipality was time-barred under Puerto Rico law. See Coln v. Ramrez, 913 F.Supp. 112 (D.P.R.1996). Plaintiffs appeal from the grant of summary judgment.
Having reviewed the record and the parties' briefs on appeal, we are satisfied with the reasoning of the decision below and affirm the judgment for substantially the reasons elucidated in the district court opinion. Cf. Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 101 F.3d 218, 220 (1st Cir.1996) () We need only note the following.
The district court correctly held that plaintiffs-appellants failed to establish a violation of constitutional rights actionable under section 1983. Appellants claim on appeal that, in making this determination, the district court improperly resolved an issue of fact in favor of defendants by holding that the doctors failed to act with the requisite degree of culpability to sustain a section 1983 claim. See Coln, 913 F.Supp. at 119. Appellants urge us to consider certain affidavits they produced in support of the view that the defendant doctors were reckless, and not merely negligent. First, it is not clear that the district court's statement that plaintiffs "failed to show that defendants acted with the requisite degree of culpability" means that the district court explicitly found that defendants were not reckless. More importantly, there is no need to arrive at a factual conclusion regarding whether the doctors were negligent or something more than negligent, because, either way, the plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action under section 1983. As the district court opinion explains, plaintiffs must fail on their civil rights claim because they do not demonstrate either of the following: that there was an interest protected by the due process clause at stake, or that there was governmental conduct that "shocks the conscience." See id. at 116-18 (applying Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir.1991)).
It is surprising, in light of clear Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent, that appellants would consider it worth their while to try their luck, or, rather, waste time and energy, with what is essentially a malpractice claim clothed in section 1983, civil rights, language. This is plainly not a situation in which the state "takes a person into custody and holds him there against his will," thereby implicating a possible constitutional due process interest in adequate medical care. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1005-1006, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). To avoid future waste of judicial resources, we wish to underscore the decisive legal principle in this case. A substantive due process interest in "bodily integrity" or "adequate medical care" cannot support a personal injury claim under section 1983 against the provider of a governmental service unless: (a) the government has taken the claimant into custody or otherwise coerced the claimant into a situation where he cannot attend to his own well-being, see, e.g., Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 990-93 (1st Cir.1992) ( )(applying DeShaney ); or (b) the government employee, in the rare and exceptional case, affirmatively acts to increase the threat of harm to the claimant or affirmatively prevents the individual from receiving assistance, see Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir.1993) ( )(distinguishing DeShaney ); Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1429-34 (7th Cir.1990) (...
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