Francini v. Town of Farmington

• Decision Date: 23 December 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. H 81-95.
• Citation: 557 F. Supp. 151
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Albert FRANCINI v. TOWN OF FARMINGTON, Ruth Ann Baird, E. Cody Cartnick, Robert W. Johansen, Jr., and Ray S. Cragin.

557 F. Supp. 151

Albert FRANCINI v. TOWN OF FARMINGTON, Ruth Ann Baird, E. Cody Cartnick, Robert W. Johansen, Jr., and Ray S. Cragin.

Civ. A. No. H 81-95.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

December 23, 1982.

Allen J. Segal, Plainville, Conn., for plaintiff.

James J. Tancredi and Palmer S. McGee, Jr., Day, Berry & Howard, Hartford, Conn., for defendants.

AMENDED RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS¹

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, District Judge:

In this action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff Albert Francini challenges the denial by the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Farmington (the "Commission") of his application to subdivide a parcel of land in which he had an interest.

I.

The undisputed facts in this case can be quickly sketched. Sometime in 1979, Albert Francini, a real-estate developer, entered into a contract to purchase a parcel of land in the Town of Farmington. Completion of the contract was conditioned on approval by the Commission of Francini's application to subdivide the land into four lots. On November 30, 1979, Francini made his application to the Commission for approval of his subdivision plan and for permission for a "regulated wetlands activity."² The Commission is authorized to pass upon such applications, having been created pursuant to C.G.S. § 8-19, in accordance with the procedures applicable to approval of subdivision applications under C.G.S. § 8-25. Public hearings on Francini's applications were held on January 14, 1980 and February 11, 1980. On March 10, 1980 the Commission denied Francini's applications.

Thereafter, the original owner of the land in question sold it to an entity called Libron, Inc. ("Libron"), of which Francini himself was one-half owner. Libron filed its own applications for approval of a subdivision plan that called for ten lots, permission for a regulated wetlands activity, and removal of the land from wetlands classification. Libron's application was filed on July 15, 1980, and a public hearing was held on September 8, 1980. On October 14, 1980 the Commission granted Libron's application.³

Francini appealed the Commission's denial of his application to the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain, Francini v. Planning and Zoning Commission, CV 80-0402914S; his appeal was dismissed as moot, because of the expiration of his interest in the property during the pendency of the action. Thereafter, he brought this action against the Town of Farmington and the individual members of the Commission, claiming that he had been denied due process of law and equal protection of the laws; although it has never been specified as a separate claim, it also appears that Francini claims that property was taken from him without just compensation. All of those claims allege violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

There is now before the court Francini's Amended Complaint (filed Feb. 9, 1982), against which the defendants have launched a twofold attack. As to Francini's claims that he was deprived of property without due process of law and without just compensation, the defendants have filed a motion to dismiss that portion of the complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R. Civ.P., for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (filed May 21, 1982). As to Francini's claim that he was denied equal protection of the laws, the defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment in their favor, pursuant to Rule 56(b), Fed.R. Civ.P. Defendants' Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (filed May 25, 1982).

II.

The frustrated applicant for subdivision approval is fast becoming a familiar figure in this court. In Deutsch v. Yudkin, Civ. No. N 79-14 (D.Conn. Jan. 8, 1981) (Daly, J.), Deutsch had been denied approval of her zoning application by the planning and zoning commission of the town of Woodbridge. She appealed that denial to the Connecticut courts and won an order directing the town to approve her application. She then sued in federal court, claiming that the initial disapproval of her subdivision application violated certain of the rights secured to her by the United States Constitution. One of her arguments was that she had a state law property right to obtain approval of her application and that in denying her application the defendant commission had deprived her of that right without due process of law. Judge Daly rejected that argument, holding that Deutsch could not have acquired a property interest in the subdivision permits at issue until the commission's function had been reduced to a ministerial one. As long as the commission had discretion to determine whether applicable regulations had been satisfied by the proposed subdivision plan, Deutsch's property interest, if any, did not amount to one deserving constitutional protection and thus cognizable under § 1983.

Adams v. Town of Bethlehem, Civ. No. H 80-544 (D.Conn., Feb. 22, 1982) (oral ruling) (Cabranes, J.), aff'd without op., 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.1982), presented a similar situation. In Adams the plaintiff argued that the act of the planning commission in approving his application for a subdivision was purely ministerial, and that therefore his interest in that approval rose to the level of constitutional protection. Adams had appealed the denial of his application to a Connecticut court, which court had found the commission's denial of Adams's application to be arbitrary, illegal, and an abuse of discretion. The federal court concluded that if the state court had found that the commission had abused its discretion, it followed that there was some discretion in the commission's function. Accordingly, the federal court held that the commission's act was not purely ministerial and that Adams's interest was not a constitutionally protected one.

In Viking Construction Co. v. Thorne, Civ. No. H 80-250 (D.Conn., April 15, 1982) (Clarie, C.J.), the plaintiff had submitted a subdivision application to the planning commission of the town of Simsbury. The commission failed to act on the application for sixty-five days, after which the plaintiff, pursuant to C.G.S. § 8-26, sought issuance of a certificate of approval from the commissioners. Instead, the commission promptly disapproved the application. The plaintiff appealed, and the Connecticut Supreme Court eventually held that the planning commission lacked discretion to determine when the statutory sixty-five day period of C.G.S. § 8-26 began to run. The plaintiff then filed suit in federal court, alleging that its constitutional rights had been violated. Chief Judge Clarie, however, held that the plaintiff's interest in the subdivision approval remained a mere expectancy until the Supreme Court acted. Before that event, there being no settled law on point, the plaintiff could have had at most a hope that its application would be granted.

The constitutional context within which Deutsch, Adams, and Viking Construction Co. were decided is elucidated in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972):

To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.

"The range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite," id. at 570, 92 S.Ct. at 2705; such interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Id. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1164, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976).

In claiming that he was deprived of property without due process of law, Francini seeks to distinguish his case from Deutsch, Adams, and Viking Construction Co. — while admitting, with admirable candor, that this is an "unenviable task." Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition of sic the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (filed June 28, 1982) ("Plaintiff's Opposition to Dismissal") at 3. Plaintiff argues that Deutsch and Adams turned on the judicial finding that the planning commission in question enjoyed some discretion in deciding whether to grant the particular plaintiff's subdivision application. In the instant case, however, Francini alleges that the planning commission had no discretion. Plaintiff's Opposition to Dismissal at 4. The Commission, according to Francini, lacked discretion, because the plaintiff "met all of the criteria required of him for the approval of the subdivision as provided in the Statutes, rules and regulations." Amended Complaint at 3. For the background of this allegation, see Transcript of Oral Argument and Ruling, Francini v. Town of Farmington, Civ. No. H 81-95 (D.Conn., Jan. 29, 1982) ("Tr.") at 29-30.

III.

It is, of course, axiomatic that in considering a motion to dismiss, the wellpleaded and material factual allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted, though conclusions of law may be disregarded by the court. 2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.08 (1982). Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Hence, this court takes as admitted the allegation that Francini's subdivision plan met the criteria necessary for approval by the Commission. Nonetheless, the court concludes plaintiff's claim of deprivation of property without due process of law must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Amended Complaint contains the following statements:

Nevertheless, even though the plaintiff, the equitable owner of the land, had met all of the

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