Francis v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 November 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:21-cv-00823-SRC
• Citation: 572 F.Supp.3d 706
• Parties: Christine FRANCIS, Plaintiff(s), v. COMPASS GROUP USA, INC., Defendant(s).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

572 F.Supp.3d 706

Christine FRANCIS, Plaintiff(s),

v.COMPASS GROUP USA, INC., Defendant(s).

Case No. 4:21-cv-00823-SRC

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

Signed November 16, 2021

Jeffrey David Hackney, HKM Employment Attorneys LLP, Town and Country, MO, for Plaintiff(s).

Erin E. Williams, Mallory Stumpf Zoia, Ogletree Deakins PC, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant(s)

Memorandum and Order

STEPHEN R. CLARK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Christine Francis worked as a Campus Quality Assurance Manager for Compass, which prepares and serves food at multiple hospital campuses, including the one where Francis worked. In her four years on the job, Francis made repeated complaints about food-safety violations, and she believes that these complaints led to Compass terminating her in 2021. Soon after, Francis brought this suit, claiming that Compass wrongfully discharged her because of her complaints about food safety, among other things, in violation of the Missouri Whistleblower's Protection Act (the Act) and the common law. Compass moved to dismiss Francis's common-law claim as preempted by the Act. Because the Court finds that the Act abrogates Francis's common-law claim, or alternatively, that the Act does not infringe on the Missouri constitutional right to a jury trial, the Court dismisses Count 2.

I. Background

The Court accepts Francis's well-pleaded factual allegations as true for motion to dismiss purposes. Christine Francis began working for Compass as Campus Quality Assurance Manager in January 2017. Doc. 1-2 at ¶ 6. Francis claims that over the next few years she made repeated complaints about food safety and documented instances of improper food safety protocol which resulted in the destruction of numerous batches of meat. See Doc. 1-2 at pp. 2–10. Francis alleges that she reported violations of law and well-established public policy to her superiors at Compass and claims that her reporting contributed to her employment termination in May 2021. Id. at ¶¶ 73, 75–77.

Following her termination, Francis filed a Complaint¹ against her former employer in state court. Count 1 of her Complaint asserts a claim for wrongful termination under the Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 285.575, and Count 2 asserts a Missouri common-law claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Doc. 1-2 at pp. 8–11. Having removed the case to this Court, Compass now moves to dismiss Count 2 of the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, arguing that the Missouri legislature abrogated common-law wrongful-termination claims in 2017 when it passed the Act. Doc. 15.

II. Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to give "a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ...." To meet this standard and to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). This requirement of facial plausibility means the factual content of the plaintiff's allegations must "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co. , 911 F.3d 505, 512 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). The Court must grant all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Lustgraaf v. Behrens , 619 F.3d 867, 872–73 (8th Cir. 2010). Ordinarily, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered for purposes of a motion to dismiss; however, materials attached to the complaint may also be considered in construing its sufficiency. Reynolds v. Dormire , 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court "must liberally construe a complaint in favor of the plaintiff ...." Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. , 592 F.3d 853, 862 (8th Cir. 2010). However, if a claim fails to allege one of the elements necessary to recover on a legal theory, the Court must dismiss that claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Crest Constr. II, Inc. v. Doe , 660 F.3d 346, 355 (8th Cir. 2011). Threadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although courts must accept all factual allegations as true, they are not bound to take as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations and citation omitted); Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

When interpreting state law, this Court is "bound to apply the law of the state as articulated by the state's highest court." Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat'l Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa. , 621 F.3d 697, 707 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis , 596 F.3d 465, 475 (8th Cir. 2010) ). Though not bound by intermediate state court decisions, if "the state's highest court has not spoken, our job is to predict how the state's high court would resolve the issue," and the Court may consider intermediate courts’ decisions "to the extent they contain sound reasoning." Id. (citing Lancaster v. Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. , 272 F.3d 1059, 1062 (8th Cir. 2001) ). Such decisions are often " ‘the best evidence’ of how the highest court would rule." Id.

III. Discussion

In Count 2, Francis claims that after she reported violations of law and well-established public policy to her superiors, Compass wrongfully terminated her, in violation of the common-law public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Doc. 1-2 at ¶¶ 73, 77. Compass argues that the Act abrogates Francis's common-law claim. Doc. 16 at p. 1. Francis responds that the Act is unconstitutional because it interferes with the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the Missouri Constitution. Doc. 17 at p. 2. The Court agrees with Compass.

A. Read plainly, the Act abrogated common-law claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

In 2017—before Compass terminated Francis—the Missouri legislature revised portions of the statutes relating to unlawful employment practices. One of these statutes, the Act, states in relevant part:

This section is intended to codify the existing common law exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine and to limit their future expansion by the courts. This section, in addition to chapter 213 and chapter 287, shall provide the exclusive remedy for any and all claims of unlawful employment practices.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 285.575.3. Section 213.070.2 similarly states: "[t]his chapter, in addition to chapter 285 and chapter 287, shall provide the exclusive remedy for any and all claims for injury or damages arising out of an employment relationship."

Compass argues that, read plainly, these three statutes—the Act (chapter 285), the Missouri Human Rights Act (chapter 213), and the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law (chapter 287)—abrogate common-law claims like the one in this case. Doc. 16 at p. 3 (citing Peters v. Wady Indus., Inc. , 489 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Mo. 2016) ("If the intent of the legislature is clear and unambiguous, by giving the language used in the statute its plain and ordinary meaning, then [this Court is] bound by that intent and cannot resort to any statutory construction in interpreting the statute.") (internal quotation omitted)); see also Abrogate , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining "abrogate" as "to abolish (a law or custom) by formal or authoritative action; to annul or repeal.").

The Missouri Supreme Court has identified that "[t]he primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent, which is most clearly evidenced by the plain text of the statute." State ex rel. Goldsworthy v. Kanatzar , 543 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Mo. 2018). Courts must give undefined statutory words "their plain and ordinary meaning as found in the dictionary." Sun Aviation, Inc. v. L-3 Commc'ns Avionics Sys., Inc. , 533 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Mo. 2017).

Here, the Court finds that the Missouri legislature abolished common-law wrongful-termination claims by providing that these three statutes serve as the "exclusive remedy for any and all claims of unlawful employment practices." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 285.575.3. The plain text of the statute compels this conclusion. "Exclusive" means "single" or "sole." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 793 (2002). "Remedy" means "the legal means to recover a right or to prevent or obtain redress for a wrong." Id. at 1920. Thus, these three statutes provide the sole means to obtain redress for employment-related wrongs. Wrongful termination claims plainly involve "unlawful employment practices," Mo. Rev. Stat. § 285.575.3, and "aris[e] out of an employment relationship," Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.070.2, and thus fall within the ambit of the statutes. Additionally, "codify" means "to reduce to a code (as laws)." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 438 (2002). Thus, the legislature's stated intent to "codify the existing common law exceptions," Mo. Rev. Stat. § 285.575.3, reinforces the conclusion that the statutes "reduced to a code" the common law remedies relating to employment.

Neither the Missouri Supreme Court nor the Missouri Court of Appeals has addressed this question, though other judges on this Court have. The only two Missouri appellate cases the Court found that mention the Act involved claims arising before the Act's effective date. See Jaeger v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc. , ...