Francis v. Davidson, Civ. No. 71-853-K.
Decision Date | 25 June 1974 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 71-853-K. |
Citation | 379 F. Supp. 78 |
Parties | Robert FRANCIS, etc., et al. v. Rita C. DAVIDSON, Secretary, Department of Employment and Social Services, et al., The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Intervenor, Department of Health, Education & Welfare, Amicus Curiae. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
C. Christopher Brown, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.
Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Henry R. Lord, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Joel J. Rabin and Diana G. Motz, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, Md., for defendants.
Milton A. Smith, Gen. Counsel, and Richard Berman, Labor Relations Counsel, Chamber of Commerce of U. S., Washington, D. C., Gerard C. Smetana, Chicago, Ill., Lawrence M. Cohen and Jeffrey M. Goldman, Chicago, Ill., and James P. Garland, Baltimore, Md., for intervenor U. S. Chamber of Commerce.
George Beall, U. S. Atty., and Thomas G. Banjanin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., and Stephanie W. Naidoff, Regional Atty., and James C. Newman, Asst. Regional Atty., Region III, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare.
Before WINTER, Circuit Judge, and KAUFMAN and YOUNG, District Judges.
After this Court's first opinion in this case1 was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States,2 the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) promulgated, effective July 12, 1973, an amendment to 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a). Prior to that amendment, that regulation provided in part:
After the July 12, 1973 amendment, subsections (i) and (ii) of 45 C.F.R. § 23.100(a)(1) were amended to read as follows:
Thereafter, the State of Maryland, citing the July 12, 1973 change in the federal regulation, moved to dissolve the injunction this Court issued in accordance with its earlier opinion.4 Plaintiffs noted their opposition to the State's motion. Subsequently, this Court granted the motion of the United States Chamber of Commerce to intervene,5 requested and received the written views of the Secretary of HEW pursuant to Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406-407, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970), received briefs, and heard oral argument from the parties and the intervenor.6
In its prior opinion7 this Court held invalid Maryland's Rule 200.X.A. (2) which renders ineligible for AFDCE aid children of "fathers who were discharged for gross misconduct or as a disciplinary measure", because that rule was in conflict with 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a) as then written. In so doing this Court wrote:
* * * A man out of work because he was discharged for cause by his employer is unemployed. There can be no two ways about that conclusion. * * * Emphasis in original.
The conflict between the federal and the Maryland regulation ended after the former was amended in July 1973 to permit each State to render ineligible for AFDC-E aid children whose fathers were unemployed by reason of their conduct. The federal regulation, as so amended, conflicts however with the provision for aid in 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) for "a needy child * * * who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) of his father * * *."8 The statute relates to the unemployment of a father — and a father who is discharged for cause by his employer is unemployed. Because the federal regulation is incompatible with the federal statute, it follows that the Maryland regulation as of this date is based upon a provision authorized by an invalid federal regulation, and is thus itself invalid. Until the Congress amends the statute, no combination of federal and state regulations may provide that a father who is unemployed is not unemployed.
By way of contrast a person out of work because of a labor dispute does not necessarily fall within the definition of "unemployed". In 1968, the Congress enacted an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 607(b) providing for the Secretary rather than the State to define unemployment. Commenting upon that amendment in its prior opinion, this Court wrote that "* * * the Congress empowered the Secretary, by regulation, to require each participating state (1) to include or (2) to exclude from its respective AFDC-E program those out of work because of involvement in labor disputes, or (3) to leave that decision to each state. * * *" Id. at 367. Further, in that earlier opinion9 this Court concluded that the Secretary by regulation at that time required participating States to classify those out of work because of labor disputes as "unemployed" and held Maryland's contrary regulation invalid. As related supra, the Secretary subsequently amended the federal regulation. That amendment established no standards for the States to follow and simply permitted each State to do as it chose. Thus, the Secretary interpreted this Court's opinion as nullifying the 1968 amendment.
Candor requires this Court to state that the language used by this Court in its earlier opinion in describing the three alternatives available to the Secretary does — literally read — permit the amendment promulgated by the Secretary on July 12, 1973. That language could have, and from hindsight should have, included as part of alternative (3) and after the words "to leave that decision to each state" the additional words "in accordance with appropriate standards established by the Secretary". The need for the inclusion of those words is strongly supported by the legislative history of the 1968 statutory amendment which makes it clear that the Congress, in 1968, no longer was willing to allow each state to define the word "unemployment" for itself, but rather desired that national standards be established by the Secretary. "Section 607 was amended in 1968 to remove from the states the authority to define unemployment * * *." Macias v. Finch, 324 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (N.D.Cal.), aff'd, 400 U.S. 913, 91 S.Ct. 180, 27 L.Ed.2d 153 (1970). For example, the Under Secretary of HEW in 1967, Wilbur Cohen, stated to the Senate Finance Committee:
And the House Report,11 with regard to the bill which embodied that amending language, explained:
* * * Under present 1961 law, the States can establish programs for families with dependent children based on the unemployment of a parent and receive Federal matching. The definition of unemployment is left up to the individual States. Under the bill, Federal matching would be available only for the children of unemployed fathers and the definition of unemployment would be made by the Federal Government.
The Secretary, instead of being required to promulgate a national definition, was required by the 1972 amendment only to establish national standards within which the regulations of each of the states were to be channelized and confined. The July 12, 1973 federal regulation contains no standards whatsoever. Accordingly, that federal regulation does not carry out the intent of the 1968 amendment and is thus invalid. Accordingly also, the...
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