Francis v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 29 August 2018
• Docket Number: Index No. 63868/14,2016–07803
• Citation: Francis v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Educ., 164 A.D.3d 873, 83 N.Y.S.3d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)
• Parties: Marlene FRANCIS, etc., appellant, v. MOUNT VERNON BOARD OF EDUCATION, respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

164 A.D.3d 873

83 N.Y.S.3d 637

Marlene FRANCIS, etc., appellant,

v.MOUNT VERNON BOARD OF EDUCATION, respondent.

2016–07803

Index No. 63868/14

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued April 3, 2018

August 29, 2018

Cohn & Spector, White Plains, N.Y. (Julius W. Cohn of counsel), for appellant.

O'Connor, McGuinness, Conte, Doyle, Oleson, Watson & Loftus, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Montgomery L. Effinger of counsel), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, ROBERT J. MILLER, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County(Terry Jane Ruderman, J.), dated July 5, 2016.The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied the plaintiffs' cross motion, inter alia, to strike the defendant's answer on the ground of spoliation of evidence.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The complaint alleges that L.F., an infant, sustained injuries when he was picked up and dropped on his head by a fellow student at Mount Vernon High School.The plaintiff, suing individually and as the parent and natural guardian of L.F., commenced this action against the defendant, Mount Vernon Board of Education, to recover damages for personal injuries, alleging that it failed to provide adequate supervision.The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied the plaintiff's cross motion, inter alia, to strike the defendant's answer on the ground of spoliation of evidence.The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination denying that branch of the plaintiff's cross motion which was to strike the defendant's answer on the ground of spoliation (seePeters v. Hernandez,142 A.D.3d 980, 981, 37 N.Y.S.3d 443;Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berkoski Oil Co.,58 A.D.3d 717, 718–719, 872 N.Y.S.2d 166 )." ‘When a party negligently loses or intentionally destroys key evidence, thereby depriving the nonresponsible party from being able to prove its claim or defense, the responsible party may be sanctioned by the striking of its pleading’ "( Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berkoski Oil Co., 58 A.D.3d at 718, 872 N.Y.S.2d 166, quotingDenoyelles v. Gallagher, 40 A.D.3d 1027, 1027, 834 N.Y.S.2d 868 )." ‘[S]triking a pleading is a drastic sanction to impose in the absence of willful or contumacious conduct,’ " and thus, a court must " ‘consider the prejudice that resulted from the spoliation to determine whether such drastic relief is necessary as a matter of fundamental fairness’ "( Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berkoski Oil Co., 58 A.D.3d at 718, 872 N.Y.S.2d 166, quotingIannucci v. Rose, 8 A.D.3d 437, 438, 778 N.Y.S.2d 525;seePeters v. Hernandez, 142 A.D.3d at 981, 37 N.Y.S.3d 443 )."When the moving party is still able to establish or defend a case, a less severe sanction is appropriate"( Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berkoski Oil Co., 58 A.D.3d at 718, 872 N.Y.S.2d 166;seePeters v. Hernandez, 142 A.D.3d at 981, 37 N.Y.S.3d 443 ).The Supreme Court has broad discretion in determining what, if any, sanction should be imposed for spoliation of evidence and this Court will substitute its judgment only where the Supreme Court improvidently exercised such discretion (seeDoviak v. Finkelstein & Partners, LLP, 137 A.D.3d 843, 846, 27 N.Y.S.3d 164 ).Here, a video recording which captured the incident from a distance could not be located after it had been viewed by the plaintiff, the police, and school administrators.According to the Principal of Mount Vernon High School, he did not know when the video disappeared but he asserted that its disappearance was accidental and a search had been conducted to locate it.Under these circumstances, where the defendant lost the video recording after having provided it for viewing to the plaintiff and others, the plaintiff would still be able to establish her case at trial despite the absence of the video.As such, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its broad discretion in concluding that the drastic sanction of striking the defendant's answer was unwarranted.

We also agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint."Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision"( Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263;seeBrandy B. v. Eden Cent. School Dist., 15 N.Y.3d 297, 302, 907 N.Y.S.2d 735, 934 N.E.2d 304;Nash v. Port Wash. Union Free School Dist., 83 A.D.3d 136, 146, 922 N.Y.S.2d 408 )."However, unanticipated third-party acts causing injury upon a fellow student will generally not give rise to a school's liability in negligence absent actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct"( Brandy B. v. Eden Cent. School Dist., 15 N.Y.3d at 302, 907 N.Y.S.2d 735, 934 N.E.2d 304;seeMirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d at 49, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263 )."In determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated"( Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d at 49, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263;seeBrandy B. v. Eden Cent. School Dist., 15 N.Y.3d at 302, 907 N.Y.S.2d 735, 934 N.E.2d 304;Nash v. Port Wash. Union Free School Dist., 83 A.D.3d at 150, 922 N.Y.S.2d 408 ).

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.The defendant submitted evidence that L.F. and the other student had no previous interaction and that the other student's prior disciplinary record did not include any violent act, thereby establishing that the defendant had no specific knowledge or notice of any prior conduct such that L.F.'s alleged assault could reasonably have been anticipated (seeBrandy B. v. Eden Cent. School Dist., 15 N.Y.3d at 302, 907 N.Y.S.2d 735, 934 N.E.2d 304;Jake F. v. Plainview–Old Bethpage Cent. School Dist., 94 A.D.3d 804, 805–806, 944 N.Y.S.2d 152;Morman v. Ossining Union Free School Dist., 297 A.D.2d 788, 789, 747 N.Y.S.2d 586;Janukajtis v. Fallon, 284 A.D.2d 428, 430, 726 N.Y.S.2d 451 ).In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (seeBrandy B. v. Eden Cent. School Dist., 15 N.Y.3d at 303, 907 N.Y.S.2d 735, 934 N.E.2d 304;Brown v. South Country Cent. Sch. Dist., 137 A.D.3d 732, 733, 25 N.Y.S.3d 675;Jake F. v. Plainview–Old Bethpage Cent. School Dist., 94 A.D.3d at 805–806, 944 N.Y.S.2d 152 ).

DILLON, J.P., MILLER and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.

SGROI, J., dissents and votes to reverse the order, on the law, deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and grant the plaintiff's cross motion to the extent of directing an adverse inference charge and otherwise denying the cross motion, with the following memorandum:

After the infant L.F. was picked up and dropped on his head by a fellow student (hereinafter the fellow student) at Mount Vernon High School, L.F.'s mother, individually and as the parent and natural guardian of L.F., commenced this action against the defendant, alleging that it was negligent in providing supervision to L.F.Although a video recording was made of the subject incident, the recording was misplaced by the defendant and could not be produced in discovery.

After the completion of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the plaintiff cross-moved to impose sanctions on the defendant on the ground of spoliation of evidence as related to the missing recording.The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion and denied the plaintiff's cross motion.As to the defendant's motion, the court reasoned, essentially, that the fellow student's act was unforeseeable and could not have been prevented.Because I disagree with my colleagues in the majority that this conclusion can be reached as a matter of law, I respectfully dissent.

Schools have a duty to provide supervision to ensure the safety of those in their charge, and are liable for foreseeable injuries proximately caused by the absence of adequate supervision (seeBrandy B. v. Eden Cent. School Dist., 15 N.Y.3d 297, 302, 907 N.Y.S.2d 735, 934 N.E.2d 304;Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263;Butera v. Village of Bellport, 128 A.D.3d 995, 10 N.Y.S.3d 292;Buchholz v. Patchogue–Medford School Dist., 88 A.D.3d 843, 844, 931 N.Y.S.2d 113 )."In determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated"( Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d at 49, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263 ).If, in fact, "dangerous play comes to its notice while children are within its area of responsibility," a school is bound "to take energetic steps to intervene"( Lawes v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16 N.Y.2d 302, 305, 266 N.Y.S.2d 364, 213 N.E.2d 667 ).

I agree with my colleagues in the majority that the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, the lack of prior similar conduct on the...