Franckowiak v. Catholic Health

Docket Number22-CV-514-JLS-LGF
Decision Date13 April 2023
PartiesDR. MELISSA FRANCKOWIAK, Plaintiff, v. CATHOLIC HEALTH, and GREAT LAKE ANESTHESIA, Defendants. REPORT and RECOMMENDATION
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of New York

LAW OFFICE OF LINDY KORN, PLLC ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF LINDY KORN, AND CATHERINE JANE McCULLE, OF COUNSEL

HORTON LAW PLLC ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT CATHOLIC HEALTH SCOTT PATRICK HORTON, OF COUNSEL

BOND SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT GREAT LAKE ANESTHESIA STEPHEN A SHARKEY, OF COUNSEL

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

LESLIE G. FOSCHIO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JURISDICTION

This case was referred to the undersigned by Honorable John L Sinatra, Jr., on September 12, 2022, for all pretrial matters including preparation of a report and recommendation on dispositive motions. (Dkt. 13). The matter is presently before the court on Defendant Great Lake Anesthesia's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed September 27, 2022 (Dkt. 15).

BACKGROUND

On July 5, 2022, Plaintiff Dr. Melissa Franckowiak (Plaintiff) commenced this action alleging employment discrimination based on sex, age and familial status against Defendants Catholic Health (Catholic Health), and Great Lake Anesthesia (Defendant or “GLA”) (together Defendants), in connection with Plaintiff's former employment as an anesthesiologist at Kenmore Mercy Hospital in Kenmore, New York. Plaintiff asserts six claims for relief including (1) employment discrimination based on age in violation of New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), New York Exec. Law Art. 15, § 296[1](a) (§ 296[1](a)), and the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C § 621 et seq., Complaint, First Cause of Action (“First Claim”); (2) employment discrimination based on familial status in violation of NYSHRL and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (§ 2000e), id., Second Cause of Action (“Second Claim”); (3) sexual harassment in violation of NYSHRL and Title VII, id., Third Cause of Action (“Third Claim”); (4) employment discrimination based on sex in violation of NYSHRL and Title VII, id., Fourth Cause of Action (“Fourth Claim”); hostile work environment based on sex and sexual harassment in violation of NYSHRL and Title VII, id., Fifth Cause of Action (“Fifth Claim”); and retaliation for opposing discrimination in violation of NYSHRL and Title VII, id., Sixth Cause of Action (“Sixth Claim”). On September 7, 2022, Catholic Health filed an answer (Dkt. 10).

On September 27, 2022, Defendant GLA moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim (Dkt. 15) (Defendant's Motion”), attaching the Declaration of Stephen A. Sharkey, Esq. in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 15-1) (“Sharkey Declaration”), with exhibits A through E (Dkts. 15-2 through 15-6) (Defendant's Exh(s). _”), and the Memorandum of Law on Behalf of Defendant Great Lakes Anesthesiology, P.C. in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 15-7) (Defendant's Memorandum”). On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Great Lakes Anesthesia's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 19) (Plaintiff's Response”). On December 15, 2022, Defendant filed the Reply Memorandum of Law on Behalf of Defendant Great Lakes Anesthesiology, P.C. in Further Support of Its Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 20) (Defendant's Reply”). Oral argument was deemed unnecessary.

Based on the following, Defendant's Motion should be GRANTED.

FACTS[1]

On July 1, 2012, Plaintiff, Dr. Melissa Franckowiak (Plaintiff or “Dr. Franckowiak”), an anesthesiologist, commenced working for Anesthesia Consultants Associates (“ACA”), at Kenmore Mercy Hospital in Kenmore, New York (“Kenmore Mercy” or “the hospital”), pursuant to an exclusive contract between Defendant Catholic Health System, Inc.[2](“CHS”) and ACA (“the ACA contract”) for the provision of anesthesia services. Plaintiff was a partner at ACA. While working pursuant to the ACA contract as an anesthesiologist at Kenmore Mercy, Plaintiff provided anesthesia for patients undergoing surgical procedures. On October 31, 2019, Plaintiff was notified that CHS would not be renewing the ACA contract. On April 30, 2020, the ACA contract expired and was not renewed, and Plaintiff ceased working as an anesthesiologist at Kenmore Mercy. Instead of renewing the ACA contract, CHS entered into a contract with Defendant Great Lakes Anesthesiology, PC[3] (Defendant or “GLA”). One Dr. Robert Ramsdell (“Dr. Ramsdell”) is the President and a partner at GLA.

Prior to the expiration of the ACA contract, Plaintiff interviewed with Dr. Ramsdell about possibly working as an anesthesiologist for GLA. While interviewing with Dr. Ramsdell about a possible position with GLA, Dr. Ramsdell told Plaintiff that because she has young children, Plaintiff might not want a position that required travel to other sites in Western New York. GLA did not offer Plaintiff a full-time position, but “only an occasional per diem arrangement to work elsewhere at [GLA's][4] contracted sites,” did not include working at Kenmore Mercy, was for “a fraction” of the pay Plaintiff received under the ACA contract, and did not provide any “opportunity for equal partnership.” Complaint ¶ 33; see id. ¶ 67 (alleging when Plaintiff expressed interest in a full-time job, GLA partners suggested Plaintiff might not want a full-time position because it might involve travel and Plaintiff has young children). Plaintiff particularly alleges the per diem contract positions offered by GLA were for only 18 hours per week at GLA sites, were not necessarily at Kenmore Mercy, were non-partner track positions, not full-time positions, and did not offer any benefits. id. ¶ 66. When Plaintiff discussed with Dr. Ramsdell that the contract position GLA offered her was for less than half the money Plaintiff earned under the ACA contract, did not include benefits, did not provide job security, and there was no guarantee Plaintiff would work at Kenmore Mercy, Dr. Ramsdell stated the position “might turn into something permanent if people like you.” id. ¶ 68. Plaintiff did not accept Dr. Ramsdell's job offer to work for GLA.

On April 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), a Charge of Discrimination (“EEOC charge”), claiming employment discrimination by CHS and GLA based on her sex, age, and familial status, and also asserting retaliation and sexual harassment.[5]Plaintiff ceased working at Kenmore Mercy upon the ACA contract's expiration on April 30, 2020. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Ramsdell and the other physicians from GLA who currently work for CHS on a per diem basis “are on cellphones and laptops, conducting business deals in the middle of cases with no repercussions.” Complaint ¶ 42. On April 6, 2022, the EEOC, upon Plaintiff's request, issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue, advising Plaintiff that 180 days had passed since Plaintiff filed the EEOC charge, the EEOC was terminating its processing of the EEOC charge, and that Plaintiff had 90 days in which to file a legal action based on the claims raised in the EEOC charge. This action followed on July 5, 2022.

DISCUSSION
1. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant GLA moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)) for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court looks to the four corners of the complaint and is required to accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and to construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008) (court is required to liberally construe the complaint, accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor). The Supreme Court requires application of “a ‘plausibility standard,' which is guided by [t]wo working principles.' Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “First, although ‘a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint,' that ‘tenet' ‘is inapplicable to legal conclusions,' and [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.' Harris, 572 F.3d at 72 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). ‘Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss,' and [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.' Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The factual allegations of the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Simply put, unless the plaintiff pleads “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face” so as to “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is addressed to the face of the pleading. “In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the...

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