Franco v. Caldwell
| Decision Date | 06 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10-60944-CIV-COHN/SELTZER |
| Parties | FIDENSIO FLORES FRANCO, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL, and ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Deputy Christopher Caldwell's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 29] ("Caldwell's Motion") and Defendant Alfred T. Lamberti's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 30] ("Lamberti's Motion") (together, "Motions"). The Court has considered the Motions, Plaintiff Fidensio Flores Franco's Response [DE 33], Defendants' Reply [DE 42], the parties' related submissions, the record in this case, and is otherwise advised in the premises.
This action concerns claims of false arrest/false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as false arrest/false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, pursuant to Florida law. The claims arise from an incident on September 2, 2007, when Defendant Deputy Christopher Caldwell, a Broward Sheriff's Office ("BSO") Deputy, arrested Plaintiff Fidensio Flores Franco.
Plaintiff works sporadic day jobs. See Exhibit B to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, Deposition of Fidensio Flores Franco [DE 31-2] ("Flores Franco Deposition") at 9:23-25, 11:1-3. On September 2, 2007, Plaintiff's friend, Juan Ramirez, called him to do a job moving furniture. Id. at 13:23-14:3, 14:18, 15:3-5. Mr. Ramirez told Plaintiff to meet at a nearby BP gas station in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, where a man with a truck would arrive and take them to the job. Id. 14:19-24, 15:3-10. The man with the truck was supposed to arrive at 3:50, but he never came. Id. 17:3-5.
The same day, Deputy Caldwell was on patrol in a marked BSO vehicle. Exhibit F to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, BSO Event Report [DE 31-6] ("Event Report") at 4. According to Deputy Caldwell, the BP gas station and the surrounding plaza is a gathering spot for panhandlers who beg customers for money as they exit the gas station and other stores and restaurants in the plaza. Exhibit E to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, Deposition of Christopher Caldwell [DE 31-5] ("Caldwell Deposition") at 31:1-32:5. The BP gas station had a trespass affidavit on file "due to unwanted individuals walking around the front of the business and asking entering and exiting customers for money, and/or by their very appearance, causing potential customers not to come in." Event Report at 4; see also Exhibit G to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, Probable Cause Affidavit [DE 31-7] ("Probable Cause Affidavit"); see also Exhibit C to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, Residential Trespass Affidavit [DE 31-3] ("Trespass Affidavit"). A trespass affidavit is placed on file when a business requests BSO's assistance regarding an ongoing problem with individuals congregating at the business. Caldwell Dep. at 50:7-15. BSO's Operating Procedures provide that if a business participates in the TrespassEnforcement Program, a deputy is authorized to advise an alleged trespasser at that business of the offense and ask him to vacate the premises. Exhibit D to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, BSO Department of Law Enforcement Standard Operating Procedures [DE 31-4] ("Operating Procedures") §§ 4.15.4(A), (B). If the alleged trespasser refuses to vacate, the Operating Procedures provide, "the subject will be placed under arrest for the applicable trespassing violation." Id. § 4.15.4(C).
Around 5:15p.m., Deputy Caldwell observed Plaintiff and Mr. Ramirez at the BP gas station. Event Report at 4. Deputy Caldwell wrote in his Event Report that he "made contact with both Ramirez and Flores[ and] determined they had no business at this location." Id. Ultimately, he arrested Plaintiff for trespass after warning. Exhibit H to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, BSO Daily Patrol Activity Log [DE 31-8] ("BSO Daily Log") at 1; Probable Cause Affidavit at 1; see also Event Report at 4.
On June 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Caldwell, individually, and against Lamberti, as Sheriff for Broward County. See Complaint [DE 1]. The Amended Complaint [DE 8] alleges that Deputy Caldwell did not have probable cause or lawful authority to arrest him or, alternatively, that Deputy Caldwell acted outside the course and scope of his employment with BSO, and in bad faith or with malicious purpose. Plaintiff brings the following claims: false arrest/false imprisonment against Caldwell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); false arrest/false imprisonment against BSO (Count II), or alternatively against Caldwell in his individual capacity (Count III); and malicious prosecution against Caldwell (Count IV). Id.
On March 31, 2011, Deputy Caldwell filed his Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity for the federal claim against him andsovereign immunity under Florida Statutes § 768.28(9)(a) for the state law claims against him. See Caldwell Mot. The same day, Sheriff Lamberti filed his Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that BSO is immune from suit under Florida Statutes § 768.28(9)(a) where Deputy Caldwell had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court may grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To discharge this burden, the movant must show that "there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325.
After the movant has met its burden, the burden of production shifts to the non-moving party, who "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact [the Court may] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3).
At the summary judgment stage, the Court's function is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Inmaking this determination, the Court must decide which issues are material, and Id. at 248.
This case turns on the issue of probable cause. Deputy Caldwell argues that he is immune from suit and liability for Plaintiff's federal claim and state tort claims, focusing his argument on the contention that he did not violate Plaintiff's rights because he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. See Caldwell Mot. Deputy Caldwell further argues that the existence of probable cause bars the state law claims for false arrest/false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. See id. Similarly, Sheriff Lamberti argues that BSO is immune from suit where Deputy Caldwell had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. See Lamberti Mot.
As discussed below, there is a genuine issues of material fact as to whether Deputy Caldwell had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court will deny both Motions for Summary Judgment.
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To invoke qualified immunity, the public official must establish that he wasacting within the scope of his discretionary authority. Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2008). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to overcome the defense of qualified immunity. Id.
"A government official proves that he acted within the purview of his discretionary authority by showing 'objective circumstances which would compel the conclusion that his actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority.'" Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotations and citations omitted). Actions such as questioning witnesses, responding to calls, arresting suspects, and escorting those suspects to jail fall within the scope of a deputy's discretionary authority. See Riebsame v. Prince, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2003) affirmed 91 Fed. App'x 656 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, Deputy Caldwell was on patrol when he observed Plaintiff and Mr. Ramirez, approached and talked to them, arrested them, and escorted them to jail. Such actions fell within the scope of Deputy Caldwell's discretionary authority as a deputy. Though Plaintiff argues that Deputy Caldwell "had no legal authority to trespass warn [Plaintiff] in the first instance," Resp. at 9, because "law enforcement officers are not 'authorized persons' for purposes of issuing trespass warning under Florida Statute §§ 810.08(3) or § 810.09(3)," Id. BSO's Operating Procedures authorize a deputy to warn a suspected trespasser at a business that participates...
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