Franco v. District of Columbia
Decision Date | 10 October 2006 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 05-1058 (RMU). |
Parties | Samuel FRANCO et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Ralph Werner, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Richard Gaspare Amato, Aaron M. Levine & Associates, Paul J. Kiernan, Holland & Knight LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
The plaintiffs,2 leaseholders of property in Skyland Shopping Center in the District of Columbia, challenge legislation authorizing the defendants to exercise eminent domain over their property. The court previously granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs' claims were not ripe. Specifically, the court ruled that no taking had occurred and that the plaintiffs had not exhausted state procedures for seeking relief. The matter is before the court on the plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend its judgment. As to the first prong of the court's ruling, the plaintiffs now assert, and the defendants concede, that during the pendency of this case, defendant National Capital Revitalization Corporation ("NCRC") exercised a taking of the plaintiffs' leasehold interest. As to the second prong, the plaintiffs assert that the court improperly concluded that they must exhaust state court remedies because the taking was facially unconstitutional and because they seek equitable relief and monetary damages rather than compensation. Although the defendants properly exercised a public-use taking of the plaintiffs' leasehold interests, the plaintiffs have not exhausted state court remedies, and their claims are still not ripe. Accordingly, the court did not commit a clear legal error in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims, and the court declines to alter or amend its judgment.
The plaintiffs are tenants of property located in the Skyland Shopping Center ("Skyland Center") in Southeast Washington, D.C. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. In 2004, deeming the condemnation of the Skyland area "necessary and desirable for the public," the District of Columbia Council passed the "Skyland Legislation," authorizing defendant NCRC to condemn property in the Skyland Center. D.C.Code § 2-1219.19.
On May 26, 2005, the plaintiffs filed suit to challenge the legislation authorizing defendant NCRC to exercise eminent domain on the Skyland Center. See Compl. On March 22, 2006, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' amended complaint because their claims were not ripe. Mem. Op. (Mar. 27, 2006) ("Mem.Op.") at 15. On April 5, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the court's order on the grounds that defendant NCRC initiated eminent domain proceedings against the Skyland Center in July 2005, and that the court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust state procedures. Pls.' Mot. at 2. The defendants oppose the plaintiffs' motion, arguing that the plaintiffs must still exhaust state court procedures, and that the plaintiffs' claims are otherwise not properly before the court. Defs.' Opp'n at 2. The court now turns to the plaintiffs' motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed within 10 days of the entry of the judgment at issue. FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e); see also Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1098 (D.C.Cir.2003) ( ). While the court has considerable discretion in ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion, the reconsideration and amendment of a previous order is an unusual measure. Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C.Cir.1996) (per curiam); McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999). Rule 59(e) motions "need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear legal error or prevent manifest injustice." Ciralsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C.Cir.2004) (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208). Moreover, "[a] Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider is not simply an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled," New York v. United States, 880 F.Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C.1995), or a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier. Kattan v. Dist. of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C.Cir.1993); W.C. & AN. Miller Cos. v. United States, 173 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1997).
In its March 27, 2006 ruling, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as not ripe because a public use taking had not occurred and the plaintiffs had not sought just compensation in state court. Id. at 13. The plaintiffs now challenge the court's ruling, arguing that the defendants did not effect a public use taking and that they need not seek compensation in state court before bringing suit in this court. See generally id.
The plaintiffs argue that because defendant NCRC exercised a taking of the disputed property, the court must amend its ruling that the plaintiffs' claims are not ripe. Pls.' Mot. at 2. They also make two arguments claiming that the court improperly required them to seek compensation in state court proceedings. First, the plaintiffs assert that they need not exhaust state remedies before pursuing their claims in federal court because they seek equitable relief and because they allege that the taking was for private use. Id. at 5-6. Second, the plaintiffs assert that they should be exempted from seeking relief in state court because their leases preclude their recovery of any condemnation award. Id at 5. The defendants counter that the plaintiffs merely repeat the arguments set forth in their complaint, and that the state court is an appropriate forum to address the plaintiffs' claims. Defs.' Opp'n at 2.
For a Fifth Amendment challenge to be ripe for federal court intervention, either the taking must be facially unconstitutional, i.e. not for a public purpose, or the state must have failed to provide just compensation after a public-purpose taking. U.S. Const. amend. V ( ). Because the court reviews its holding for clear legal error, Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 671 (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208), it will first look to the nature of the taking to determine whether it correctly concluded that it was for a public purpose. Second, it will examine whether the plaintiffs must exhaust their state remedies.
The plaintiffs argue that the court committed a clear legal error because the taking was for a private purpose, and, as a result, it does not constitute a public use taking. Pls.' Mot. at 2-5. In support of their contention, the plaintiffs maintain that the Skyland Legislation "contains false and pretextual findings" purporting to justify it as a taking for public use. Id. at 7. The defendants maintain that the taking at issue "had at its inception and has at its core the public benefits associated with economic redevelopment [such as] removing conditions of blight and dilapidation, and bettering the community." Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pls.' Am. Compl. () at 5.
Courts have long given great deference to legislative judgment in deciding whether or not a taking satisfies the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2663, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005) ( ). A court should accept the stated public purpose of the condemnation offered by the legislature unless it concludes that it is "palpably without reasonable foundation." Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 241, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680, 16 S.Ct. 427, 40 L.Ed. 576 (1896)). Although courts rarely conclude that a taking does not meet the public use standard, Montgomery v. Carter County, Tenn., 226 F.3d 758, 765-66 (6th Cir.2000), courts need not defer to the legislature "where the ostensible public use is demonstrably pretextual." 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1129 (C.D.Cal.2001) (citing Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir.1996)).
The plaintiffs claim that the defendants' findings of blight and dilapidation are a pretext to mask a private transaction between defendant NCRC and an independent developer. " Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. at 10. The plaintiffs further allege that there were no slum or blight studies conducted prior to the enactment of the Skyland Legislation, and that the blight findings cited by the defendants were added after the public hearing. Id. Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertions, the transfer of property to private developers is immaterial to whether a taking is constitutional, Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243-44, 104 S.Ct. 2321, and a court will not recognize a taking as unconstitutional without evidence that the taking was strictly for a private purpose, Montgomery, 226 F.3d at 765-66; see also 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F.Supp.2d at 1129 (...
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