Franco v. Greystone Ridge Condo.

• Decision Date: 14 August 2019
• Docket Number: G056559
• Citation: Franco v. Greystone Ridge Condo., 39 Cal.App.5th 221, 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 149 (Cal. App. 2019)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Victor M. QUIROZ FRANCO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GREYSTONE RIDGE CONDOMINIUM et al., Defendants and Appellants.

39 Cal.App.5th 221

252 Cal.Rptr.3d 149

Victor M. QUIROZ FRANCO, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.GREYSTONE RIDGE CONDOMINIUM et al., Defendants and Appellants.

G056559

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.

Filed August 14, 2019

Scott & Whitehead and Nancy Rader Whitehead for Defendants and Appellants.

The Kristy Law Firm and James R. Kristy, Huntington Beach, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

FYBEL, J.

INTRODUCTION

In March 2018, employees of defendant Greystone Ridge Condominium (Greystone), including plaintiffVictor M. Quiroz Franco(plaintiff), were presented with and asked to sign an agreement requiring that each employee agree to submit to final and binding arbitration "[a]ny and all claims ... relating to any aspect of ... employment with Employer (pre-hire through post-termination)."About 10 days later, plaintiff filed a complaint against Greystone, C & A Services, John Stokke, and Maher A.A. Azer (defendants) asserting employment-related claims.Two days after that, plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement and returned it to Greystone.Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims which plaintiff opposed on the ground the arbitration agreement failed to expressly state that claims that had already accrued, including the claims asserted in plaintiff's complaint, were subject to arbitration.The trial court agreed with plaintiff and denied the motion to compel arbitration.

We reverse.The parties' arbitration agreement is clear, explicit, and unequivocal with regard to the claims subject to it and contains no qualifying language limiting its applicability to claims that had yet to accrue.On the contrary, the agreement's reference to claims relating to "pre-hire" matters expresses an intent to cover all claims, regardless of when they accrued, that are not otherwise expressly excluded by the arbitration agreement.

BACKGROUND¹

Greystone is in the business of providing property management services for C & A Services.Plaintiff has worked for Greystone or its predecessor since 2000 at an apartment complex Greystone manages in Anaheim.In early March 2018, Greystone's vice-president John Stokke was in the process of distributing arbitration agreements to all of Greystone's employees.On March 9, 2018, Stokke gave plaintiff a document entitled "Agreement to Arbitrate All Covered Claims"(the Agreement).

The Agreement states in relevant part: "1.Final and Binding Arbitration: Any and all claims, controversies or disputes ("Disputes") relating to any aspect of Employee's employment with Employer (pre-hire through post-termination), which Employer may have against Employee, or which Employee may have against Employer or any related entity, owner, partner, officer, director, shareholder, employee, contractor, representative or agent, shall be resolved through final and binding arbitration.Employer and Employee acknowledge that Employer and Employee are relinquishing the right to a court trial or jury trial of any Dispute, except as otherwise provided by law or this Agreement.The Parties intend that this Agreement be enforced under the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act to the fullest extent permitted by law.

"2.Covered Claims: Disputes that are subject to this Agreement include, but are not limited to, those arising under: (a) the federal or California Constitution;(b) any federal, state or local statute, regulation, ordinance or order (including the California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders); (c) this Agreement, or the enforceability of this Agreement, in whole or in part; (d) the California Private Attorneys General Act if, and to the extent, permissible by law; and (e)case law/common law (collectively, "Covered Claims"), except as otherwise preluded by law or by this Agreement.

"3.Excluded Claims: The following claims are not subject to this Agreement: (1) claims properly brought before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board; (2) claims for unemployment insurance benefits; (3) claims for damages that fall within the jurisdiction of Small Claims Court; (4) claims brought pursuant to the Ralph Civil Rights Act or the Bane Civil Rights Act;(5) claims that may not be waived by an agreement to arbitrate as a matter of law, including claims that a federal or state agency may pursue via an enforcement action (although if Employee chooses to pursue a claim following the exhaustion of such administrative remedies, that claim would be subject to the provisions of this Arbitration Agreement); (6) actions properly brought pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act brought before the National Labor Relations Board; and (7) claims for injunctive and/or other equitable relief, including but not limited to orders sought pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 527.6and527.8 to restrain threats of and/or any act of harassment or violence, or the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and related law to stop or prevent unfair competition and/or the misappropriate or illegal conduct related to trade secrets or Confidential Information.Any excludable action by Employer or by Employee shall be filed in the State of California, County of Orange.Employee shall not be subject to disciplinary or retaliatory action for engaging in protected, concerted activity, related to any portion of this Agreement, including this provision."

A few days after Stokke presented the Agreement to plaintiff, plaintiff asked Stokke to provide him with a Spanish translation of the Agreement; on March 16, 2018, Stokke did so.At that time, plaintiff told Stokke that he"had a meeting scheduled with a lawyer on March 19, 2018."Stokke and plaintiff did not discuss the nature of the meeting plaintiff had scheduled with a lawyer, but Stokke "assumed he would discuss the Arbitration Agreement with his counsel."

On March 19, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants in which he asserted claims for (1) disparate treatment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)( Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq. );(2) hostile work environment in violation of FEHA;(3) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation in violation of FEHA;(4) failure to pay overtime compensation ( Lab. Code, §§ 218.5,510, & 1194 ); (5) failure to pay minimum wage ( id. , §§ 218.5, 510 & 1194 ); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (id. , § 226); (7) failure to indemnify employee for business expenses (id. , § 2802); and (8) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.

On March 21, 2018, plaintiff personally handed to Stokke the Agreement which plaintiff had signed and dated "3/21/18."At that time, Stokke was unaware that plaintiff had filed the complaint.Plaintiff and Stokke did not discuss the substance of the Agreement and no threats were ever made to plaintiff if he chose not to sign it.

Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims on the ground plaintiff had signed the Agreement and thereby agreed to submit any claims arising from his employment to binding arbitration.

Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to compel arbitration in which he argued the claims in his complaint were not subject to the Agreement because plaintiff filed the complaint before he signed the Agreement.He argued it is "well-settled in California that legal claims embodied in a lawsuit which is filed before the Plaintiff signs an arbitration agreement cannot be subject to arbitration unless the agreement expressly covers a pre-existing lawsuit" and "Plaintiff filed a valid lawsuit in California Superior Court before signing an agreement to arbitrate."²

The trial court denied the motion to compel, stating its reasoning in a minute order as follows: "Defendants move to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement (‘Agreement’) executed by Plaintiff a few days after he had filed this action.[Citation.]However, the claims at issue had accrued before the Agreement was signed.( Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc.(2013)218 Cal.App.4th 50, 62[159 Cal.Rptr.3d 444][the ‘critical point in time is when the claims accrued’—i.e. when the conduct at issue occurred].)Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff had either agreed in advance to arbitrate those claims, or that he gave express consent in the Agreement that it would have retroactive application.Arbitration thus cannot be compelled here.(SeeCobb v. Ironwood Country Club(2015)233 Cal.App.4th 960, 966-968[183 Cal.Rptr.3d 282], andAvery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc.[2013]218 Cal.App.4th [50], 61-62[159 Cal.Rptr.3d 444].)"

Plaintiff appealed.( Code of Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a).)

DISCUSSION

I.Governing Legal Principles and Standard of Review

"Both the California Arbitration Act( Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq. ) and the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act]( 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ) recognize ‘ " ‘arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution’ " and are intended " ‘to encourage persons who wish to avoid delays incident to a civil action to obtain an adjustment of their differences by a tribunal of their own choosing.’ "[Citation.]’[Citations.]The fundamental policy underlying both acts ‘is to ensure that arbitration agreements will be enforced in accordance with their terms. ’[¶] Arbitration is therefore a matter of contract."( Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc., supra , 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 59, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 444( Avery ).)

General contract law principles include that "[t]he basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties' mutual intent at the time of contracting.[Citations.]... ‘The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense.’ "( Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc.(2003)109 Cal.App.4th 944, 955, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505.)Furthermore, " ‘[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to...