Frank C. Minvielle v. Imc Global Operations

Decision Date19 October 2004
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A.03-1908.,CIV.A.03-1908.
Citation380 F.Supp.2d 755
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
PartiesFRANK C. MINVIELLE, L.L.C. v. IMC GLOBAL OPERATIONS, INC. Transok Inc. Encana Midstream, Inc. Estis Well Service, L.L.C.

Patricia E. Weeks, Weeks & Gonzalez, New Orleans, LA, Donald T. Carmouche, Talbot Carmouche et al. (Gonzales), John H. Carmouche, Talbot Carmouche et al (Gonzales), Gonzales, LA, John P. Gonzalez, Weeks & Gonzalez, New Orleans, LA, Robert C. Vines, New Iberia, LA, Victor L. Marcello, Talbot Carmouche et al. (Gonzales), Gonzales, LA, for Plaintiff.

Carl D. Rosenblum, R. Kevin Hamilton, Eric M. Whitaker, New Orleans, LA, Jeffrey M. Baudier, Jones Walker et al., Lafayette, LA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION — RULING ON MOTIONS

METHVIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the court are a number of motions to dismiss filed by defendant IMC Global Operations, Inc. ("IMC").1 Plaintiff, Frank C. Minvielle, L.L.C. filed an opposition and IMC filed a reply.2 Plaintiff submitted additional affidavits and defendant filed a motion to strike a portion of the affidavits.3 Oral argument was held on July 22, 2004.4

Procedural Background

Plaintiff, a limited liability company, filed suit on August 27, 2003, in the 16th Judicial District Court alleging that it owns real property and oil and gas leases in Iberia Parish, Louisiana, which have been "contaminated or otherwise damaged by defendants' oil and gas exploration and production activities."5 Plaintiff named as defendants IMC, Encana Midstream, Inc., Estis Well Service, L.L.C., and Transok, Inc. The case was removed to federal on October 15, 2003 pursuant to diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Only one defendant remains in the case at this juncture: IMC.6

Factual Background

The record shows as follows: On September 28, 1961, Juliet Bourgeois Delcambre, a previous owner of the land at issue, entered into an Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease (hereinafter referred to as the "1961 lease") with The Atlantic Refining Company ("ARCO") for the purposes of exploring and possibly drilling for oil on the property.7 ARCO subleased the mineral rights to Callery Properties, Inc. on November 26, 1962.8 Callery Properties, Inc., in turn, conveyed its interest in the lease to Petro-Lewis Funds, Inc. on November 26, 1974.9 Petro-Lewis conducted operations on the property and on December 24, 1977 filed a "Plug and Abandon Report" related to the Delcambre # 1 Well (well serial no. 105992).10 Plaintiff alleges that Petro-Lewis breached the contract and contaminated the property during its operations. IMC is the successor of Petro-Lewis.

Plaintiff's predecessor, Minvielle & Segura, L.L.C. purchased the land in 1998 by Act of Cash Sale.11 On November 30, 2001, Frank C. Minvielle acquired all ownership of Minvielle & Segura, L.L.C., and shortly thereafter changed its name to Frank C. Minvielle, L.L.C., plaintiff in this action.12

Motions Presented

IMC filed the following motions:

(A) Rule 12(b)(1) Motion Requesting Deference to the Primary Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Louisiana Office of Conservation ("LOC") and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ");

(B) Rule 12(b)(1) and/or 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss premature claims;

(C) Rule 12(e) motion for more definite statement;

(D) Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue;

(E) Motion for compliance with Rule 20 and 21 regarding improper joinder;

(F) Rule 12(b)(7) motion dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties;

(G) Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for lack of standing, nonrecoverable damages, and prescription.13

On June 2, 2004, the 12(b)(6) motions (Paragraph (G) above) were converted to motions for summary judgment since their disposition required reference to documents outside of the complaint. The parties were allowed ten days to submit additional information to be considered in connection with the motion for summary judgment.14 On June 14, 2004, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Frank Minvielle, owner of plaintiff Frank C. Minvielle, L.L.C. Plaintiff subsequently filed the affidavits of Juliet and Finis Cowan, regarding the previous owners' knowledge of the condition of the land at issue.15 Defendant filed a motion to strike the affidavits, maintaining that portions of the affidavits were not based on the personal knowledge of the affiants.16 Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to strike and the parties filed supplemental briefs regarding prescription and indispensable parties.17

Analysis

The district court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, must apply the substantive law of Louisiana, while employing Federal procedural rules. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). In the absence of a valid Federal Civil Rule addressing the point, the court must determine whether a particular rule is procedural or substantive by considering the "twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965).

(A) Rule 12(b)(1) motion for deference to the primary concurrent jurisdiction

Plaintiff seeks damages for IMC's disposal, discharge, and storage of highly toxic chemicals into plaintiff's property. Plaintiff also seeks funds to conduct a scientific analysis of the extent and nature of the contamination, the costs to restore the property, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. IMC argues that all of the claims are subject to the primary concurrent jurisdiction of the Louisiana Office of Conservation ("LOC") and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ"), and that this court should allow those agencies to address the environmental remediation issues prior to judicial consideration of liability and damage issues.

Louisiana Revised Statute 30:1(D) provides that the LOC has jurisdiction over claims regarding: "the disposal of any waste product into the subsurface by means of a disposal well and the regulation of all surface and storage waste facilities incidental to oil and gas exploration and production, shall be within the jurisdiction of the department." The LOC also has jurisdiction over issues regarding surface and storage waste facilities incidental to oil and gas exploration and production and abandoned oil and gas wells. La. R.S. 30:4(C). The DEQ has jurisdiction over remedial action plans and has set forth a process by which remediation plans are approved and enforceable. La.R.S. 30:2286.1.

Under Louisiana law, the deference to the commissioner for an initial decision on matters within the expertise of the LOC, which is contemplated by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So.2d 475, 489 (La.1991). The two major considerations underlying the doctrine are the need for uniformity in various areas of regulated industry, and the special administrative expertise attributable to agencies due to their intimate working associations with industries they regulate. South-West Utilities v. S. Cent. Bell Tel., 339 So.2d 425 (1976). Louisiana's doctrine of primary jurisdiction is substantive and it requires the federal courts to exercise discretion as if it were a Louisiana state court. Mills v. Davis Oil Co., 11 F.3d 1298, 1304-1304 (5th Cir.1994).

Landowners in Louisiana have no duty to seek relief from an administrative agency before filing suit against an oil company. Corbello v. Iowa Production, 850 So.2d 686 (La.2003). Plaintiff's action for damage to its property is a matter of private law. Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So.2d 475, 483 (La.1991). In Magnolia Coal, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a trial court's decision, in deciding a remediation issue, refusing to defer to the Commissioner of Conservation as a matter of primary jurisdiction. The court stated that "damages from soil pollution are within the conventional knowledge and expertise of a trier of fact and the court of appeal erred in deciding that the plaintiff's damages cannot be fixed until the commissioner of conservation holds a new hearing." Magnolia Coal, 576 So.2d at 484.

Considering the applicable law, and the fact that plaintiff opposes it, the court concludes that preliminary submission of the claims to the LOC and DEQ is not necessary. Accordingly, the Rule 12(b)(1) motion for deference to the primary concurrent jurisdiction of the LOC and DEQ is DENIED.

(B) and (C): Motion to dismiss premature claims, or for more definite statement

1. Prematurity involving LOC and DEQ

IMC argues that plaintiff's claims are premature because plaintiff has not sought review with the LOC or DEQ, and therefore has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies. As discussed above, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not necessary. As discussed in Corbello, supra, landowners have no duty to seek relief from an administrative agency before filing suit against an oil company.

IMC asserts that claims under the Conservation Act for contamination of "usable ground water" must be made with the LOC and DEQ, pursuant to La. R.S. 30:1 and 30:2015.1 (requiring notification of DEQ in certain cases). Those statutes are inapplicable. Plaintiff has specifically stated that it does not seek redress for public issues, but instead has limited its claims to private causes of action. Louisiana Revised Statute 30:1 requires exhaustion prior to judicial review for claims by "a person aggrieved" by a law, rule, regulation or order made by the assistant secretary of the office of conservation. Plaintiff has not asserted that it has been aggrieved by an order of the LOC or DEQ, and is therefore not limited to a claim under La. R.S. 30:1.18

Nor is La.R.S. 30:14 applicable. The latter statute authorizes the...

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