Frank v. Herold

• Decision Date: 03 June 1901
• Citation: 52 A. 152,68 N.J.E. 443
• Parties: FRANK et al. v. HEROLD et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

52 A. 152

68 N.J.E. 443

FRANK et al.

v. HEROLD et al.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

June 3, 1901.

Bill for an injunction by Frank & Dugan against Clemens Herold and others. Motion to modify restraining order denied.

The bill in this cause was filed on the 18th of April, 1901, by the complainants, Frank & Dugan, against upwards of 80 defendants, and to it were annexed numerous affidavits charging that the defendants were conspiring and acting together and separately to prevent certain operatives of the complainants from continuing to work for them. On presentation of the bill and affidavits to a vice chancellor, an order was made, returnable on May 20th, commanding the defendants named to show cause why an injunction should not issue in accordance with the prayer of the bill, and in the meantime restraining them from doing a variety of things specified, which tended, as was alleged, to prevent the operatives of the complainants from continuing in their employ. On the 1st of May, and before the return of the previous order, numerous affidavits were presented to the vice chancellor tending to show that certain of the defendants named in the bill had disobeyed the order of the 18th of April; and on that day—May 1st—an order was made, calling on 23 of the defendants to show cause on the 20th of May, which was the return day of the original order, why they should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of the court, and punished therefor. On or before May 20th the hearing on both these orders was adjourned by written consent until the 3d of June. On June 3d the complainants, by their counsel, and the defendants, by their counsel, appeared before the court at the chancery chambers in Jersey City, and a motion was made by the counsel of complainants for the issuing of an injunction in accordance with the prayer of the bill, and for an adjudication of contempt against the defendants who were charged in the affidavits with disobedience of the interim restraint That motion was resisted by the counsel of the defendants, and a counter motion made to modify the restraining order in several particulars. The restraining language of the order is as follows: "Be and are hereby restrained, and each and every of them, from collecting and attempting to collect in crowds in the street at or near said complainants' premises, consisting of two silk mills,—one in Market street, at the foot of Jersey street, in Paterson, N. J., and the other on Railroad avenue, between Grand and Ward streets, and the mill of complainants known as the 'Greater Barnert Mill,' being in the rear thereof, and fronting on Dale avenue, in said city of Paterson, N. J.,—and from entering or attempting to enter complainants' said premises, and from following in the street for the purpose of annoying or intimidating any person employed by complainants, and from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the free passage of such employe or employes of complainants in going to and from complainants* premises, from in any wise threatening or using any coercive language or coercion whatever in order to induce any employe of complainants not to work for complainants, or in any wise to interfere with or annoying by acts or words such employe of complainants against his will, and from in any manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing, or stopping any of the business of complainants or their agents, servants, or employes in the operation of their said plants at Paterson, N. J., and from entering their grounds and premises for the purpose of interfering with, hindering, or obstructing their business, from compelling, inducing, or attempting to compel or Induce by threats, Intimidation, annoying language, or acts of force or violence, any of the employes of complainants to refuse to or fail to perform their duties as such employes, or from compelling or inducing or attempting to compel or Induce by threats, intimidation, annoying language or acts, force or violence, any of the employes of complainants to leave the service of complainants, and from preventing or attempting to prevent any person or persons by threats, Intimidation, annoying language or acts, force or violence, from entering the service of complainants, and from using money of the said association or other money in furtherance of the purpose of preventing further employes of complainants from returning to their work, and paying money to such employes to induce them to leave, and from doing any act whatever in furtherance of any conspiracy or combination to restrain complainants or its agents or employes in the free and unhindered control of its business, and from ordering, directing, aiding, assisting, or abetting in any manner any person to commit any or either of the acts aforesaid, and from congregating at or near the said premises of complainants for the purpose of intimidating complainants' employes or from preventing them from rendering their service to complainants, and from inducing or coercing by threats, annoying language or acts, said employes to leave their employment, and from in any manner interfering with complainants in carrying on their business in its usual and ordinary way, and from in any manner interfering with or molesting any person or persons who may be employed by complainants in the operation of its plants, and from collecting either singly or in combination with others in and about the approaches to complainants' said plants for the purposes of picketing or patroling or guarding the streets, avenues, gates, and approaches to complainants' said property for the purpose of intimidating, threatening, or coercing any of the employes of complainants in going to and from their work and the said plants of complainants, and from congregating at or about any places at said Paterson for the purpose of intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person or persons seeking employment of complainants, and from going either singly or collectively to the homes of complainants' employes, or any of them, for the purpose of intimidating or coercing any or all of them to leave the employ of complainants, or from entering complainants' employment, or from intimidating or in any manner threatening the wives and families of said employes at their said homes, and from conspiring in meetings or otherwise conspiring together by threats or other unlawful coercion to induce or coerce any of the employes of complainants to leave the service of said complainants, or prevent any person by threats, intimidation, force, or violence from entering the service of complainants."

John W. Harding, for complainants.

James G. Blauvelt and William Hughes, for defendants.

PITNEY, V. C. (orally, after hearing Mr. Blauvelt and Mr. Hughes): I do not care to hear you, Mr. Harding. I have had occasion to consider the questions raised by the counsel of defendants, and will state roughly and briefly my views. The counsel for the defendants complain that the restraining order is very broad and sweeping in its language. I so perceived when I read it before advising it, and yet, notwithstanding, advised it. In fact, so far as the court is concerned, it was intentionally broad and sweeping. There may be one or two words used which reach a little farther than I thought they did at the time; and if, upon further consideration, I should so conclude, I will give the counsel for the defendants the benefit of such conclusion on the hearing of the motion to adjudge their clients guilty of contempt; but at present I will content myself with giving my views of the rule which should govern in a case of this kind. Now, in the first place, the defendants rely upon the act of February 14, 1883 (P. L. p. 36), which is in these words: "That it shall not be unlawful for any two or more persons to unite, combine or bind themselves by oath, covenant, agreement, alliance or otherwise, to persuade, advise or encourage, by peaceable means, any person or persons to enter into any combination for or against leaving or entering into the employment of any person, persons or corporation." And they point to an opinion of Vice Chancellor Green in Mayer v. Association, 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492, where, at page 531, 47 N. J. Eq., page 496, 20 Atl., that learned judge treats that act as having changed the common law of the land. It is perceived at once that the only thing...