Frank v. P N K (Lake Charles) L. L.C.

• Decision Date: 21 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-31060,18-31060
• Citation: 947 F.3d 331
• Parties: Maria Steffan FRANK, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Betty Steffan; David Bruce Steffan; Thomas J. Steffan; Cynthia D. Gum; Robert M. Steffan; David B. Steffan, Jr.; Richard L. Steffan; Suzanne L. Kelley, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. P N K (LAKE CHARLES) L.L.C., erroneously named as Pinnacle Entertainment Incorporated, doing business as L'Auberge du Lac Hotel; Casino, Defendant - Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

947 F.3d 331

Maria Steffan FRANK, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Betty Steffan; David Bruce Steffan; Thomas J. Steffan; Cynthia D. Gum; Robert M. Steffan; David B. Steffan, Jr.; Richard L. Steffan; Suzanne L. Kelley, Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.P N K (LAKE CHARLES) L.L.C., erroneously named as Pinnacle Entertainment Incorporated, doing business as L'Auberge du Lac Hotel; Casino, Defendant - Appellee

No. 18-31060

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED January 21, 2020

William P. Gibbens, Esq., Ian Lewis Atkinson, Esq., Attorney, Jacob Kennedy Weixler, Schonekas, Evans, McGoey & McEachin, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, Chip Brandon Lewis, Law Office of Chip B. Lewis, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant Maria Steffan Frank, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Betty Steffan.

William P. Gibbens, Esq., Ian Lewis Atkinson, Esq., Attorney, Schonekas, Evans, McGoey & McEachin, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, Chip Brandon Lewis, Law Office of Chip B. Lewis, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellants David Bruce Steffan, Thomas J. Steffan, Cynthia D. Gum, Robert M. Steffan, David B. Steffan, Jr., Richard L. Steffan, Suzanne L. Kelley.

Philip Andre Fontenot, Sr., Hallie P. Coreil, Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier, McElligott, Fontenot, Gideon & Edwards, Lafayette, LA, Zachary Thomas Mayer, Attorney, Mayer L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Andrew J. Mihalick, Mayer, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellants, Maria Steffan Frank, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Betty Steffan, David Bruce Steffan, Thomas J. Steffan, Cynthia D. Gum, Robert M. Steffan, David B. Steffan, Jr., Richard L. Steffan, and Suzanne L. Kelley (collectively referred to as "Appellants") initiated this wrongful death action against Defendant-Appellee PNK (Lake Charles) LLC ("PNK") alleging, inter alia , claims for negligence, premises liability, and breach of warranty. Appellants originally filed a state action in Harris County, Texas. The case was subsequently removed and transferred to the presiding court for lack of personal jurisdiction. Shortly after the case’s transfer, the district court dismissed Appellants’ claims for being time-barred. Appellants appeal the judgment and the related order transferring this action to the Western District of Louisiana. In view of Supreme Court precedent illuminating the personal jurisdiction standard, we AFFIRM.

I.

In 2015, Betty Steffan fell off a swivel chair in the L’Auberge du Lac Hotel & Casino in Lake Charles, Louisiana ("L’Auberge"). When the 86-year-old Texas native fell from the stool, her head struck the casino’s floor causing a subdural hematoma which led to her death the following day.

The PNK’s Texas contacts below are outlined in Appellants’ complaint and exhibits attached to Appellants’ response to PNK’s motion to dismiss or transfer.¹

While PNK’s and L’Auberge’s business operations are domiciled in Louisiana² , L’Auberge draws a large portion of its revenue from Texas patrons. Located 135 miles from Texas’s largest city, Houston, L’Auberge has long been an attractive venue to Texans since the multimillion-dollar complex was built in 2005.

PNK’s marketing plan also evinces its intention to promote L’Auberge to Texas residents. PNK sent marketing teams to Texas and conducted focus groups to learn what would attract Texan customers. It advertises in the Houston area, via mailers, the internet, billboards, television commercials, and radio ads. It also subsidizes charter bus services to shuttle Texas patrons across state lines. The bus schedule is advertised on the L’Auberge website. In her affidavit, Maria Steffan Frank stated that she (along with other members of the estate) had received mail advertisements and seen billboards while living in Texas. Despite its various Texas solicitations vis-à-vis L’Auberge, PNK’s Texas contacts solely stem from these marketing activities, with the exception of the charter services.

PNK is not registered to do business in Texas. It does not own or have any offices, personal property, real property (including rental property), bank accounts, employees³ , or agents for service of process in Texas.

II.

Claiming that L’Auberge provided unsafe facilities and failed to provide Betty Steffan with proper aid following her fall, Appellants initially filed the wrongful death complaint in a Texas state court in Harris County.⁴ PNK removed the matter to the Southern District of Texas (Houston Division) and filed a concurrent motion to transfer or dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In a one-page order, the district court granted PNK’s motion to transfer because PNK’s advertising (1) was promoted nationally and did not "establish systematic and continuous contacts with Texas that confer general jurisdiction"; and (2) did not relate to Appellants’ injuries to confer specific jurisdiction. The court transferred the case to the Western District of Louisiana.

Before the presiding district court, PNK moved for summary judgment due to Appellants’ claims being time-barred by Louisiana’s 1-year prescription under Civil Code article 3492. Appellants did not dispute this assertion. Consequently, PNK’s motion was granted because this action was filed outside of the prescription period.⁵

Appellants appeal, seeking to undo the Louisiana final judgment by reversing the Southern District of Texas transfer order. The parties assume the venue affects the case’s outcome as Texas provides for a 2-year limitations period for personal injury actions.⁶ See TEX. STAT. § 16.003. Appellants’ position is that the Texas court erred in not exercising personal jurisdiction over PNK because a non-resident company, like PNK, may be subjected to general jurisdiction for its targeted advertising in the forum state.

III.

"We review de novo a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction." Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co. , 234 F.3d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

"There is personal jurisdiction if the state’s long-arm statute extends to the defendant and exercise of such jurisdiction is consistent with due process." Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Private Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp. , 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008) ). "The Texas long-arm statute’s broad doing business language authorizes personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will allow." Zinc Nacional, S.A. v. Bouche Trucking, Inc. , 308 S.W.3d 395, 397 (Tex. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The plaintiff "bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction but is required to present only prima facie evidence." Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc. , 472 F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). To determine whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the court can consider the "assertions in the plaintiff’s complaint," as well as " ‘the contents of the record at the time of the motion ....’ " Sangha , 882 F.3d at 101 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc. , 445 F.3d 809, 812 (5th Cir. 2006) ).

A.

General Jurisdiction and the Present Framework for Being "Essentially At Home"

" ‘Minimum contacts’ can be established either through contacts sufficient to assert specific jurisdiction, or contacts sufficient to assert general jurisdiction."⁷ Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB , 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). General jurisdiction⁸ exists over a non-resident defendant when its "affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations , S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) (citation omitted).

There are very few cases where the Supreme Court addresses the scope of general jurisdiction related to corporations. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company , 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952) "remains the ‘textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum.’ " Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 928, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp. , 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ). This is the only Supreme Court case where general jurisdiction was appropriately exercised against a corporation, and since Perkins , it has become "incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business." Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter , 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court (twice) discussed general jurisdiction and stated that, in order to properly exercise general jurisdiction, a defendant-company must be "at home" in the forum state. Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846 ; Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 122, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014).⁹ In reversing the state appellate court’s decision to exercise personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court stated that "[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home." Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 924, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (citing Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction , 66 TEXAS L. REV. 721, 728 (1988) ). In turn, generally, a corporation’s "home" falls in two paradigmatic places: (1) the state of incorporation and (2) the state where it has its principal place of business. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558, 198 L.Ed.2d 36 (2017) ("The paradigm forums in which a corporate defendant is at home ... are the corporation’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). These two places "have...