Franklin Bien v. Beverly Robinson

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: White
• Citation: Franklin Bien v. Beverly Robinson, 208 U.S. 423, 28 S.Ct. 379, 52 L.Ed. 556 (1908)
• Decision Date: 24 February 1908
• Docket Number: No. 135,135
• Parties: FRANKLIN BIEN, Piff. in Err., v. BEVERLY R. ROBINSON, Receiver of the Property and Assets of the Haight & Freese Company

208 U.S. 423

28 S.Ct. 379

52 L.Ed. 556

FRANKLIN BIEN, Piff. in Err.,

v BEVERLY R. ROBINSON, Receiver of the Property and Assets of the Haight & Freese Company.

No. 135.

Submitted January 27, 1908.

Decided February 24, 1908.

Mr. Albert I. Sire for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Roger Foster, G. Thomas Dunlop, and Frederick J. Moses for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

By a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, James D. Colt was appointed receiver of the property and assets of the Haight & Freese Company, a New York corporation, then ostensibly engaged in business as stock brokers in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and other cities. Subsequently, and on May 9, 1905, in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, upon a bill filed on behalf of one Ridgway Bowker against the said Haight & Freese Company and others, Colt and one Edmonds were appointed temporary receivers of the same corporation, 'both original and as ancillary to said decree of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.' The order appointing receivers also contained a clause enjoining the defendants, various other named persons and corporations, and all persons and corporations generally, from paying over or transferring any of the money, property, effects, or assets of the corporation to any person other than the receivers. On the same day that the receivers were appointed, but before the filing of the bill of complaint, an officer of the Haight & Freese Company gave to Franklin Bien, an attorney at law, a check drawn on the Colonial Bank of the city of New York, in which were on deposit funds of the company, and later in the day Mr. Bien learned of the appointment of the receivers and the terms of the order. The check was certified on the following day, was then indorsed by Bien, and collected through a third party. In June following, upon the petition of the receivers, a rule was issued requiring Mr. Bien to show cause why an order should not be made requiring him to pay to the receivers the money thus collected on the check, with interest. The application was heard upon affidavits, and an order was issued by the circuit judge requiring Mr. Bien to pay the money to the receivers, with interest, within ten days after the service of the order. Bien thereupon sued out this writ of error. In addition to allowing the writ of error the circuit judge certified that the application was made 'upon the ground that this [circuit] court had no jurisdiction to make the order, as in said petition for appeal and assignment of errors appears,' and it was further certified 'that the question of jurisdiction was involved in making the order of May 29, 1906.'

The alleged errors assigned are, in substance, that the court below had not jurisdiction over the plaintiff in error or the subject-matter of the proceedings (1) because the plaintiff in error was not an officer of the Haight & Freese Company; (2) because the check was received prior to the filing of the bill of complaint and the appointment of receivers; and (3) because the right of the receivers to the fund could not be determined in a summary proceeding, but could only be adjudged in an action at law to recover the proceeds of the check.

It was also assigned as error that the plaintiff in error was deprived of a jury trial, contrary to his rights under the Constitution of the United States, and that the circuit court had refused and denied his application 'to compel the defendant in error to bring any action he may be advised for the recovery of the said sum of $2,000,' which denial operated to 'deprive the plaintiff in error of his property without due process of law as provided for by the Constitution and laws of the United States.'

In the brief of counsel it is further urged that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to appoint the receivers, the contention being that the case presented by the bill was not one cognizable in a court of equity, but that the remedy of the complainant was in an action at law.

The case will be disposed of by our ruling upon a motion which has been made to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction in this court over the same.

The writ of error was applied for and allowed upon...