Franklin Cent. Gay/Str. Alliance v. Franklin Township Comm. School, Cause No. IP01-1518-C-M/S (S.D. Ind. 12/26/2002), Cause No. IP01-1518-C-M/S.
| Decision Date | 26 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. IP01-1518-C-M/S. |
| Parties | FRANKLIN CENTRAL GAY/STRAIGHT ALLIANCE, AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION, OBERMEYER, AMY, Plaintiffs, v. FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION, KOERS, KEVIN IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRINCIPAL OF FRANKLIN CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This matter comes before the Court on a motion to reconsider, brought by the Defendants, the Franklin Township Community School Corporation and Principal Kevin Koers ("Koers") of Franklin Central High School (collectively referred to as "FCHS"). On October 1, 2001, the Plaintiffs, Amy Obermeyer ("A. Obermeyer") and the Gay/Straight Alliance (collectively referred to as the "GSA"), filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in this Court, seeking to compel FCHS to recognize the GSA's existence as a school club, entitled to meet on the same basis as other school clubs during the school day. The GSA argued that the FCHS's refusal to recognize it as an official student club violated the group's free speech and free association rights, as well as the specific requirements of the Equal Access Act ("EAA").
In March, 2002, the GSA filed a motion for summary judgment. FCHS responded with its own cross-motion for summary judgment. On August 29, 2002, this Court entered judgment in favor of the GSA, finding that FCHS's denial of recognition to the GSA constituted a violation of the EAA.
The Court ordered FCHS "to immediately instate the GSA as an offical school club for the coming school year, 2002-2003, with all the rights and privileges of any other officially approved club. . . ."
FCHS now points out that A. Obermeyer graduated on May 30, 2002, so that she no longer has an interest in forming a GSA club. FCHS further argues: "it does not appear that the GSA currently exists independent of her involvement." D. Brief at 2. Therefore, FCHS now requests this Court to declare its original Order "moot."
For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that its prior order has not been made moot by A. Obermeyer's graduation. As a result, the Court DENIES FCHS's motion to reconsider.
Motions to reconsider serve a limited function, to be used "where `the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension[.]'" Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.Va. 1983)). Accord Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996); Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1040 (1996). The parties may not introduce evidence previously available but unused in the prior proceeding or tender new legal theories. See Caisse
Nationale de Credit Agricole, 90 F.3d at 1269; Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d at 324; Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1986). However, new evidence that was unavailable prior to a hearing on the previous motion may be considered. See Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d at 324; Bally Export, 804 F.3d at 404; Publishers Resource, Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1985).
The Court recognizes that, given the timing of its decision to grant injunctive relief to the GSA, that decision did not have any practical impact upon the rights of A. Obermeyer. By the time she would have been affected by the decision, she had already graduated. See Stotts v. Community Unit School District No. 1, 230 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, if A. Obermeyer had been the only plaintiff in this case, the Court might have found FCHS's argument persuasive that there was no longer a live controversy by the time of the Court's Order. Id. There is an exception to the mootness doctrine for cases "capable of repetition yet evading review," but it is doubtful that A. Obermeyer's personal claim would meet the requirements for this exception. Murphy, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982).
However, A. Obermeyer was not the only plaintiff in this case. Therefore, as FCHS rightly understands, its argument cannot succeed unless FCHS can further demonstrate that the GSA did not properly belong in this lawsuit.
To that end, FCHS argues that the GSA (a) did not really exist and (b) did not have standing to sue at the time this Court handed down its Order on August 29, 2002. Thus, FCHS appears to be raising a mixed question of fact and law. Did GSA actually exist? And, if so, was GSA the type of organization that has the legal standing necessary to sue FCHS?
Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an "unincorporated association, which has no capacity by the law of [any] state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States." This rule was invoked by the GSA at the time that it sued.
But, FCHS challenges the applicability of this Rule on two fronts. First, FCHS points out that:
"[r]ule 17(b) is directed to the capacity to sue or be sued of a pre-existing legal entity, not to whether that entity exists in the first place." Defendants' Motion to Reconsider and Suggestion of Mootness ( ) at 6. Second, FCHS cites an old Indiana Appellate Court case for the proposition that, according to Indiana law, a group such as GSA, even if it does exist, would not be permitted to bring suit "in the absence of an enabling statute defining the rights and liabilities of the members." All Members of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Building Trades Council of Madison County v. Yost Construction Co., Inc., 246 N.E.2d 771, 773 (Ind.App. 1969).
It is doubtful that this case is still good law. As the GSA pointed out in its own brief, Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Reconsider and Suggestion of Mootness ( ) at 4, the Indiana Supreme Court has more recently defined an unincorporated association as "a voluntary group of persons which, without a charter, was formed by mutual consent for the purpose of promoting a common enterprise or prosecuting a common objective." Hanson v. St. Luke's United Methodist Church, 704 N.E.2d 1020, 1022 n. 5 (Ind. 1998). GSA, if it exists, was clearly formed for the purpose of pursuing a common objective. And, according to Indiana law, an unincorporated association may bring a declaratory judgment action and may sue or be sued in its common name. Ind. Code §§ 34-14-1-1, 34-14-1-13; Ind. Trial Rule 17(B), (E).
Moreover, even if there were a question of law here, that question existed at the time of this Court's original consideration of the parties' arguments. FCHS cannot raise this question for the first time, now, during a motion to reconsider. Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996).
As for the factual question, FCHS makes two arguments. First, FCHS argues that the GSA is "nothing more than a simple list that [A.] Obermeyer wrote down on a piece of paper of `her supporters.'" D. Brief at 10. Second, FCHS argues that "[t]he most eloquent evidence that the GSA was nothing more than [A.] Obermeyer's alter ego, lacking separate legal existence, is the fact that" GSA did not fill out a club form for the school year 2002-2003, after A. Obermeyer graduated.
Just as with FCHS's...
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