Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Bradford
| Decision Date | 08 November 1901 |
| Docket Number | 28 |
| Citation | 201 Pa. 32,50 A. 286 |
| Parties | Franklin Fire Insurance Company, Appellant, v. Bradford |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued October 21, 1901
Appeal, No. 28, Oct T., 1901, by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. Beaver Co., March T., 1897, No. 223, on verdict for defendant in case of Franklin Fire Insurance Company v Thomas Bradford. Reversed.
Trespass by principal against agent for negligence. Before WILSON P.J.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
The court gave binding instructions for defendant.
Error assigned was the charge of the court.
The judgment is reversed and venire facias de novo awarded.
Winfield S. Moore and Henry Hice, with them Alfred S. Moore and Agnew Hice, for appellants. -- There was nothing apparent in Hoyt's conduct that was not in accord with the authority and powers with which Bradford had clothed him, as indicated by the latter's treatment of him, and his recognition of his acts. The policy thus delivered by Hoyt was binding upon the company: Swan v. Watertown Fire Ins. Co., 96 Pa. 41, 42; McGonigle v. Susquehanna Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 168 Pa. 1; Bodine v. Exchange Fire Ins. Co., 51 N.Y. 117; Massachusetts Life Insurance Co. v. Eshelman, 30 Ohio 647, 657; Clark v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., Supreme Court N.Y., 21 Weekly Digest, 197.
The plaintiff in this case did no act, and was guilty of no negligence, that in any way contributed to the perpetration of the wrongful act.
The principal is responsible, not only for the negligent, but also for the tortious, or fraudulent acts of the agent or employee: Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468; Warren-Scharf Asphalt Paving Co. v. Commercial National Bank, 97 Fed. Repr. 181; Bank of Palo Alto v. Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co., 103 Fed. Repr. 841.
William A. McConnel, with him John M. Buchanan, for appellee. -- The principal is civilly responsible for some, but not for all, acts of his agent. This responsibility extends to the tortious acts of the agent, but only where they are committed for the principal's purposes and by his authority, either actual or apparent, or where he ratifies them, or accepts and retains some benefit from them: Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Bradford, 102 Fed. Repr. 48; Flower v. Penna. R.R. Co., 69 Pa. 210; Towanda Coal Co. v. Heeman, 86 Pa. 418; Brunner v. American Telegraph & Telephone Co., 151 Pa. 447; Hower v. Ulrich, 156 Pa. 412.
The fact that Hoyt was employed to do clerical work, receive premuims, deposit money and deliver policies and sometimes solicit insurance, did not apparently give him authority to, by forging Mr. Bradford's name to this instrument, bind either Mr. Bradford or the company.
Before McCOLLUM, C.J., MITCHELL, DEAN, FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT and POTTER, JJ.
The defendant, Thomas Bradford, was a duly appointed agent of the Franklin Fire Insurance Company at New Brighton, Pennsylvania, with authority to effect insurance, countersign, issue and renew policies signed by the president and attested by the secretary at the office of the company in Philadelphia, to fix premium rates, receive money, and in general, to attend to all the business of the company at New Brighton and the neighboring region; subject, however, to the rules, regulations of and such instructions as might, from time to time, be given him by the general officers of the company. The appointment was made in 1887, and Bradford continued to act under it until January 1, 1897. By their terms, policies had no force until countersigned by Bradford, the local agent. During his agency Bradford employed a subagent, one Hoyt, who was given by him general charge of Bradford's insurance business, and had access to all documents and blank policies, and was an occupant of his office in New Brighton. As such subagent for Bradford, he solicited policies, fixed rates, collected premiums, and filled blanks in policies, made daily reports to the company and signed Bradford's name to them. A short time before July 1, 1896, J. & E. Mayer, owners of a pottery factory at Beaver Falls, wrote to Bradford asking to renew insurance of $15,000, which Bradford had before that taken on their pottery for one year in the Franklin and other companies of which he was also agent, which policies were about to expire. In response to the letter Hoyt went to the place of business of the pottery company and delivered to the company policies aggregating $15,000 to run for one year to take the place of those about to expire; among the renewal policies was one for $2,000 in the Franklin Company, this appellant. The policy was signed by the president and attested by the secretary; it was also countersigned with the name of Thomas Bradford, agent. The total premiums on the whole $15,000 were paid by one check in the sum of $225 drawn by the Mayers and pottery company, and payable to the order of Thomas Bradford; this check was deposited to the general account of Bradford in the National Bank of New Brighton; the amount of premium paid on this policy was $30.00.
On October 21 following, within the year, the pottery was destroyed by fire and the insurance company had to pay its share of the loss, the $2,000 covered by the policy. It will be noticed that the policy was delivered by Hoyt to the insured on July 1, 1896; but before that date the insurance company, through its general state agents had notified Bradford to issue no policies on the pottery, such property not being considered a satisfactory risk. While daily reports of the business had been made to the company by Bradford, no report was made of this risk. Bradford's name had been countersigned on the policy by Hoyt as if Bradford himself had written it, but without express authority from him and without his actual knowledge. We may remark here, that while the evidence shows that there was no express authority to Hoyt by Bradford to sign Bradford's name to the policy there was evidence from which such authority might have been inferred; but this is not material in the view we take of the question. We assume that Hoyt...
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