Franklin v. Austin Inner City Redevelopment Phase I, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 03 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 1:14-CV-176-LY |
| Parties | PAMELA FRANKLIN, PLAINTIFF, v. AUSTIN INNER CITY REDEVELOPMENT - PHASE I, LTD., AUSTIN HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, CITY OF AUSTIN, AND REGINA COPIC, REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT MANAGER FOR THE CITY OF AUSTIN NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT AND AUSTIN HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 1, 2014 (Clerk's Dkt. No. 18); Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 8, 2014 (Clerk's Dkt. No. 20); Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 15, 2014 (Clerk's Dkt. No. 22); Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 22, 2014 (Clerk's Dkt. No. 23); and Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 29, 2014 (Clerk's Dkt. No. 24).
The motions were referred by United States District Judge Lee Yeakel to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation as to the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 72 of theFederal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 1(d) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. After reviewing the parties' pleadings, relevant case law, as well as the entire case file, the undersigned issues the following Report and Recommendation to the District Court.
Plaintiff Pamela Franklin ("Franklin") filed this action on September 25, 2013, naming as defendants Austin Inner City Redevelopment - Phase I, Ltd. ("AICR"), Austin Housing Finance Corporation ("AHFC"), City of Austin ("the City"), and Regina Copic1 ("Copic"), the Real Estate Development Manager for the City's Neighborhood Housing and Community Development Department and AHFC, in her individual capacity (collectively, "Defendants").2 The basis of this lawsuit is straightforward. Franklin contends she has a right to purchase the home in which she lives as a lessee ("the Residence") pursuant to a valid contract with Defendants, entered into in 1998. Defendants counter that the contract was never executed and therefore no purchase option was ever granted.
Franklin moves for summary judgment under 21 U.S.C. § 1983, requesting declaratory judgment that Defendants' refusal to honor the contract is a violation of her due process rights and an order requiring Defendants to specifically perform under the contract.3 Defendants alsomove for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all Plaintiffs' claims. The motions for summary judgment are now ripe for consideration.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only "if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986)). The Court will view the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v. Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Celtic Marine Corp. v. James C. Justice Co., Inc., 760 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2014). The parties may satisfy their respective burdens by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence. Celtic Marine, 760 F.3d at 481 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). Once the non-movant has been given the opportunity to present evidence to create a genuine issue of fact, the court will grant summary judgment if no reasonable juror could find for the non-movant. Boos v. AT&T, Inc., 643 F.3d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 2011).
The following facts are undisputed by the parties.4 In 1990, AHFC5 began acquiring properties in the Blackshear neighborhood in East Austin for the development of an affordable housing single-family subdivision. The City named the program the Scattered Cooperative Infill Program ("SCIP I Program"). The SCIP I Program was instituted to provide home ownership opportunities to low-income families. (Pltf. Ex. 1). AHFC and the City contributed funding to develop the properties into forty-four lots in a subdivision named Heritage Heights. In 1992, AHFC conveyed the subdivision lots to AICR. AICR is a non-profit organization established by AHFC for the ownership of the rental properties in Heritage Heights. (Copic Depo. 14:11-21).
The City originally designed the SCIP I Program with the intent that the families would receive Section 8 certificates that would subsidize the rents up to the fair market rent, thus ensuring payment of the construction costs on the homes over a fifteen-year period. (Pltf. Ex. 4at 42-43). At the end of fifteen years, any family completing fifteen years of continuous tenancy would receive title to the property for $1.00. Id.
Before any homes had been built or leased, the City determined it would be unable to obtain the Section 8 certificates, and so it deleted the provision providing for sale of the homes for $1.00 to any family successfully completing a fifteen-year tenancy. Id. The City proceeded, however, to lease the SCIP I homes to eligible low-income families with the express written representation that the homes would be (Pltf. Ex. 4 at 36). Franklin qualified for the lease program financially. She signed a lease agreement and moved into her home in the Heritage Heights on August 28, 1993, where she continues to reside today.
In 1998, Defendants responded to complaints about "reneging" on the ownership opportunity promised to SCIP I Program tenants by expressly agreeing that all of the original tenants would be given a right of first refusal to purchase their home at a reasonable price, conditioned on the tenant's successful completion of at least fifteen years of tenancy. (Pltf. Ex. 5 at 34-35). On April 9, 1998, Paul Hilgers ("Hilgers"), the director of the City's Housing Department at that time, sent a letter to all original tenants residing in the SCIP I development, including Franklin, informing them as follows:
Our legal department is preparing a separate first right or [sic] refusal option for delivery to all tenants who have leased their home from the beginning. This will allow all original tenants who remain in the property for 15 years to purchase the home at a price to be determined at the end of the 15 year period. You can be assured that no one leasing a SCIP [I] rental will be denied a homeownership opportunity at a reasonable price at the end of the 15 year period.
Defendants subsequently held a tenant meeting for Heritage Heights community, at which they delivered to each original tenant in SCIP I, including Plaintiff Franklin, a lease addendum, signed by an authorized representative of AICR, titled "ADDENDUM TO RESIDENTIAL LEASE AGREEMENT—Right of First Refusal to Purchase Current Residence" ("Lease Addendum"). (Pltf. Ex. 1 at 13-15 "Lease Addendum").
The Lease Addendum provides:
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