Franklin v. Bradshaw

• Decision Date: 19 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 09–3389.,09–3389.
• Parties: Antonio FRANKLIN, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Margaret BRADSHAW, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

695 F.3d 439

Antonio FRANKLIN, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.Margaret BRADSHAW, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 09–3389.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: Nov. 16, 2011.

Decided and Filed: Sept. 19, 2012.

ARGUED:S. Adele Shank, Law Office of S. Adele Shank, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Brenda S. Leikala, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:S. Adele Shank, Law Office of S. Adele Shank, Columbus, Ohio, James P. Fleisher, Bieser, Greer & Landis, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellant. Brenda S. Leikala, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: BOGGS, COLE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

BOGGS, Circuit Judge.

Antonio Franklin, an Ohio death-row prisoner, appeals a district court judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on nine claims. The first claim actually consists of two related, yet distinct, subclaims. Thus, there are ten claims presented on appeal. First, Franklin claims that the trial court erred at the pretrial competency hearing in determining that he was competent. Second, Franklin argues that he was tried while incompetent. Third, Franklin asserts that the trial court erred in not ordering sua sponte a second competency hearing after the start of the trial. Fourth, Franklin claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to request a second competency hearing. Fifth, Franklin asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a continuance after one of his arson experts died before testifying at trial. Sixth, Franklin claims that his execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment because he committed the crimes when he was mentally ill. Seventh and eighth, Franklin asserts that his execution would violate his Equal Protection and Due Process Rights because he committed his crimes when he was mentally ill. Ninth, Franklin asserts that the definition of “reasonable doubt” given in the guilt-phase jury instructions was constitutionally inadequate. Tenth, Franklin argues that the trial court erred in admitting gruesome photographs. We affirm the district court's judgment.

I

A

On April 18, 1997, nineteen-year-old Antonio Franklin killed his grandmother, grandfather, and uncle. Franklin shot his grandmother in the head and beat her in the head, probably with a baseball bat. Franklin beat his uncle in the head with a baseball bat. Franklin beat his grandfather in the back of his head with some object other than a baseball bat. After these attacks, Franklin set the house on fire and left the three to die. His grandmother died of either the gunshot wound or her blunt-force injuries. His grandfather and uncle died of a combination of blunt-impact injuries and smoke inhalation. Franklin fled from this grisly scene in his grandfather's car, taking with him his grandfather's gun and his grandmother's jewelry.

B

Franklin was charged in a 17–count indictment with nine counts of aggravated arson, two counts of aggravated robbery, and six counts of aggravated murder that reflected the two ways that each of the three killings could be classified: prior-calculation-and-design murder and felony murder. A firearm specification was attached to one of the aggravated robberies and two of the aggravated murders—the three crimes committed against Franklin's grandmother. Four death specifications were attached to each aggravated murder: murder for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense (“escaping-detection” specification); murder during commission of aggravated robbery (“aggravated-robbery” specification); murder during commission of aggravated arson (“aggravated-arson” specification); and murder as part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of two or more persons (“mass-murder” specification). Franklin pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and claimed incompetence to stand trial.

The trial court found him competent at a pretrial competency hearing but dismissed two of the aggravated-arson charges. The jury found Franklin guilty of the remaining 15 counts (seven aggravated arsons, two aggravated robberies, and six aggravated murders) and all attached specifications. The jury recommended a sentence of death. Agreeing with the jury, the trial court sentenced Franklin to death and 91 years of imprisonment. The trial court overruled Franklin's motion for a new trial.

On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court merged the escaping-detection aggravator into the aggravated-robbery and aggravated-arson aggravators (“the felony-murder aggravators”), then independently reweighed aggravation and mitigation before determining that death was indeed the appropriate sentence. The court otherwise affirmed. State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 776 N.E.2d 26 (2002), reh'g denied,97 Ohio St.3d 1486, 780 N.E.2d 288 (2002), cert. denied,539 U.S. 905, 123 S.Ct. 2249, 156 L.Ed.2d 115 (2003).

Franklin unsuccessfully sought relief via post-conviction proceedings. ¹ In 2004, Franklin filed a federal habeas corpus petition raising 51 claims. The district court denied the petition and dismissed it with prejudice but granted a COA on the nine claims at issue here: claims 1, 2, 14, 22, 30, 31, 32, 34, and 45 (claim 1 has two subparts). Franklin v. Bradshaw, No. 3:04–cv–187, 2009 WL 649581 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 9, 2009). Franklin timely appealed.

C

Franklin filed his federal petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), whose standards therefore govern. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326–27, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). District court rulings on legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo. Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir.1999). This de novo review does not extend, however, to the state court's conclusions. A federal court may not grant habeas relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication resulted in a decision that: (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state courts. See28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In analyzing whether a state-court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, a federal court may look only to the holdings of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

A state-court decision on the merits is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent only if the reasoning or the result of the decision contradicts that precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002). A federal court may grant habeas relief under the unreasonable-application clause if the state-court decision: (1) identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies it to the facts; or (2) either unreasonably extends or unreasonably refuses to extend a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407–08, 120 S.Ct. 1495. To violate the unreasonable-application clause, the state-court applicationof Supreme Court precedent must have been “objectively unreasonable,” not simply erroneous or incorrect. Id. at 409–11, 120 S.Ct. 1495. State-court factual findings are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

II

Franklin raises four variations on the argument that he was not competent to be tried. First, he asserts that at the pretrial competency hearing, the trial court erred in determining that he was competent (Subclaim 1(a)). Second, he claims that at the actual trial, he was incompetent (Subclaim 1(b)). Third, he argues that the trial court erred in not sua sponte ordering a second competency hearing (Claim 2). Fourth, he claims that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to request a second competency hearing (Claim 14). Each claim is without merit.

A

“A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). The standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; and (2) a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Id. at 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680. The due-process right to a fair trial is violated by a court's failure to hold a proper competency hearing where there is substantial evidence of a defendant's incompetency. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385–86, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). “[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required, but ... even one of these factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). On review, this court must determine whether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial judge, should have doubted the defendant's competency. Williams v. Bordenkircher, 696 F.2d 464, 467 (6th Cir.1983); see also Filiaggi v. Bagley, 445 F.3d 851, 859 (6th Cir.2006).

A state-court determination of competence is a factual finding, to which deference must be paid. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 108–11, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). “[R]egardless of whether we would reach a different conclusion were we reviewing the case de novo, the findings of the state court must be upheld unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Clark v. O'Dea, 257 F.3d 498, 506 (6th Cir.2001) (applyin...